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Abstract 
 
The ability of people to invest effectively in their future is based on their ‘capacity to 
aspire’. Lacking the capacity to aspire can shape aspirations that manifest a deprived 
position. To identify pathways out of poverty, this thesis aims to understand the role 
the social environment plays in forming aspirations. Using data on Ugandan students, 
the three empirical chapters concentrate on the role of gender, peers, and envy, 
respectively. 
First, this thesis examines gender differences in the weight given to economic 
aspirations relative to competing aspirations in the social and educational spheres. 
Differences between boys and girls are found when controlling for socioeconomic 
background. Boys attach more importance to economic independence, while girls 
attach more value to competing aspirations. The chapter concludes that boys and girls 
internalise different aspirations that fit their gender roles. 
Second, the thesis investigates the extent to which the aspirations of 
adolescents are influenced by the aspirations of friends. It zooms in on three pairs of 
competing aspirations and considers the relationship with classmates to elicit 
friendship ties. To identify peer effects in aspirations, friends’ aspirations are 
instrumented with the characteristics of non-overlapping peers. The results reveal two 
positive peer effects, emphasising potential spill-over effects when implementing 
development programmes that aim to lift economic aspirations. 
The thesis ends with a real-effort experiment, examining envy that reduces 
inequality either by stimulating competition or destroying earnings of top performers. 
Disentangling both effects is crucial to understand the costs and benefits of inequality. 
Three treatments are implemented: performance feedback, money burning, and a 
combination of both. Results provide evidence that performance feedback increases 
effort, and the threat of money burning decreases effort, but only when combined with 
feedback. It concludes that social comparison can stimulate, but in the presence of 
destructive behaviour also demotivate people, leading to lower effort.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
1.1.  Problem statement 
 
Aspirations and poverty have a strong relationship. Aspirations shape the ability to 
successfully invest in the future, which is essential for escaping poverty. Appadurai 
(2004) calls this the ‘capacity to aspire’, which revolves around the navigational 
capacity to express aspirations in straightforward goals and outcomes and produce 
clear narratives and pathways in the existing social context that should lead to their 
attainment. For the poor, the navigational capacity is smaller than for the non-poor. 
First, the non-poor have more experience with the relationship between aspirations and 
their outcomes, and second, the non-poor have practised their ability to navigate the 
relationship between aspirations and outcomes more, as they are better able to 
frequently experiment and explore future opportunities. The poor have fewer 
opportunities to experiment, and their experience with pathways that lead to the 
attainment of their aspirations is more limited.  
The consequence of a limited capacity to aspire is that poor people often remain 
poor. They are more likely to have low aspirations, whereas the relatively rich have a 
more fully developed capacity to aspire. The consequences of low aspirations can be 
severe: low aspirations result in low(er) human capital investments and under-
investment in income-generating activities, which in turn manifest the poor’s deprived 
position. For example, aspired income is a positive function of attained income (Knight 
& Gunatilaka, 2012; Stutzer, 2004) while educational aspirations have an impact on 
educational performance (Beaman, Duflo, Pande, & Topalova, 2012; Page, Garboua, 
& Montmarquette, 2007). This rationale implies that poverty is a result of low 
aspirations, and poverty can only be alleviated if the poor change their mindsets. 
However, poverty is not merely a ‘short-coming' of the poor, as Camfield 
(2015) states. Living in extreme poverty has a grave psychological impact on one’s 
cognitive ability and limits the capacity to aspire (Maclay & Marsden, 2013). It means 
that poverty influences decision-making about the future “by changing the decision-
making process itself” (Duflo, 2006, p. 376). Both Duflo (2006) and Mani, 
Mullainathan, Shafir, and Zhao (2013) show that poverty impedes cognitive capacities, 
which make the poor not just rational decision-makers that manage their scarce 
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resources. Together with a lack of resources and access to relevant information, this 
limited cognitive capacity causes the poor to deal with a complex decision-making 
process where they carefully need to trade off their aspirations. Their poverty does not 
allow manoeuvring and exploring future alternatives, and flawed judgement on which 
aspirations to pursue cannot be mitigated (Bertrand, Mullainathan, & Shafir, 2004). 
Moreover, poverty can also lead to aspiration failure, where an individual is not able 
to aspire to one’s full potential (Dalton, Ghosal, & Mani, 2016). Crettaz and Suter 
(2013) demonstrate that eventually, the poor may come to terms with their 
socioeconomic hardship and perpetuate a ‘lower’ status by taking decisions that 
maintain and manifest their deprived social position. In sum, poverty has 
psychological effects which affect effective decision- making, which in turn impacts 
attainment and well-being. This endogenous mechanism is known as an aspiration 
poverty trap. 
Aspirations are not only based on past individual experiences, but also take 
form in the social environment (Genicot & Ray, 2017). This holds especially for 
youngsters that have not yet attained life-determining achievements. The aspirations 
of the poor are not shaped in isolation and, broadly defined, two social mechanisms 
are at play. First, they adopt the aspirations of their social environment, but they may 
not always be beneficial to them. Appadurai (2004) states that the poor may even 
comply with dominant social norms that are the primary cause of their deprivation. 
Especially youngsters are believed to be susceptible to what others consider relevant 
and socially appropriate to do. For example, various studies show that youngsters 
replicate the aspirations of parents, which may still be based on traditional conceptions 
of society that have evolved over time (e.g. gender norms) (Beaman et al., 2012; 
Dercon & Singh, 2013). Especially in a situation of poverty, successful reference 
points are limited (Genicot & Ray, 2017). Second, in order to have productive 
aspirations, “the poor must perceive themselves as both capable and in control of their 
lives” (Flechtner, 2014, p. 2). Bandura (1997) demonstrated that social comparison 
with successful, like-minded people might enable others to realise they hold similar 
competences required to be successful. Exposure to successful peers is also an 
intervention proven to be successful in raising the aspirations of the poor in several 
developing country contexts (see, for example, Beaman et al. (2012) on India, Bernard, 
Dercon, Orkin, and Taffesse (2014) on Ethiopia, and (Macours & Vakis, 2014) on 
Nicaragua). 
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Despite an increasing body of literature studying the relationship between aspirations 
and poverty, this thesis focuses on three main domains that remain under-researched: 
1) gender norms and gender differences in multidimensional aspirations, 2) conformity 
to the aspirations of peers, and 3) the effect of envy. All three of them relate to how 
the social environment shapes the aspirations of young people. Studying young 
people’s aspirations is deemed necessary as more than 60% of the extreme poor in 
developing countries are below 25 years old (Castañeda et al., 2016).  
First, up until now most studies on aspirations have neglected the 
multidimensional character of aspirations, and limited research has been done on what 
poor people aspire or value in the long-term (Copestake & Camfield, 2010). The vast 
majority of studies focuses either on income, wealth, education, or health and neglects 
the notion that aspirations are interdependent. While the non-poor have the opportunity 
to experiment with various potential pathways to success, a lack of resources, relevant 
information and opportunities force the poor to carefully trade off one aspiration 
against the other before deciding on how to advance in life. The first part of this thesis 
focuses on economic empowerment and the aspiration to become economically 
independent and aims to demonstrate that in the endeavour to obtain such economic 
autonomy youngsters experience competition from alternative aspirations. Central in 
the trading off of alternatives stands the role of gender. Young boys and girls 
internalise different gender roles and aspire according to what is considered socially 
acceptable for their gender, with potential risk of perpetuating gender inequalities. 
Second, aspirations are shaped mainly in the social environment, but studies 
on the effect of peers on aspirations (Beaman et al., 2012; Bernard et al., 2014; 
Macours & Vakis, 2014) do not address how young people influence each other’s’ 
aspirations through social interactions in networks. Peer effects can then be another 
potential cause of the limitation of the capacity to aspire, but they can also be a 
potential instrument for overcoming what poverty does to the capacity to aspire. 
Gaining insight into this mechanism could, therefore, be valuable for development 
programmes that aim to raise aspiration levels and hope to benefit from potential spill-
over effects. 
Third, exposing poor people to successful peers is generally believed to 
improve outcomes and to motivate people to invest in their future. However, especially 
in small-scale societies social comparison can also render envy that has the potential 
to lower the effort that young people want to invest in improving their lives. A better 
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understanding of how envy and the anticipation on envy of others have an impact on 
effort and welfare in general can aid interventions that aim to stimulate the productivity 
of the poor through exposure to successful peers.  
Altogether, even though an increasing body of literature addresses the 
relationship between aspirations and poverty, it does not provide an overarching image 
of how the social environment shapes the aspirations of young people. Therefore, this 
thesis uses the following research question: 
 
How does the social environment shape the aspirations of youngsters? 
 
The next section presents the research setting first, followed by a discussion of the 
main concepts and ideas used in this thesis. After that, the main research questions are 
presented, together with an elaboration on how the thesis has collected data and how 
that data was analysed. This chapter ends with an outline of the thesis and shortly 
touches on the three empirical chapters and their relevance. 
 
1.2.  Research setting  
 
Uganda ranks as one of the least developed countries in the world (OECD, 2018). The 
Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2018a) shows that monthly income per capita amounted 
to 190,000 UGX in 2017, which is the equivalent of approximately 50 USD. More 
than half of this income is spent on food. Moreover, 75% of a total of 38 million 
Ugandans live in rural areas (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018c). Over the years, a 
reduction in poverty levels to approximately 21% has led to, amongst other things, an 
increased life expectancy of 60 years (United Nations, 2017b). However, 8 million 
Ugandans still live in extreme poverty, and recently the proportion of the population 
living below the poverty line has gone up again (Mejia-Mantilla, 2018). What further 
stands out is that the vast majority of the Ugandan population is below 25 years old, 
and 50% is even younger than 15 years old (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018b). This 
makes Uganda the country with the highest population growth in East Africa (United 
Nations, 2017a). Map 1 shows the main research area in Uganda, located in the eastern 
part of the country near the border with Kenya.  
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1.2.1 Eastern Uganda 
 
In Uganda, the thesis focuses on the Sironko district and Mbale district, two adjacent 
districts located in the Greater Mbale area in the eastern part of the country. Sironko 
district is mostly rural. In Mbale district, however, we only include Mbale town to 
allow a stratified sample along the rural/urban dimension. The two black circles in 
Map 1 represent the two locations. The reason for conducting our research here is 
based on the fact that both districts are among the poorest, but most densely populated 
areas in Uganda. Over the years, decentralisation has led to the creation of new names 
for the research area(s). To understand a further elaboration on the socioeconomic 
statistics, it is relevant to explain that both districts are part of the Bagisu region, which 
is part of the Elgon region, which in turn belongs to the Eastern region of Uganda.  
Sironko district has a population of approximately 242,000, with 86% living in 
rural areas. Mbale district has a much larger population of around 490,000, and 75% 
lives in rural areas. Mbale town is the largest urban centre in Mbale district with a 
population of 93,000 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Both districts belong to the 
Elgon region where on average 35% of the residents live below the poverty line. This 
percentage is a statistically significant increase compared to the percentage of 2012, 
implying that the poverty level in this region is growing (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 
2018c). In both Sironko and Mbale district, an average household consists of exactly 
4.4 members, which is slightly below the national average of 4.7 (Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics, 2018b). In the Elgon region, 47% of the population is younger than 14 years 
old which reveals a high fertility rate (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018c). Almost 
60% of the population in the Elgon region is working in subsistence agriculture, which 
is among the highest of all regions in Uganda. The main agricultural activities in the 
wider Eastern region include farming Arabica coffee beans, bananas, maize, sweet 
potatoes, and cassava and to a lesser extent herding livestock (Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics, 2017). After the capital Kampala, population density in the two areas is the 
highest in Uganda, even though both districts are mainly rural (Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics, 2016). Most of the land is cultivated, and in combination with high 
population density, land pressure has led and still leads to social conflicts (Heald, 
1998).  
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Map 1. The research area in Uganda  
 
  
Retrieved from www.google.com/maps, October 28th, 2018.  
 
1.2.2. Socioeconomic gender differences 
 
As the first part of this thesis aims to address gender differences in aspirations, it 
warrants to present an overview of any existing socioeconomic gender differences in 
the research area. The Ugandan demographic and health survey (Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics, 2018b) provides a wide range of statistics that reveal large socioeconomic 
gender differences in the Bugisu area (a smaller part of the Elgon area). Regarding 
employment and economic empowerment, 79% of women aged between 15-49 have 
some form of employment, including subsistence farming, whereas 94% of the men in 
the same age category has employment. The vast majority of working women is self-
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employed, and only 8.7% of the women with employment have a professional job, 
while for employed men this is 13.2%. Moreover, only 53% of married women can 
decide independently on how their own earnings are used, and 31% of women indicate 
they own land jointly or by themselves, while 48% of men indicate they own land 
jointly or by themselves. This difference is not surprising, as the dominant Gisu tribe 
in the research area is patrilineal, and often only sons inherit land. With regard to 
primary school enrolment, there are no gender differences, but secondary school 
enrolment reveals a higher gross enrolment ratio for boys than for girls. In addition, 
only 6.3% of all women aged between 15-49 have completed secondary school or 
higher, whereas for men this percentage is established at 11.1%. Altogether, these 
statistics reveal a substantial economic and educational gender gap.  
Looking at statistics on marriage, sexual activity and HIV prevalence, the 
Ugandan demographic and health survey (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018b) shows 
that in Uganda, 61% of women and 54% of men aged between 15-49 are married or 
live together with a partner. 26% of women and 41% of men in that same age range 
have never married. Unfortunately, these statistics are not specified at the regional or 
district level. Moreover, in the Bagisu region, the median age of a woman at first 
marriage (ranging between 20-49) is 18.2 years, whereas for men this is 22.3 years. 
Polygamy is also still prevalent in the Bagisu region, with 19% of the married women 
having a husband that also married at least one other woman. The median age at first 
sexual intercourse of girls is 16.7, while for boys this is 17.1. Also, 34% of the married 
women in the Bagisu area indicate they cannot take healthcare decisions 
independently. Last, the prevalence of HIV among adults in Uganda between the age 
15 to 64 is 7.6% among women and 4.7% among men (Uganda Ministry of Health, 
2017). In sum, these statistics point out that women in the research area find 
themselves in a more vulnerable and dependent position than men.  
 
1.2.3. The Gisu 
 
When studying the aspirations of the poor, it is essential to understand the cultural 
context in which they are anchored. Ethnically, the Sironko and Mbale districts are 
populated by the Gisu tribe, which is part of the Eastern Lacustrine Bantu (Byrnes, 
1992). They constitute a rough 5% of the total population in Uganda (Uganda Bureau 
of Statistics, 2018b). Even though they are grouped as Gisu tribe, there is significant 
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variation in clans and sub-groups, with substantial levels of animosity within lineages 
(Heald, 1998). The Gisu speak Lugisu, which is linked to Masaaba, originally a Bantu 
language, but due to the myriad of clans, many dialects exist (Brown, 1970). In her 
anthropological study of the Gisu, Heald (1998) illustrates that they share borders with 
the Teso, Sebei (both Nilotic), Gwere, and Nyole (both Bantu). She also states that 
relatively little is known about the history of the Gisu, and by having the same 
ancestors as the Bukusu tribe in Kenya, they are believed to share strong cultural links. 
Ancestral stories claim that the Gisu people are descendants from Mount Elgon, a non-
active stratovolcano on the border of Uganda and Kenya and locally known as Masaba 
(Heald, 1998). Ba-Masaba refers to all the people living on the slopes of Mount Elgon 
(La Fontaine, 2017). Even though the Gisu tribe share various cultural practices with 
other groups, disposing of the idea of an exclusive identity, they claim to be a unique 
culture on the base of their descent, language, and male circumcision (Heald, 1998). 
Heald (1998) also points out that male circumcision feeds the Gisu’s collective 
identity as men, which distinguishes them from all other men not circumcised. After 
circumcision, men receive resources that should enable them to live an autonomous 
life; only those circumcised, moving from boyhood to manhood as a ‘rite de passage’ 
(i.e. social transition), are considered true men privileged to have ownership over land 
and resources. This socially embraced masculinity comes with responsibilities 
revolving around providing and protecting direct kin and the idea of a self-made man. 
The Gisu culture, therefore, drives male aspirations of self-determination based on 
autonomy and independence (Heald, 1998). However, failing to live up to these 
expectations can create feelings of frustration and envy as competition is high among 
young men, encouraging violence amongst them (Heald, 1998; Kituyi, 2007). Women, 
on the other hand, are socialised as carers and nurtures and considered less violent than 
men. As a consequence, the Gisu culture brings forward intricate gender relations in 
situations where women take over provision responsibilities (e.g. female-headed 
households), opposing the idea of male masculinity (Kituyi, 2007). 
The cited studies on the research area make clear that the added value of the 
Gisu region for conducting this research project not only lies in the poor living 
conditions that allow linking aspirations and poverty, but also in how well existing 
studies have documented aspirations of the Gisu, their prescribed gender roles, and the 
importance of competition among young people.  
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1.3.  Conceptual framework  
 
This research project aims to examine the role of the social environment in shaping 
aspirations, providing more insight into (the formation of) aspirations of youngsters in 
Uganda. Understanding the interaction between the social environment and aspirations 
could offer new insights into how youngsters may be locked in an aspiration poverty 
trap, and how to possibly avoid it. The next section first defines what aspirations are, 
and why it is relevant to focus on the aspirations of young people, after which it will 
elaborate on the social environment, which is further broken down into gender norms 
and peer influences. 
 
1.3.1. Aspirations 
 
Appadurai (2004, p. 67) describes an aspiration as something that is related to “wants, 
preferences, choices, and calculations”. His definition signposts that aspirations have 
no straightforward description. In general, aspirations are defined as a desire or 
ambition to achieve a certain goal or target (Bernard & Taffesse, 2014). Aspirations 
are also often thought of being linked to beliefs and expectations of the future, but 
Macbrayne (1987, p. 1) provides a clear distinction between aspirations and 
expectations: “Aspirations are defined as an individual's desire to obtain a status object 
or goal such as a particular occupation or level of education”. She then explains that 
“expectations are the individual's estimation of the likelihood of attaining those goals, 
plans, ambitions or dreams” (Macbrayne, 1987, p. 1).  
Aspirations are also different from beliefs. Denzau and North (1994) explain 
belief structures as individual attitudes about the structure of one’s world and the 
relationship between behaviour and attainment of the individual and others in that 
world. Bernard et al. (2014, p. 4) point out that aspirations, beliefs and expectations 
are related: “the beliefs held by individuals about their environment and themselves, 
including expectations, will influence their aspirations”. This thesis builds on this and 
brings forward its own working definition: aspirations are mid-term life goals that are 
realistically achievable as a result of one's individual actions.  
Research on aspirations is interdisciplinary, and according to Ibrahim (2011), 
each discipline conceptualises aspirations differently. This thesis follows her sum-up 
of relevant perspectives and presents them in random order. First, an economic 
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perspective relates aspirations to the bounded rationality approach developed by 
Simon (1978). This approach is based on economic decision making and suggests that 
economic agents are dealing with bounded rationality resulting from a complex world, 
which can limit cognitive capabilities. Consequently, aspirational decision-making 
(i.e. which aspiration to attain at the expense of another, creating a preference order) 
is an optimisation problem based on searching for alternative life scenarios that meet 
certain aspirations. When an agent discovers an alternative that satisfies an aspiration 
or exceeds existing aspiration levels, the search is terminated, and the suboptimal 
alternative is chosen without searching further for the most optimal outcome. Selten 
(1999) adds to this the dynamic nature of aspirations and proposes an aspiration 
adaptation theory. Where satisfactory alternatives are easy to find, the initial aspiration 
levels are raised until they are not attainable anymore, and lowered when searching for 
satisfactory alternatives proves to be difficult until aspiration levels are attainable 
again. This implies that, in theory, aspirations can be the result of optimising 
behaviour, and a rational economic agent can maximise utility, but only when all 
information is available and alternatives (and their probability of attainment) are 
known, aspirations are consistent, and an agent acts accordingly. In a developing 
country context, however, the lack of information about alternatives, the path to their 
attainment, and their return is often lacking or insufficient. In addition, individuals that 
base their decisions on the most satisficing alternative instead of the one maximising 
utility are more likely to attain lower outcomes (Heifetz & Minelli, 2015).  
A psychological perspective focuses mainly on the effect of aspirations on 
expectations (and vice versa), as shown by Heslin (2003), and the relationship between 
aspirations and attainment (Beal & Crockett, 2010). Other studies also investigate how 
identity has an influence on aspirations, for example, the effect of priming gender roles 
on career aspirations (Rudman & Phelan, 2010), or how personality traits affect 
aspirations and career trajectories (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 
2001). An increasing number of studies are based on this discipline and examine the 
relationship between poverty and psychological constraints, also known as the poverty 
of scarcity. According to these studies (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014; Mani et al., 2013; 
Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013), poverty causes stress and a negative mindset, which 
results in short-term thinking and risk evasive decision making. Consequently, these 
decisions may then manifest socioeconomic hardship. 
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From sociological and anthropological perspectives, aspirations are considered part of 
larger societal and cultural norms. “They are always formed in interaction and in the 
thick of social life” (Appadurai, 2004, p. 67). Ray (2006) adds to this and discusses 
how aspirations are based on the social environment and how individuals adapt to 
aspirations of peers in their cognitive neighbourhood. According to him, aspirations 
should therefore not simply be regarded as consumer preferences. In subsequent work, 
Genicot and Ray (2017) develop a theory on how society-wide outcomes affect the 
aspirations at an individual level, which in turn affect wider societal outcomes.  
To gain a more comprehensive conceptual understanding of aspirations, this 
thesis follows Bernard and Taffesse (2014) who propose three distinct characteristics 
that are acknowledged in each academic discipline. First, aspirations are future-
oriented, as desires or ambitions are believed to determine behaviour for the future. 
Lybbert and Wydick (2018) relate this to hope, as decisions and behaviour are based 
on a belief that specific actions will improve future outcomes. This mechanism also 
works the other way around, and goal attainment and life experiences of the past also 
change aspirations over time. Aspirations are thus endogenous reference points that 
shift with goals accomplished (Dalton et al., 2016). 
Second, aspirations are motivators and determine how much time, effort, and 
resources individuals put in achieving and attaining them. From a ‘development 
perspective', Genicot and Ray (2017) state that aspirations mainly motivate human 
capital investments and strategic livelihood decisions. Also, Macours and Vakis 
(2014) demonstrate that in developing countries aspirations are highly relevant for 
escaping poverty as they determine household investments, for example in the 
education of children, nutrition and income-generating activities.  
Third, aspirations span multiple interrelated aspects of life, like health, income, 
wealth, education, but also social security and friendship, amongst many others. Some 
dimensions are aspired over others. These trade-offs bear significance as specific 
dimensions are considered more relevant for escaping poverty than others. Taking 
individual constraints, capacities, and opportunities into account, one cannot aspire to 
do well in all dimensions; some of them are considered more important than others, 
implying a classification of aspirations on base of the intrinsic values attached to them. 
Therefore, each individual has a different combination of aspirations which constitute 
a desired long-term life scenario. This set of aspirations is shaped by sociocultural 
norms, (the lack of) exposure to success stories or role models, and access to tangible 
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resources, which determine an equilibrium as a set of aspirations that gives the highest 
level of ‘satisfaction’ to an individual within his or her capacity to aspire. So, the 
individual configuration of an aspirational set is the result of (continuous) trade-offs 
between aspirations, resulting in the most aspired combination of dimensions. 
Naturally, this configuration is dynamic and changes when the environment changes. 
In addition, the importance of each aspirational dimension is contextual (Bernard & 
Taffesse, 2014; Copestake & Camfield, 2010; Ibrahim, 2011).  
Aspirations of young people are of particular importance. In developing 
countries, young people form the majority of the population (Castañeda et al., 2016). 
According to Sumberg et al. (2014), many of these young people in sub-Saharan Africa 
face unemployment or underemployment without any prospects of a better life. 
However, due to urbanisation, globalisation, and migration, in combination with new 
technological developments that stimulate exposure to other (more modern) ways of 
life, the aspirations of young people are more and more shaped outside their local 
context (Langevang & Gough, 2012). Together with increased attention for secondary 
education, this exposure has raised the aspirations of youngsters, but traditional social 
norms and beliefs, prescribed gender roles, and limited socioeconomic opportunities 
still largely constrain attainment (Sumberg et al., 2014). Although youngsters can 
function as a potential catalyst for development, they increasingly face a gap between 
their aspirations and what is perceived as possible to attain. Eventually, this may lead 
to aspiration failure and lower outcomes, as they accept and internalise their economic 
hardship.  
In sum, the existing literature provides various conceptualisations of 
aspirations. In general, they are conceptualised as desires or ambitions to achieve 
goals. They are future-oriented, motivators, and multidimensional, and the 
configuration of the optimal set of aspirations is context-specific. Of particular interest 
are the aspirations of young people, as they are increasingly exposed to other ‘worlds', 
but opportunities to attain their aspirations are limited. 
 
1.3.2. Social environment; gender norms and peer influences 
 
This section provides a conceptualisation of how aspirations are the product of the 
interactions in social life. It places particular emphasis on the role of gender norms and 
the influence of peers, which is further broken down into peer effects and envy.  
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Aspirations are gender-specific and mainly rooted in socioeconomic context. 
A gender system largely shapes the belief structure about the relationship between 
behaviour and attainment on which aspirations are based. Interaction in social life play 
a vital role in sustaining that system (Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 2006). People start 
internalising gender role beliefs at a very young age, and in the process of maturing, 
youngsters begin to mirror the aspirations of people in their cognitive neighbourhood 
(e.g. parents and peers). Tafere (2014) for example, shows there is very little difference 
in the aspirations of children and the aspirations of their parents in Ethiopia. Over time, 
boys and girls develop different aspirations which they feel are appropriate for their 
gender role and realistic within the social boundaries of the society in which they live. 
Evidence from developed countries suggests, for example, that the aspirations of 
women are the result of internalised gender role beliefs (Eccles, 1994), and 
occupational aspirations are based on gender beliefs about task competency (Correll, 
2004). Evidence from developing countries also suggest gender differences in 
aspirations. Favara (2017) finds a significant gender gap in the educational aspirations 
of boys and girls in Ethiopia. Her results also point out that especially in the poorest 
households, girls are less likely to aspire to go to university than boys from similar 
wealth levels. In addition, Bernard et al. (2014) show that Ethiopian women have lower 
income and social status aspirations and lower educational aspirations for their 
children than men.  
Gender disparities in aspirations can have grave consequences. Boys and girls 
that adapt their aspirations to gender norms are likely to perpetuate existing social 
differences and inequalities through their aspirations and attainment. This holds 
especially for societies with large socioeconomic inequalities between gender groups. 
For example, Dercon and Singh (2013) show that children in India, Ethiopia, and 
Vietnam internalise the aspirations of parents. Their results show that this gender bias 
eventually perpetuates a gender gap in educational attainment (favouring girls in 
Vietnam while favouring boys in India). Boys and girls that aspire along gender norms 
can cause significant gender gaps in income, education, and health, amongst other 
dimensions, and often girls find themselves in disadvantaged positions. Eventually, 
young people transfer socially accepted, but inequality generating gender norms to the 
next generation, even if these norms are non-optimal or have evolved over time in 
other layers of society. 
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Aspirations are also shaped and transmitted through the influences of peers. This thesis 
breaks down peer influence into peer effects and envy. First, there is ample evidence 
from developed and developing countries that exposure to peers changes attitudes, 
aspirations, and future-oriented behaviour. Greene, Sullivan, and Beyard-Tyler (1982) 
show that exposing U.S. students to non-traditional role models can change the 
attitudes towards gender-appropriateness of certain careers. In addition, Bernard et al. 
(2014) and Macours and Vakis (2014) study the effect of exposure to peers in Ethiopia 
and India, respectively, and find that exposing people to successful, like-minded 
people leads to increased aspirations and higher human capital investments. Berg and 
Zia (2017) emphasise, however, that social influence only takes place when 
individuals can identify themselves with role models that bear strong similarities. They 
look at the effect of an education soap opera on responsible financial behaviour in 
South Africa and demonstrate that emotional connection with the main characters of 
the show is of great importance in motivating others. Comparing aspirations with peers 
in one's cognitive world is prone to take place in locality between those perceived close 
(Ray, 2006).  
There is also a growing body of literature that addresses peer effects within 
social networks, based on an approach developed by Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 
(2009) and De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli (2007). They use friendship networks 
and the non-overlapping peers’ approach to identify peer effects in the use of 
recreational services and the choice of college majors. This model allows studying the 
feedback created by endogenous interactions between individuals and the population 
to which they belong, as it solves the reflection problem proposed by Manski (1993): 
how to study the influence of a group on an individual if that individual is part of the 
group? Various studies are based on the non-overlapping peers’ approach, albeit in 
different contexts, and demonstrate that social interactions in networks lead to peer 
effects. Patacchini and Zenou (2012), Cingano and Rosolia (2012) and Arcidiacono, 
Foster, Goodpaster, and Kinsler (2012), amongst others, use individual specific 
friendship networks to examine the existence of peer effects in juvenile delinquency, 
employment rate, and school performance, respectively. In addition, Lin (2010) 
demonstrates that also the average characteristics of friends (i.e. friends’ group 
composition) as a peer effect can influence the aspirations of an individual. 
Peer effects are believed to work through two different mechanisms. First, 
individuals may learn from observing the outcomes of the aspirations of their friends 
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(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992). The idea of observational learning is that 
an individual imitates another person on the base of the belief that the other has 
relevant information that they do not possess (Manski, 2000). Second, and this is what 
this thesis primarily focuses on, individuals conform to the aspirations of their peers 
as they want to fit in socially. Akerlof and Kranton (2002) develop a theory that shows 
that students are mainly motivated by their identity and how well they fit in the social 
setting of the school, and utility is gained from conforming to the group norm. In the 
context of aspirations, conformity causes individuals to assimilate their ordering (and 
levels) of a set of aspirations to the ordering of aspirations of those in their cognitive 
proximity. This could mean, however, that the aspiration levels adopted may not 
always be necessarily the most optimal given the marginalised living conditions of 
poor young people. 
The influence of peers may also evoke envy when levels of attainment are 
compared among peers. People tend to compare themselves and assess their 
performance in relation to the performance of similar others. For example, there are 
numerous studies (Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2008; Knight & Gunatilaka, 2010) that show 
how very poor people still express high levels of well-being as they are relatively better 
off than others in their neighbourhood. Social comparison also gives birth to envy, 
which has the potential to lift people out of poverty but also to keep poor people poor. 
Central in this stands the notion of effort, which according to the definition of 
aspirations presented in the previous section is an essential requirement for attainment 
as it determines human capital investments (i.e. effort ‘translates’ the aspiration into 
behaviour). Effort is also reference-dependent, which means that social comparison 
motivates people (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). Observing others doing well may create 
feelings of competitive envy, translated into the aspiration to keep up with others. On 
the other hand, top performers may aspire to stay ahead of others. Through social 
comparison, inequality between similar people has then the potential to lift them out 
of poverty.  
However, in societies with strong egalitarian norms, social comparison can 
also lead to lower effort. As inequality grows, successful individuals may be targeted 
by envious, less successful peers (Zizzo & Oswald, 2001). In the presence of this so-
called destructive envy, the consequence of being successful bears social costs. 
Successful individuals may want to reduce their effort to avoid social harassment or 
social exclusion, reducing inequality between them and less successful others. As a 
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result, inequality can then be costly, and social comparison is likely to keep poor 
people poor.  
 
1.4.  Research questions 
 
This study aims to disentangle the social influences that shape the aspirations of young 
people. The following main research question is formulated: 
 
How does the social environment shape the aspirations of youngsters? 
 
We answer this question by focusing on the following three research-questions: 
 
1. To what extent do boys and girls aspire to economic independence and 
what is the influence of competing alternative aspirations?  
 
2. How are the aspirations of youngsters affected by the aspirations of their 
friends?  
 
3. What are the effects of competitive and destructive envy on effort?  
 
Research question 1 aims to explore the extent to which boys and girls aspire to obtain 
their economic independence, and whether they experience any competition from 
alternatives like marriage, children, education, social network- and sense of belonging 
aspirations. It also studies the weight given to economic independence when paired 
with the alternatives. The outcomes of research question one feed into research 
question two, where three pairs of aspirations are selected to investigate further 
whether peer effects in social networks influence aspirations. The results reveal 
whether students conform to the average aspiration levels of their friends. The third 
and last research question focuses on effort as an instrument that converts aspirations 
into behaviour. It examines how social comparison may render competitive and 
destructive envy, and how both types may have different effects on effort and welfare. 
Each research question is discussed in a separate chapter, which are described in more 
detail in section 1.6. 
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1.5.  Methodology and data  
 
The general research design followed a mixed methods approach, albeit with a strong 
emphasis on a positivist epistemology. Even though epistemological differences 
between scientific ideologies exist, sequencing research methods is considered an 
improvement of reliability and representativeness (Holland & Campbell, 2005). The 
qualitative method used is an open-ended interview approach, which was aimed at 
providing insights into the local meaning of aspirations and to present an overview of 
relevant aspirations for the research area. The results of the open-ended interviews 
were aimed at feeding into the quantitative data-collection instruments that elicited 
aspirations in a novel and innovative way. The quantitative instruments also elicited 
friendship ties and allowed studying effort and envy. Assistance during the data 
collection phase was provided by The Field Lab Uganda, which is a not-for-profit 
organisation that offers a network of research assistants that have ample experience 
with conducting qualitative and quantitative data collection in Uganda. 
For the qualitative data-collection, the thesis defined youngsters as individuals 
between the age of 18-21 in rural Sironko, and between the age of 18-23 in urban 
Mbale. A lower upper age limit in Sironko was believed to be necessary to avoid 
sampling youngsters that were still young of age but had already accomplished life-
determining outcomes like children or marriage. In the urban area this was considered 
less of a problem, but despite the age limit, respondents with substantial achievements 
in life still participated in the interviews in both Sironko and Mbale.  
For the quantitative data-collection, the thesis focused on Senior six high 
school students only. This is done for the following reasons. First, students had not yet 
realised aspirations like getting marriage, getting children, or owning a business. This 
avoided that students justified the goals they had accomplished and decisions they had 
made that had shaped their current lives (the open-ended interviews already proved 
this was difficult to avoid). A second reason, which is related to the first, is that Senior 
six students are the most senior students in the Ugandan school system and were 
expected to have started anticipating on their future. For most students, dependency 
on parents or caretakers soon came to an end, and they needed to start planning for an 
own, independent life. Third, classrooms are delineated places in which students 
interact on a frequent base (e.g. self-contained networks). This created an ideal ‘space' 
to examine peer effects in aspirations. Students interact with each other daily, they 
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select their friends mainly from the classroom and focusing on classes only excluded 
any influence from peers that were not in school. Fourth and last, focusing on students 
in this study had a practical reason as it avoided illiteracy and cognitive ability issues 
that could have affected the understanding of the data-collection instruments.  
Deciding to focus on the aspirations of high school students in a second phase 
instead of continuing researching the aspirations of youngsters in general (school 
going and non-school going adolescents), may affect the external validity of the 
results. Compared to the aspirations of non-school going youngsters, the aspirations of 
students could be based on more liberal gender norms, giving girls more room to 
manoeuvre and access to potential life avenues that otherwise would have been 
deemed unrealistic to accomplish. Moreover, school-going youngsters come from 
relatively wealthier families, which also provides access to opportunities which their 
non-school going peers do not have. Altogether, this compositional difference implies 
that in terms of external validity any differences that we may find between the 
aspirations of school-going boys and girls are underestimates of actual gender 
differences in the aspirations of Ugandan adolescents.  
The data collection consisted of two phases of field-work and data collection. 
The first phase took place in the period September – November 2015 and was aimed 
at scoping the research area and conducting open-ended interviews of explorative 
nature. The interview script was tested, adjusted, and implemented and resulted in 38 
interviews that provided insight into how youngsters experience trade-offs between 
aspirations when trying to improve their lives. At the end of the first field-work period, 
coding on base of the interview topics was used to identify six pairs of aspirations 
where the aspiration to become economically independent was paired with six 
alternatives in the social and educational sphere.  
The second data-collection phase took place in the period June – August 2016. 
During this period, a questionnaire was tested and implemented that elicited the weight 
that students gave to the aspiration to become economically independent, relative to 
the six alternative aspirations. The questionnaire also included a section on 
socioeconomic background and a section on friendship ties. The questionnaire was 
self-completed at the school location during weekdays. Tablet computers were used to 
register and save responses. Only the friendship ties were elicited using hard-copy lists 
of students. Two local enumerators introduced the study to participants, explained 
questions if needed, and checked the completed questionnaires for anomalies. After 
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data collection, OLS regressions and individual-fixed effects regressions were used to 
analyse gender differences in weights given to economic aspirations relative to their 
alternatives. To estimate the peer effects, this thesis made use of instrumental variable 
estimation (IV/2SLS and IV/GMM).  
The second data-collection phase also contained the development and 
implementation of a real-effort experiment to capture the effects of envy on effort. For 
the experiment, 50% of the students that participated in the questionnaire were invited. 
The experiments took place on Saturday mornings at the school location to keep 
interference with school activities to a minimum. The data collected was analysed 
using individual-fixed effects regressions.  
Altogether, high school students were sampled from 11 classes in 8 different 
schools, of which 5 were located in Mbale town and 3 in Sironko district. From a 
potential sample of 650 students, 578 students participated in the study. However, due 
to invalid or missing values, the sample size varies per empirical chapter. 
 
1.6.  Thesis outline  
 
Each empirical chapter discusses one of the three research questions presented in 
section 1.4. The chapters are written in such a manner that they fit the publication 
guidelines of peer-reviewed journals. The advantage is that they can be read as 
independent chapters without the necessity to read other parts of the thesis. 
Consequently, there may be some conceptual overlap between this introductory 
chapter and the empirical chapters, and between the research methods sections of the 
empirical chapters for which data is collected through the same data collection 
instrument.  
The next chapter studies the reported trade-offs between the aspiration to 
obtain economic independence and six alternative aspirations that compete for time, 
effort and resources. This innovative conceptualisation of aspirations allows analysing 
gender differences in the weight that students give to economic independence relative 
to the importance of the six alternative aspirations. In addition, the chapter examines 
which of the six alternative aspirations is considered the most important competing 
alternative and whether boys and girls differ in this. As economic independence is 
considered highly relevant for economic empowerment, while the alternative 
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aspirations may be less optimal for escaping poverty, the presence of gender 
differences in economic aspirations may perpetuate gender inequalities. 
The third chapter investigates how peer effects influence aspirations through 
social networks. For identification reasons, the chapter zooms in on the pairs of 
aspirations where economic independence is paired with three alternative aspirations 
that share a communal component. In order to deal with the reflection problem that 
results from simultaneity between the aspirations of friends and the individual, this 
chapter is the first of its kind to propose a non-overlapping peers’ approach where the 
aspirations of friends are instrumented with the characteristics of friends of friends 
who are not the friends of the individual. The existence of any peer effects emphasises 
the relevance of spill-over effects, which can be beneficial to economic empowerment 
programmes. 
The fourth chapter moves from aspirations to actual behaviour and examines 
the effect of envy on effort. Envy is divided into two types: one type that increases 
effort, and one type that decreases effort. The chapter implements a real-effort 
experiment and investigates whether participants are affected by relative performance 
feedback, the threat of money-burning, or a combination of both. The innovative 
design of the experiment allows disentangling the effects of both types of envy. The 
existence of competitive- and destructive envy effects on effort is relevant for policies 
that aim to increase the production of the poor through exposure to successful peers. 
The fifth and last chapter concludes and answers the three research questions. 
It also highlights the contribution each independent chapter makes to the existing 
literature and elaborates on their relevance for development policy. The chapter ends 
with acknowledging the limitations of the study and proposes ideas for future research 
on aspirations.  
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Chapter 2. Gendered aspirations of high school students in 
Uganda  
 
Abstract 
Women’s economic empowerment provides an important pathway to increase gender equality 
and tackle poverty. Gender norms, however, may pose an important constraint on economic 
aspirations of girls in developing countries. This study examines gender differences in 
aspirations of high school students in eastern Uganda. We elicit the economic aspirations as 
well as six competing aspirations in the social and educational spheres of 572 Ugandan high 
school students. We find that boys and girls aspire to economic independence over most 
alternatives, apart from education. However, girls compared to boys attach a lower value to 
economic aspirations relative to five of six alternative aspirations. Looking at the weight given 
among the different alternative aspirations, girls have a relatively stronger preference for 
aspirations like community engagement and education, while boys have a relatively stronger 
preference for living in peace with relatives. These gendered aspirations suggest an important 
mechanism by which gender inequality in the economic sphere is perpetuated. 
 
Keywords: aspirations, youth, gender, economic empowerment. 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, most developing countries have implemented policies to reduce 
gender inequalities. Nevertheless, the most recent Human Development Report 
(Nations, 2017) indicates that in more than 100 countries, women are still primarily 
discriminated against, and they often end up in a marginalised position. The origins of 
gender inequality are deeply embedded in dominant social norms that define gender 
roles and associated behaviour, favouring men over women. Such norms are 
intergenerationally transmitted, and young people replicate social norms that fit their 
prescribed gender roles, internalising and perpetuating gender inequalities by starting 
to aspire accordingly (Harper, Marcus, & Moore, 2003). 
The economic aspirations of women are largely affected by this. Women who 
have full control over their economic activities play a fundamental role in development 
and poverty reduction, and women’s economic empowerment could improve the 
health, education, and nutrition of their children, amongst other dimensions (Duflo, 
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2003, 2012; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2000). For women, starting a small-scale 
business is often considered a gateway to increased economic empowerment 
(Richardson, Howarth, & Finnegan, 2004). Nevertheless, women have lower 
entrepreneurial and income aspirations compared to men, and in combination with 
limited time and resources available, the performance of women-owned businesses is 
lower and significantly less profitable than those owned by men (Dalton, 
Ruschenpohler, & Zia, 2018; Jamali, 2009).  
In this paper, we hypothesise that, because of internalised gender norms, 
women’s economic aspirations strongly compete with aspirations in alternative 
domains that society considers more appropriate for them. This could constrain 
women’s economic aspirations and perpetuate low standards of living for women in 
particular. An analysis of the aspirations of boys and girls in the economic, social and 
educational spheres can expand our understanding, which is the main contribution of 
this paper. For this purpose, we interviewed boys and girls in Uganda on their 
aspirations and the competition they experience between them. We then identified six 
main alternative aspirations in the social and educational domains with which 
economic aspirations might compete. In a next step, we paired these aspirations in a 
questionnaire to elicit the aspirations of a sample of 572 high school students.  
Our results can be summarised as follows. When comparing aspirations 
between boys and girls, we find important gender differences. Apart from education, 
both gender groups aspire to economic independence over most of its alternatives, but 
boys cast a stronger preference for economic independence than girls do. Girls also 
aspire to economic independence more than most of its alternatives but attach more 
value to competing alternatives like marriage, childbearing, community engagement, 
the proximity of family and friends, and higher education than boys.  
Our study contributes to two strands of literature. First, it adds to research on 
interventions aimed at raising girls’ economic empowerment. Interventions that 
include vocational training only have resulted in low and short-term gains (McKenzie, 
2017), while sex-based education and soft skills programmes have mixed results 
(Dupas, 2011; Groh, Krishnan, McKenzie, & Vishwanath, 2012). Bandiera et al. 
(2017) demonstrate that successful economic empowerment interventions that target 
girls living in poverty need to combine the technical skills of running a business or 
employment-related skills training with addressing internal constraints like low self-
confidence and low economic aspirations.  
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This study also relates to a large number of studies that demonstrate that gender-
specific aspirations are rooted mainly in social and economic context, reproduced via 
three mechanisms. First, adolescents are likely to mirror their parents’ aspirations, 
which frequently leads to gender differences in aspirations (Beaman et al., 2012; 
Dercon & Singh, 2013). Second, aspirations are transmitted through peers with similar 
backgrounds (Bernard et al., 2014; Macours & Vakis, 2014), and third, the 
socioeconomic context largely determines the resources available to young people. 
They determine what youngsters consider realistic and attainable when trying to 
improve their lives, and this could, in turn, influence their aspirations. All three 
mechanisms create significant differences in the aspirations of boys and girls in 
developing countries, with women often having lower aspirations than men as shown 
in studies by Bloem, Boughton, Htoo, Hein, and Payongayong (2017) on land and 
income aspirations, Dalton et al. (2018) on business aspirations, Bernard et al. (2014) 
on status, wealth and income aspirations, and Mukherjee (2015) on educational 
aspirations. 
However, the two strands of literature pay minimal attention to the 
multidimensional character of aspirations and the interdependency between them, 
which is especially relevant for adolescents growing up in poverty. Due to a lack of 
resources, they are forced to trade off their aspirations when trying to better their lives. 
Apart from Bernard and Taffesse (2014) and Kosec, Hameed, and Hausladen (2012), 
who both use a survey instrument to capture a number of aspirational dimensions in 
Ethiopia and Pakistan and the weight attached to each dimension, no study has looked 
at how the poor trade off their aspirations, and whether boys and girls do so differently. 
In the remainder of this paper, we present a conceptual framework that reflects 
on the interdependency adolescents perceive between economic aspirations and 
competing aspirations in the social and educational domains. It also conceptualises 
why boys and girls may trade off economic aspirations with competing aspirations 
differently. An elaboration on the research methods then follows in a third section, 
together with an explanation of how we make aspirations context-specific to the 
research area. We present the empirical results in a fourth section, followed by a 
discussion of the most important results and their relevance for development policy. A 
final section concludes. 
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2.2. Trading off aspirations 
 
Youngsters growing up in poverty need to make complex decisions when trying to 
better their lives. Due to their poverty, their aspirations are mutual substitutes, 
competing with one another for time, effort and scarce resources. As aspirations are 
interlinked, deciding how to advance in life involves a context-specific process of 
trading off aspirations. In this section, we first describe economic, social and 
educational aspirations, after which we discuss the trade-offs between economic 
aspirations and competing aspirations in the social and educational spheres, and how 
boys and girls may aspire to them differently.  
 
2.2.1. Multidimensional aspirations 
 
The economic aspirations of the poor have always played a central role in development 
and poverty reduction. Due to a lack of formal employment, entrepreneurship among 
young people is widely promoted in sub-Saharan Africa (Garcia & Jean, 2008), and 
various studies emphasise the role of economic aspirations among the poor. Kosec et 
al. (2012), who study aspirations in Pakistan, find that participants give income 
aspirations most weight when asked to decide on the importance of income, assets, 
education, and social status. In addition, a number of studies (Camfield, Masae, 
McGregor, & Promphaking, 2013; Nguyen, Moschis, & Shannon, 2009) suggest that 
young people in developing countries increasingly attach value to symbols of 
modernity and acquire materialistic values, adding to their sense of belonging to a 
modern society and opposing the idea of being considered ‘undeveloped’. 
Aspirations in the social dimension mainly relate to establishing, sustaining, 
and improving social relationships with others. In developing countries, traditional 
values regularly emphasise the importance of children and marriage, peaceful family 
relations, and a sense of community. Social status is determined mainly by parenthood 
and marriage (Caldwell & Caldwell, 1987), and family and community engagement 
remain vital for social inclusion, access to social and financial capital, and help to 
recover from shocks. In their study on mapping multidimensional aspirations in Peru, 
Thailand, and Bangladesh, Copestake and Camfield (2010) demonstrate that aspiring 
to keep good family relations is still reported as one of the most ‘needed’ aspirations 
for a good life, while childbearing scores relatively high as well.  
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A third dimension touches on the relevance of education. The increasing importance 
of education among young people is mainly the result of the growing access to 
education, which has steadily increased tertiary school enrolment in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The educational aspirations of young people are driven by prospects of better 
job opportunities, higher salaries (Bloom, Canning, & Chan, 2006) but also social 
status, influence, and personal satisfaction from being highly educated (Johnstone, 
2004). 
 
2.2.2. Competing dimensions 
 
In this section, we discuss how young people trade off economic aspirations with 
aspirations in the social and educational spheres, and how this may differ between boys 
and girls. We focus on economic aspirations because we are interested in women’s 
economic empowerment. Due to traditional gender roles that define the notion of 
femininity and masculinity and corresponding behaviour, boys and girls may aspire to 
certain domains that come at the expense of their economic aspirations. 
Table 1 structures the competition between dimensions and shows how 
aspirations compete differently per gender group. From the literature, we distil two 
mechanisms that might make girls attach a stronger weight to the social dimension 
than boys when trading off the economic dimension with the social dimension. The 
first mechanism refers to starting a family (the numbers (1) and (2) in Table 1). For 
girls, economic independence reduces vulnerability by being able to access food, 
health, and social networks (Duflo, 2012). It can also decrease girls’ dependency on 
older men, which decreases vulnerability to HIV/AIDS and protects them against 
coerced sex and transactional sex (Bruce & Hallman, 2008). On the other hand, the 
social status of girls depends primarily on motherhood and marriage (Mason, 2001). 
Also, being taken care of at later life is considered a motivation stronger for girls than 
for boys to have many children (Caldwell & Caldwell, 1987). Marriage can also be a 
tool to reduce vulnerability and economic hardship, and it lowers a financial burden 
from their parental household. However, during marriage and childbearing girls 
experience a direct negative impact on their income generating activities (Aldaz-
Carroll & Morán, 2001; Cáceres-Delpiano, 2012). Household chores can consume 
time and effort, and in many developing countries, spouses restrict their wives’ 
mobility and economic activities. Even though girls in developing countries are 
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increasingly postponing marriage and childbearing to participate in the labour market 
(Shapiro & Gebreselassie, 2014), girls may still internalise traditional gender norms, 
aspire to what they consider is socially appropriate, and sacrifice critical levels of their 
economic freedom to attain their social aspirations. This mechanism identifies the 
relation between both dimensions as ‘conflicting’ for girls. 
 
Table 1. Trading off the economic dimension 
 Girls Boys 
 Economic dimension 
Social dimension 
(children/marriage) 
 Conflicting: 
Children and marriage provide 
status as a mother and a wife, but 
strongly limit income-generating 
opportunities for young women 
and vice versa. Employment 
reduces dependency on men and 
increases agency. (1) 
 Complementary: 
Children and marriage provide 
status as ‘man’ but demand 
substantial economic resources 
(being a ‘provider’ is elementary 
for masculinity). Alternatively, 
economic success needed to 
advance reputation. (2) 
Social dimension 
(social capital) 
 Complementary:  
Social networks provide 
socioeconomic safety and a rare 
opportunity to build social capital 
that stimulates information 
exchange, decision-making power 
and economic success. But 
building social networks is costly 
and strongly limits the time 
available for employment. (3) 
 Conflicting:  
Social networks provide 
socioeconomic safety, but also 
come with firm pressure to share 
economic success. Not 
contributing can have severe 
social repercussions and social 
exclusion. Social capital is less 
scarce, and it does not outweigh 
the cost of maintaining social 
networks (4). 
Educational 
dimension 
 Complementary:  
Economic independence reduces 
dependency on family/spouse, but 
without education, unskilled 
labour has low benefits for girls: 
education qualifies girls for more 
beneficial employment but means 
extended dependence on others. 
(5) 
 Conflicting:  
Education leads to better 
economic opportunities in the 
future but requires economic 
sacrifices. Generating income 
reflects social expectations of 
boys and having a stable source 
of income can be a safer 
investment for boys in the short 
term. (6) 
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For boys (see number (2) of Table 1), economic independence leads to power and 
autonomy, advancing their masculinity (Barker & Ricardo, 2005). The reputation of 
young men also increases through children and marriage, but starting a nuclear family 
requires them to possess resources that pay for a bride price, find and pay for lodging, 
and cater for children and wife. In Uganda, being a ‘provider' is, therefore, a defining 
element of a man's masculinity (Adams, Salazar, & Lundgren, 2013; Heald, 1998). 
Townsend (1997) demonstrates that such financial burden lowers the appeal of the 
social dimension for young men in Botswana. As a consequence, boys marry at a later 
age than girls, and the percentage of boys between the age 20-24 currently married is 
much lower (16%) than girls (32%) in Uganda (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018b). 
Therefore, the economic dimension is ‘complementary’ to the social dimension for 
boys in this mechanism.  
A second mechanism that shows how boys and girls may trade off the 
economic and social dimensions differently addresses the importance of social 
networks in traditional societies where egalitarian norms prevail. A wide strand of 
literature (Chantarat & Barrett, 2012; Fafchamps, 2006; Fafchamps & Minten, 2002; 
Woolcock & Narayan, 2000) demonstrates that participation in social networks is 
essential for survival, providing the poor access to resources, social security, and 
friendship. However, building and maintaining social networks is costly.  
In Table 1, number (3) describes what this second mechanism means for girls, 
and claims that girls depend more on spouses and family than boys (Barker & Ricardo, 
2005). Girls have limited access to economic opportunities and are sometimes even 
prohibited from engaging in them. Therefore, involvement in family-transcending 
social networks provides a subtle opportunity to build social capital outside the 
household, share information and awareness on rights (Alemu, Van Kempen, & 
Ruben, 2018). These outcomes could fuel entrepreneurial success and economic 
opportunity, making both dimensions complementary in this mechanism. Even though 
building and maintaining social networks requires time and resources (Dasgupta, 
2005), economic opportunities are limited for girls. Therefore, girls may aspire to 
building social networks more than to their economic independence. 
Boys, on the other hand, are more and more socialised as providers and 
pressured to contribute and share with kin. This is especially the case in times of 
economic success. Barr and Stein (2008), for example, show that Zimbabwean 
households with higher income are considered to violate the egalitarian norm, and 
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frequently face sanctions. Richards (2005) and White (2012), however, provide 
evidence that boys face various difficulties in their endeavours to generate an income, 
like limited productive opportunities in rural societies with strong gerontocratic 
structures. Consequently, young men may be inclined to shy away from their social 
obligations and aspire to keep economic proceeds to themselves instead. The 
description in (4) in Table 1 concludes that in this mechanism both dimensions are 
conflicting for boys.  
The literature also suggests a difference between boys and girls when trading 
off the economic dimension with the education dimension, which is best demonstrated 
by the economic sacrifices that need to be made to obtain higher education. Even 
though school enrolment has increased over the past decades, tuition fees, low quality 
of education and lack of employment opportunities still pressure young people to 
consider unskilled labour or running small businesses as alternative livelihoods.  
For girls, unskilled labour is a less attractive alternative, having lower benefits 
for them than for boys (Aldaz-Carroll & Morán, 2001). Education, on the other hand, 
has clear-cut benefits for girls, and can eventually qualify them for a type of 
employment like administrative and service jobs that is more beneficial to them 
(Duflo, 2012). Therefore, number (5) outlines that girls that have the opportunity to 
access education may be more inclined to aspire to obtain a degree as an alternative 
trajectory than boys, accepting the cost of remaining dependent on others. It also 
implies that for them, education is complementary to economic success.  
Barker and Ricardo (2005) claim that social expectations require young men 
to provide income, while Blum (2007) states it may eventually outweigh education as 
a more reliable investment for their future, forming argument (6) in Table 1. Favara 
(2017) shows that the pressure on boys to drop out of school and earn money grows 
with their ability to contribute to the household. Especially boys that work on the 
family farm or already have a form of income are more likely to drop out. As the 
economic sacrifices of education are significant, education and economic 
independence are then conflicting aspirations for boys. 
In sum, boys and girls face trade-offs between the economic sphere and the 
social and educational sphere. Social aspirations like marriage, childbearing, and 
building and maintaining social networks influence the ability to become economically 
successful and autonomous. Moreover, also the educational dimension competes with 
the economic dimension for time, resources, and effort. For girls, aspiring to being part 
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of social networks and obtaining higher education can potentially be complementary 
to economic independence and a more subtle way of acquiring levels of economic 
empowerment, whereas marriage and fertility are mainly restraining. Altogether, we 
expect boys and girls to trade off the economic dimension and its alternatives 
differently, creating gender differences in aspirations.  
 
2.3. Research methods 
 
Our research design includes both a qualitative and quantitative instrument. In 
November 2015, we started with 38 semi-structured interviews to identify the relevant 
aspirations of adolescents in the greater Mbale area in Uganda. The interviews 
provided insight into how boys and girls trade-off aspirations differently in their 
endeavours to become economically independent. The interviews also allowed us to 
design a survey instrument to elicit individual aspirations in the economic, social and 
educational dimensions, which we used in the subsequent quantitative phase of the 
study.  
 
2.3.1. Interviews 
 
We recruited boys and girls from the rural Sironko district and urban Mbale district in 
Uganda using a snowball sample approach. In Sironko, we randomly sampled two 
villages, and in each village the local council chairperson (LC1) was approached who 
proposed a number of differing adolescents to start the interviews with. In Mbale town, 
a key mobiliser composed a diverse first group of adolescents (university, 
workshops/garages, shops, etc.) who were willing to take part in the study. They were 
then asked to suggest new participants, who were invited to come to the school or 
townhall the day after. Therefore, the 38 participants form the complete census of the 
snowball sampling, and they were not randomly sampled from a larger set of 
adolescents. We did not limit our sample to high school students to obtain a broader 
perspective of relevant aspirations and a better understanding of the social context in 
which the aspirations of high school students were situated.  
We realise that a snowball sampling technique can lead to a homogeneous 
sample that may not necessarily represents the research area. Therefore, we used an 
initial stratified sample along the rural/urban dimension and aimed to start the snowball 
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sample approach with a preselected group of adolescents differing on the 
characteristics gender, age, and school enrolment. Table 2 presents a descriptive 
overview of the final sample that resulted from the snowball sampling technique. 
 
Table 2. Socioeconomic descriptives of participants semi-structured interviews 
 Pooled Boys Girls 
Female 50%   
Urban 50% 47% 53% 
Age 19.89 19.95 19.84 
Married / cohabitation 11% 5% 16% 
Religion    
Catholic 55% 47% 63% 
Protestant 32% 32% 32% 
Other 13% 21% 5% 
Gisu tribe 89% 95% 83% 
Household members 6.52 6.32 6.74 
Children 0.29 0.11 0.47 
Highest education level finished    
Primary (not finished) 29% 37% 21% 
Primary  34% 32% 37% 
Secondary 37% 32% 42% 
Income generation    
Study 26% 0% 53% 
Agriculture / cattle 34% 53% 16% 
Urban labour 21% 37% 5% 
Other (small business, reliance on spouse, etc.) 16% 11% 26% 
Observations 38 19 19 
 
Because of our stratified sampling approach along the urban/rural dimension, half of 
the 38 participants were located in rural Sironko, while the other half was based in 
urban Mbale. Moreover, we aimed at including an equal number of women as men, 
hence why half of the respondents is female. We used as age limits a minimum of 18 
years and maximum of 21 years in Sironko. In Mbale we used a maximum age limit 
of 23 years. Half of the participants identified as Catholic, which is probably the result 
of randomly sampling two villages in Sironko that were predominantly Catholic. 
Respondents were also largely uniform in ethnic background, as almost all of them 
identified as belonging to the Gisu tribe. In our sample, six girls and two boys already 
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had children. What further stands out is that more girls than boys were already married 
or living in cohabitation. Also, all participants have been enrolled in primary school or 
higher, and the percentages suggest that the girls interviewed are higher educated than 
the boys. None of the boys were still in school at the time of the interview, in contrast 
to the girls, and they indicated that they generated an income mainly through 
agricultural activities or urban labour (e.g. bricklayer, car mechanic, etc.). In sum, the 
descriptives in Table 2 demonstrate that although a snowball sampling technique can 
lead to a uniform sample as respondents may refer to similar, like-minded respondents, 
our sample of 38 participants is relatively diverse in terms of religious, educational, 
and income generating background.  
The script of the semi-structured interviews included questions on their 
perception of aspirations as a social construct (e.g. linguistic expressions, descriptions 
and meaning), after which interviewees were presented fourteen cards containing short 
but general descriptions of various aspirations like getting married, getting a stable 
income, building an own house, being well-regarded by family and friends. They were 
written down in English and Lugisu, the local language in the research area, and laid 
out on the interview table for participants to read them. These cards aimed to avoid a 
discussion of short-term goals like planting coffee or buying a motorcycle and induce 
the participants into thinking about realistic long-term aspirations. Participants were 
not bound to the aspirations on the cards and could also mention other aspirations.  
In a second section, participants were then asked 1) which of the aspirations 
were relevant to them, and 2) which aspirations competed with each other. They were 
asked to elaborate on their choices.1 The aspirations chosen had to be future-oriented 
(i.e. not yet attained), realistically possible, and attainable through their effort. The 
interviews were conducted using local enumerators: a female enumerator for female 
participants, and a male enumerator for male participants. The interviews took 
approximately 80 minutes and were held in private in either a school building or town 
hall.2 The interview notes were analysed using a topic list that contained a priori codes 
                                                     
1 Participants were also asked which aspirations were instrumental to one another in a third and final 
part of the interview. The results are not included here, as the answers contained a platitude of complex, 
hypothetical pathways through which aspirations were linked to one another.  
2 For privacy reasons, interviewing at home was not allowed as it could have biased the results. A school 
or townhall as interview location was considered the most neutral location available. 
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on which also the interview script was based.3 The script of the interviews can be found 
in Appendix A.2. 
 
2.3.2. Survey 
 
The interviews brought forward a set of six competing aspirations to economic 
independence. We paired the aspiration to become economically independent with 
each of the six competing aspirations and moulded the pairs into constant sum paired 
comparisons which we then put in a survey format. In our survey approach, we 
requested respondents to rate the direction and intensity of their preference by 
allocating ten tokens over the two alternatives in one pair. As a result, responses 
provided information on the respondents’ strength of preference. Importantly, the 
allocation of tokens allowed respondents to indicate one alternative as the better of two 
aspirations, even when both are considered suitable choices. The allocation of tokens 
uses a rating scale that is similar to a Likert scale but does not assign ordinal labels. 
The scale includes 11 answer categories ranging from 0 to 10. De Beuckelaer, Toonen, 
and Davidov (2013) demonstrate that for contingent valuation, 11-point Likert scale 
ensures best measurement validity and avoids transitivity errors. We also captured the 
extent to which participants considered paired aspirations as competing. This entailed 
the degree to which the pairs are deemed relevant trade-offs for both gender groups. 
For this, we used a 5-point Likert scale with ordinal labels, ranging from fully agree 
(5), to fully disagree (1).  
In our survey, we focused on sixth form high school students for two reasons. 
First, sixth form students are the most senior students in the Ugandan high school 
system and were expected to contemplate already on long-term, future-impacting life 
decisions, soon experiencing competing aspirations in real-life as dependency on 
parents comes to a close. Second, high school students have not yet attained life-
compelling achievements like marriage, full-time employment, or a graduate’s degree, 
                                                     
3 Interviews were not recorded and transcribed, as most of them were conducted in a mix of English and 
Lugisu. Per topic, the enumerators made notes based on what they considered relevant quotes and 
stories. The quotes of interviewees used in this paper are, therefore, the product of the translation of the 
enumerators, and should be interpreted as such. 
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in contrast to many of their non-school going peers. This eliminates potential 
justification of decisions adolescents made in the past that could bias survey responses. 
We randomly sampled at the class level. For the sample frame, we used a list 
of all high school classes in Mbale District and Sironko district, compiled by the 
municipality offices in both locations (but based on the data the schools provide to 
them).4 All students within classes sampled were invited to participate, leading to a 
potential sample of 650 students divided over eleven classes and eight schools; five 
classes in five schools in Mbale District, and six classes in three schools in Sironko 
District. 
We tested the description of pairs, wording of questioning, and response 
categories with adolescents at non-sampled schools in both urban and rural locations 
before presenting them to our participants. Detailed descriptions of the paired 
aspirations and the corresponding survey questions are presented in Appendix A.4.  
For each pair, the questionnaire in the appendix first provides a short 
description of each of the two aspirations paired. These descriptions are based on the 
results of the semi-structured interviews and refer to the accomplishments and benefits 
when an aspiration is attained. After the two descriptions, a statement follows that 
indicates that the attainment of both aspirations at the same time is not possible and 
explains why they conflict with each other. Respondents are then asked to indicate the 
extent to which they agree with that statement (i.e. the extent to which they conflict or 
not), after which they are asked to distribute ten tokens over the two aspirations paired. 
The distribution of the tokens reflects the importance of each of the two aspirations 
and indicates whether one aspiration is preferred over the other or whether they are 
valued equally.  
Over the period July-August 2016, 572 students participated in the study. The 
aspirations of students and their socioeconomic characteristics were elicited at the 
school location with the help of tablet computers. Respondents self-completed the 
                                                     
4 Initially, the study aimed to include only classes with a minimum of 30 students, but in reality, this 
appeared to be difficult. In general, student enrolment in Uganda is highly volatile as students face 
various challenges like raising tuition fees or (family) sickness, forcing them to drop out. Also, many 
schools register students manually and in writing, resulting in erroneous student records. Only after 
approaching schools, we discovered that actual enrolment numbers were often lower than mentioned in 
official records, and we, therefore, decided to continue our study with classes that we already had 
sampled.  
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questionnaire individually. To keep oversight on data collection, a maximum of six 
participants completed the questionnaire at the same time in the interview room. After 
completion, a new participant was invited, although participants’ group size could not 
exceed six. Questions were stated in English, which is also the official language at the 
schools selected, and participants took approximately 90 minutes to complete the 
questionnaire. Two local enumerators were present to provide instructions and to help 
participants with any queries regarding the questionnaire and tablet computer. On the 
tablets, visual aids were used to make filling out the questionnaire easier. For example, 
questions belonging to similar components (e.g. socioeconomic background, paired 
aspirations) were put together on one screen. After completing a component, the screen 
coloured green indicating all questions had been answered. Once a respondent 
completed the entire questionnaire, an enumerator checked responses to eliminate any 
invalid answers (e.g. typos) before submitting the survey to an online storage platform. 
 
2.4. Results 
 
2.4.1. Interviews; economic independence and six competing alternatives 
 
In this section, we elaborate on how the interviewees define the economic dimension, 
the motives for aspiring to it and its contribution to a better life, and how boys and 
girls experience competitive pressure from other aspirations. We start with a short 
description of how the respondents describe aspirations in their own words during the 
semi-structured interviews. In Lugisu, which is the dominant language of the Bagisu 
tribe in the greater Mbale area, the word aspiration does not have a direct translation. 
Aspirations are described as ‘byambaaso bye muutu byemumaaso bysi asibilirwa 
kurfuna’ and ‘bintu byesi usubila kukola mumaaso’. The first description can be 
translated as someone’s future plans that one intends to achieve, whereas the second 
description refers to things that you intend to do in the future. Both expressions relate 
to the intention to achieve a certain outcome in the future. Other words related to 
aspirations that were mentioned during the interviews are ‘bisubiro’, bisubizo’ and 
‘byambaaso’, which refer to expectations, promises (i.e. potential or possibilities), and 
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thoughts, respectively. Also, the notion of planning (‘kupanga’) and thoughts and 
ideas to a better (financial) situation (‘imbela’) were mentioned.5  
A close reading of the 38 semi-structured interviews with youngsters between 
18 and 23 years old yields a comprehensive perspective on the different aspirations 
and interpretations of the boys and girls living in rural Sironko and urban Mbale.6 The 
youngsters are well able to indicate what is realistically achievable in their current life 
situation, and also what is not; they do not aspire to dimensions they deem unrealistic 
to accomplish in the next five years. We use a five-year limit to make aspirations more 
realistic and to distinguish between aspirations and more general wishes or desires. 
Regarding what sets possibilities and what is considered realistic, however, girls point 
out that men have a strong influence on the aspirations of girls. On the base of what 
they deem appropriate, men determine the boundaries of what girls are allowed to do, 
which then defines what girls perceive as realistically achievable. We do not make a 
distinction between Mbale and Sironko when presenting the interview results as they 
do not reveal substantial differences between locations. 
Economic aspirations are given considerable importance and are broken down 
into income, ownership, and wealth. These terms are used interchangeably by the 
interviewees. The most popular route mentioned for attaining economic aspirations is 
setting up a business (‘shop’ or ’trading’). An 18-year-old girl states that “In Uganda 
today jobs are limited. So, if you have no business of your own you can die of poverty, 
even after going to school” (participant U1, personal communication, November 12, 
2015). A 20-year-old girl from rural Butaleja but now living in Mbale describes the 
steps that should lead to opening her clothing shop; 
 
                                                     
5 In May 2015, seven focus group discussions in the Budadiri area in Sironko were organised where 
participants discussed the meaning of aspirations and the characteristics that define them. The design of 
the focus group discussions and short analysis of the responses that lead to a context-specific 
characterisation of aspirations are presented in Appendix A.1. The aim of the focus group discussions 
was mainly to get familiar with the research area and to provide input for the design of the data collection 
instruments. The linguistic expressions in the appendix are in the Budadiri dialect (Ludadiri).  
6 A complete list of interviewees by age, gender, location and date of interview is attached in Appendix 
A.3.  
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Starting a business for lady clothes will help me to become financially 
independent and also improve my standard of living. Through hard 
work, I think it is achievable because I already started making mandazi, 
popcorns and crisps. If I continue saving for my project, in the future, I 
am sure I will open a boutique shop. I will also get a fridge and make 
juice for people, and I will continue selling food (participant U9, 
personal communication, November 14, 2015). 
 
A small-scale business can be started without any form of education and contributes 
more to status than farming. A 21-year-old boy in rural Sironko indicates that ”With a 
business, you will be known everywhere. You can borrow money and you are feared” 
(participant R17, personal communication, November 10, 2015). Farming is 
considered a start-up option which feeds into setting up a business, or functions as a 
backup option in case business attempts fail. Obviously, owning a business is believed 
to yield more independence than working for someone else.  
Boys and girls explain that their aspiration to start a business is primarily based 
on independence, gaining responsibility, autonomy, and being able to take care of 
others. A 20-year-old boy from rural Busiu but based in Mbale says that “I want to 
start a business to be self-employed and to make money, to take care of my family, and 
to show a sign of maturity” (participant U12, personal communication, November 14, 
2015). A 21-year-old Sironko based girl emphasises that when doing economically 
well “People within the community run to you for support and advice” (participant 
R16, personal communication, November 9, 2015). Others argue that independence is 
not always desirable as it demands a social sacrifice: “It also changes your behaviour, 
you become more tough” (participant U6, personal communication, November 13, 
2015). 
Boys and girls report aspiring to similar alternatives that compete with the 
aspiration to become economically independent. In random order, the interviews 
mention competing pressures from marriage, childbearing, community engagement, 
living near family and friends, peaceful relations with kin and obtaining higher 
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education. In the next section, the aspiration to each of these alternatives is shortly 
explained, and their trade-off with economic independence discussed.  
Boys and girls report marriage as a competing alternative. To marry is 
considered obeying social and religious norms and doing what is expected of young 
people. A 19-year-old girl from rural Busulani states that “If you are not married, 
people mock you” (participant R9, personal communication, November 7, 2015) and 
a 19-year-old boy from neighbouring Buyobo adds that marriage “gives you respect 
and maturity” (participant R13, personal communication, November 9, 2015). It is 
also considered an assurance of social security and support, which explains why girls 
are believed to frequently marry older men. However, once married, girls are often not 
allowed to work or are expected to do domestic work, limiting the possibility to spend 
time and effort on own employment. A 20-year-old girl from Mbale explains: 
 
It will block some of my aspirations. Like, if I marry now, the man might 
control me, and I would fail to become independent in my life. Some 
men do not want working women. So, I will be struggling to make him 
happy at the cost of my aspirations (participant U9, personal 
communication, November 14, 2015). 
 
Without contributing financially, girls’ decision-making power in the household 
declines, while dependency on spouses increases largely. Boys, on the other hand, 
report they need to be financially ‘established’ before they can marry, being able to 
take over the responsibilities of the girl’s family. A 19-year-old boy from rural 
Busulani states that “Getting a wife needs that you have prepared yourself” 
(participant R2, personal communication, November 5, 2015) and another boy sums 
up what it means to be prepared “By starting a business or getting employed, by 
constructing an own house, and by behaving responsible” (participant U16, personal 
communication, November 16, 2015). Marriage also demands a bride price. Boys 
often do not have those resources available and trying to obtain them could interfere 
with their economic endeavours. 
Connected to marriage is the aspiration of getting children. Like marriage, 
childbearing provides social status, and taking care of children creates an image 
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towards the community that the parents are responsible individuals. Children are also 
expected to take care of the parents at an older age. A 19-year-old Mbale based boy 
states that “In our tradition, having a wife and children is a sign of respect and 
maturity. They will help me in my old age, and provide labour” (participant U4, 
personal communication, November 12, 2015). However, boys and girls are aware of 
the implications of childbearing on economic aspirations. Girls report they do not just 
want to ‘produce’ and indicate that their economic activities are likely to be strained 
by the children they anticipate having. Consequently, girls mention that they prefer 
having children when they feel they have accumulated income that functions as 
personal, financial buffer. An 18-year-old girl from Buyobo says that “When you start 
up a business, and this business copes, and you are sure there is a reliable income, 
only then you can produce children. Because you are sure you can care for them” 
(participant R14, personal communication, November 9, 2015). Boys also mention 
competing pressure of children on economic independence. However, they express a 
strong preference for raising children and seem not to worry about the cost of 
upbringing. At the same time, boys indicate that the Gishu tradition of giving land can 
be costly with many children. A 21-year-old farmer from rural Busulani provides an 
example:  
 
Once you give your children land, you cannot go to their plantation to 
cut matoke. It no longer belongs to you. They can only do you a favour 
by giving you some matoke if they wish, but you have no right to cut it 
from their garden (participant R10, personal communication, 
November 7, 2015). 
 
Aspiring to becoming an active communal person bears practical and political 
relevance. Boys and girls aspire to engage in collective groups, as not participating 
excludes them from being allowed to take part in communal agricultural programmes 
or community-based NGO programmes. It also provides access to social safety 
networks. In that regard, the interviewees portray community engagement as a 
classical form of social capital, providing access to resources and support. An 18-year-
old girl from Busulani states “When you are not active, you will be excluded from 
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future projects, which often have agricultural benefits. The NGOs that come here only 
deal with groups” (participant R5, personal communication, November 6, 2015). 
Moreover, community engagement also contributes to building a personal reputation 
and allows access to decision making. However, community participation is 
considered demanding, time-consuming, sometimes ‘a waste of time’, without 
tangible benefits in the short-term, and takes its toll on the effort, time and resources 
that could otherwise have been invested in agricultural or business activities.  
Boys and girls also aspire to have peaceful relations with relatives, which, at 
the same time, is deemed a double-edged sword; on the one hand family helps out by 
offering support, but on the other hand, participants indicate that strong family ties can 
lead to jealousy, envy, and demand for sharing income when doing well. Interviewees 
mention that they aspire to be respected by family members for doing well, but also 
like to keep them at a distance to avoid being affected by them. Some interviewees 
even fear being harmed or killed in case of economic success. This goes together with 
a general belief in spiritually and witchcraft, which can only be exercised by close 
relatives. Envy is then a frequent motive to instigate such rituals. A 19-year-old girl 
from Busulani explains how jealousy, also known as ‘fitiina’ in the local language, 
takes shape in practice: 
 
Close family and friends can turn against you. If you accumulate wealth 
and you have your own business, you can bring family together in there. 
But they will steal from you and plan against you, plan your death 
(participant R9, personal communication, November 7, 2015).  
 
Living near family and friends is a related aspiration that is based on socioeconomic 
security, which also provides knowledge and labour when setting up labour-intensive 
economic activities like farming and animal husbandry. However, the family is also 
believed to be a burden to any personal development and the ability to think and plan 
for the future. Living near family hinders exposure to new ideas, which is perceived 
relevant for prospering economically. A 19-year-old boy from rural Buyobo explains: 
“The people you have lived with do not give you any new ideas, so you have to go far 
in order to learn new ideas. You will never develop and meet your goals” (participant 
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R13, personal communication, November 9, 2015). Moreover, local migration is 
sometimes deemed necessary to keep family members out of economic activities and 
the household. According to another 19-year-old boy, “Family and friends will keep 
on eating the small business that you have. When they borrow, they do not pay back 
normally. They are your family, and in the end, your shop can collapse" (participant 
R12, personal communication, November 7, 2015). When deciding to migrate, the 
interviewees explain they cannot just return to their communities in case of economic 
failure. They prefer to stay at their new location, even if that means lethargy. 
Moreover, obtaining higher education is a popular aspiration and boys and girls 
consider it the main gateway to a better life. Acquiring skills and knowledge are 
deemed essential in securing an office job or starting a successful business. In many 
cases, however, the family only pays tuition fees for the first couple of years, and most 
interviewees indicate they have to pay fees themselves, emphasising the necessity of 
finding work that generates sufficient income. Therefore, it is not unusual to take a 
break from school to collect money for fees and save money to create a financial buffer 
while being at school. Eventually, the individual needs to stop working to go back to 
school. A 20-year-old Mbale based girl states that: 
 
I cannot be at school and concentrate on starting an own business like 
a boutique. I intend to start my business, make an income, and then 
later will use the profits to pursue an education. I will not even have 
time to run my business then. School needs commitment (participant U9, 
personal communication, November 14, 2015). 
 
The dilemma that adolescents often face is whether they still see the necessity to go 
back to school. Going back means financial instability, funds saved may be used for 
other purposes, and former students may get accustomed to life with a relatively low 
but stable income and no educational obligations. 
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2.4.2. Descriptive statistics of socioeconomic characteristics 
 
In this section, we present the descriptives of the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
participants in our sample. Complete data are available for 572 Ugandan high school 
students, and basic descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3. 245 students (43%) live 
in the rural Sironko district and 337 students (57%) in the urban Mbale district. The 
sample consists of 359 boys (63%), and 213 girls (37%),  
 
Table 3. Descriptives of socioeconomic characteristics 
Variables Pooled Boys Girls Mean 
Difference  
Urban location (Mbale) 57% 51% 68% -0.17*** 
    (0.042) 
Household wealth index (PCA) 0.00 0.12 -0.21 0.33 
 (2.54) (2.62) (2.41) (0.218) 
Locus of control index (PCA) 0.00 -0.11 0.19 -0.30*** 
 (1.26) (1.31) (1.16) (0.108) 
Birth order 3.77 3.60 4.04 -0.43* 
 (2.80) (2.71) (2.94) (0.242) 
Religiosity (monthly participation in religious events) 4.92 4.64 5.39 -0.75 
 (5.46) (5.31) (5.63) (0.471) 
Father enrolled in secondary education or higher 50% 49% 53% -0.04 
    (0.043) 
Mother enrolled in secondary education or higher 40% 37% 44% -0.07* 
    (0.042) 
Father farming most important income activity 32% 35% 28% 0.06 
    (0.040) 
Father business most important income activity 19% 17% 22% -0.05 
    (0.034) 
Mother farming most important income activity 34% 37% 28% 0.09** 
    (0.041) 
Mother business most important income activity 16% 12% 24% -0.12*** 
    (0.032) 
N 572 359 213 572 
Notes. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard deviation in parentheses. For two-sided t-test, 
standard error in parentheses.  
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The household wealth index we use follows the approach suggested by Filmer and 
Pritchett (2001). They propose a linear index that proxies for household wealth, using 
asset ownership indicators and principal component analysis (PCA). To calculate our 
wealth index, we use the first factor of a PCA for which we use a set of assets we 
elicited information on through our questionnaire.7 Additionally, the locus of control 
index measures self-efficacy and is based on an instrument designed initially by Rotter, 
Liverant, and Crowne (1961). As both characteristics are indexed, pooled scores are 
not discussed. 8  
On average, students have a relatively high birth order. Half of the students 
indicate their fathers have been enrolled in secondary education or higher, whereas 
also a substantial number of students reveal that their mothers have been enrolled in 
secondary education or higher. The most important income generating activity of both 
parents is farming (including livestock herding). Students attend religious services 
approximately once every week. Girls attend more often than boys, but the difference 
is not statistically significant.  
The results of the two-sample t-tests in the last column of Table 3 reveal gender 
differences in a number of socioeconomic characteristics. First, the girls' sample is 
predominantly made up of urban students, whereas the boys' sample is more equally 
compiled. Also, girls have a statistically significantly higher birth order than boys and 
they also feel statistically significantly more in control of their lives than boys. A more 
substantial proportion of girls than boys have mothers who have been enrolled in 
secondary education or higher, as evidenced by a difference of 7%. Moreover, a 
statistically significantly larger proportion of boys than girls has a mother for whom 
farming is the most important income generating activity, while a statistically 
                                                     
7 The wealth index includes the following items: an independent house, walls of burned bricks with 
cements, floors of cement, a private water connection, a private flushed toilet, access to electricity, 
charcoal as cooking fuel, the number of cows, the number of bulls, the number of calves, the number of 
motorbikes, the number of cars, the number of fridges, the number of sofas, the number of (modern) 
beds, the number of radios, the number of tables, the number of chairs, the number of clocks, the number 
of televisions, the number of watches, the number of mobile phones, the number of computers, and the 
number of cabinets. 
8 Principal component analysis was used to compute the two indexes. For household wealth, only those 
items were included with eigenvalues higher than 10%. For locus of control, however, items were 
included with eigenvalues higher than 5%. If not, the index would be based on too few items.  
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significantly larger proportion of girls than boys indicates their mother runs a business 
as the most important income generating activity.  
These differences suggest that for girls to be enrolled in the sixth form, they 
need to have better socioeconomic characteristics than boys. This may partly explain 
the gender gap in school enrolment, with almost double the number of boys enrolled 
in the sixth form than girls, especially in Sironko where girls only make up 28% of the 
sample. It also points out a between-group difference in the sample, as boys and girls 
enrolled in the last class of secondary school come from different backgrounds.  
The gender gap in school enrolment and compositional differences between 
boys and girls in our sample correspond with the statistics of the most recent 
demographic and health survey in Uganda (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018b). 
Despite an increasing number of girls with an education, the report states that only 
6.3% of the women who fall in the age category 15-49 have completed secondary 
education or higher in the Bugisu region, whereas 11.1% of the men in the age category 
15-49 have completed secondary education or higher. The women who have 
completed secondary education or higher belong primarily to the highest wealth 
quintile, while the statistics for men with similar education levels show more variation 
in wealth quintiles. In addition, the current gross school attendance ratios for the 
Bugisu region (to which the Mbale district and Sironko district belong) reveal that still 
relatively more boys than girls attend secondary school in the Bugisu region.  
 
2.4.3. Descriptive statistics of paired aspirations 
 
In the following section, we discuss the scores assigned to the aspirations. First, we 
use a one-sample t-test to test whether participants consider the paired aspirations 
competing, which triangulates the interview findings. We then examine whether boys 
and girls aspire to one of the paired aspirations statistically significantly more than its 
alternative, using a one-sample t-test. We also use kernel density plots to graph gender 
differences in aspirations. In a final paragraph, we use a two-sample t-test to examine 
gender differences in aspirations.  
A one-sample t-test is used to examine the extent to which participants consider 
paired aspirations ‘competing’. The 5-point Likert scale includes a ‘neither disagree, 
nor agree’ option, represented by a response score of 3, and we test whether the mean 
responses are statistically significantly higher than this indifference point. As can be 
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seen in Table 4, the responses support the anecdotal findings from the qualitative 
interviews. The scores for each of the six pairs on whether the aspirations are 
competing or not are statistically significantly higher than 3. Therefore, we conclude 
that the six aspirations that we derived from the interviews are relevant alternatives 
that compete with the aspiration to become economically independent. We also test 
whether we find any gender differences in the level to which boys and girls consider 
the aspirations paired competing. The t-test results can be found in Appendix A.5 and 
show no statistically significant gender differences in five of the six pairs, implying 
they are equally relevant to boys and girls. When pairing economic independence with 
childbearing, however, we find that girls assign statistically significantly higher levels 
of competition between the two aspirations than boys. This is not surprising, as boys 
are less constraint by pregnancy.  
 
Table 4. One-sample t-test. Perception of competition between aspirations 
Paired aspirations Mean 
Economic Independence - Getting Married 3.40*** 
Economic Independence - Getting Children 3.36*** 
Economic Independence - Living in Peace with Relatives 3.57*** 
Economic Independence - Living Near Family / Friends 3.43*** 
Economic Independence - Active Community Member 3.66*** 
Economic Independence - Obtaining Higher Education 3.56*** 
Observations 572 
Notes. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. One-sample t-test, with H0: response = 3.  
 
To analyse the boys’ and girls’ responses to the extent to which economic 
independence is aspired in relation to competing alternatives, kernel density plots and 
one-sample t-test results are displayed in Figure 1. The horizontal axes of the plots 
represent a continuum between 0 and 10 (11-point Likert scale with cardinal 
properties) reflecting the distributional preference between economic independence 
and its alternatives. The kernel density plots and the one-sample t-test results provide 
insight in which aspiration per pair is preferred, together with the strength of the 
preference. The one-sample t-test compares whether the aspirations paired differ 
statistically significantly from the indifference score, represented by a Likert score of 
5 (i.e. the allocation of 5 coins to each aspiration paired). Per pair, only the score given 
to economic independence is tested, as it correlates perfectly with the score of its 
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alternative. At the top of each plot, we report the independent mean scores for boys 
and girls on economic independence, the aspiration representing the right end of the 
horizontal axis.  
The one-sample t-test results in Figure 1 show that in pair 1 (getting married), 
pair 2 (childbearing), and pair 4 (proximity of family and friends) the values boys and 
girls assign to economic independence are statistically significantly higher compared 
to our indifference point of 5. In pair 6 (higher education), the values boys (4.03) and 
girls (3.56) assign to economic independence are statistically significantly lower 
compared to the indifference score of 5. Boys feel indifferent about trading off 
economic independence with peaceful family relations (5.10) in pair 3. The value that 
girls assign to economic independence (5.31) in pair 3, however, is statistically 
significantly higher than the indifference score. Also, girls feel indifferent about 
trading off economic independence with community engagement (5.20) in pair 5, 
whereas the value that boys assign to economic independence (5.63) is statistically 
significantly higher than 5. The kernel density plots, however, do not graph large 
differences between the aspirations of boys and the aspirations of girls. In sum, the 
one-sample t-test results demonstrate that both boys and girls aspire statistically 
significantly more to economic independence than five out of six competing 
alternatives. 
A two-sample t-test of equal means is used to examine gender differences in 
the responses on the six pairs. The test results in the last column of Table 5 reveal that 
boys have statistically significantly higher economic aspirations when paired with 
community engagement and obtaining higher education than girls, evidenced by mean 
differences of 0.422 and 0.470. As the scores of paired aspirations correlate perfectly, 
a mirrored perspective implies that girls assign more value to the two competing 
alternatives than boys. 
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Figure 1. Kernel density plots of paired aspirations by gender 
   
 
   
Notes. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each plot reports the mean scores for economic independence and the results of a one sample t-test (with H0: score = 5) by gender. 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
D
en
sit
y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Boys (6.07***) Girls (6.00***)
0 = Marriage
10 = Economic Independence
Pair 1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
D
en
sit
y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Boys (6.18***) Girls (5.99***)
0 = Children
10 = Economic Independence
Pair 2
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
D
en
sit
y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Boys (5.10) Girls (5.31**)
0 = Peaceful Family Relations
10 = Economic Independence
Pair 3
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
D
en
sit
y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Boys (5.35***) Girls (5.27*)
0 = Living near Family/Friends
10 = Economic Independence
Pair 4
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
D
en
sit
y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Boys (5.63***) Girls (5.20)
0 = Community
10 = Economic Independence
Pair 5
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
D
en
sit
y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Boys (4.03***) Girls (3.56***)
0 = Education
10 = Economic Independence
Pair 6
56 
 
Table 5. Two-sample t-test. Aspiration levels by gender 
Paired aspirations Mean difference 
Economic Independence - Getting Married 0.074 
 (0.188) 
Economic Independence - Getting Children 0.198 
 (0.190) 
Economic Independence - Living in Peace with Relatives -0.207 
 (0.189) 
Economic Independence - Living Near Family / Friends 0.076 
 (0.187) 
Economic Independence - Active Community Member 0.422** 
 (0.185) 
Economic Independence - Obtaining Higher Education 0.470** 
 (0.182) 
Observations 572 
Notes. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard error in parentheses. The gender base level is 
boy. Each row represents an independent two-sample t-test.  
 
2.4.4. Regressions; gender differences 
 
In this section, we use multiple linear regression analysis to check the robustness of 
the two-sample t-test results. The ordinal properties of the survey responses allow 
ordinary least squares regression as analysis technique. Although an 11-point Likert 
scale is a set of ordered categories, we treat the aspiration scores as interval variables. 
We assume the underlying concept of assigning importance to aspirations as 
continuous, and intervals between the eleven points equal.9 We present a regression 
model with the scores on the paired aspirations as six dependent variables and gender 
as the explanatory variable. Our model also includes socioeconomic controls and class-
level fixed effects: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 + µ𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖               (1) 
 
                                                     
9 Existing studies demonstrate that dependent variables based on Likert scales can still be used for 
parametric tests, despite their ordinal properties, and often lead to robust inference. See, for example, 
Bollen and Barb (1981), Bollen, Glanville, and Stecklov (2001), and Norman (2010). 
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Here, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 represents the score assigned to economic independence in one of the six pairs 
of individual i. Gender effects are represented in 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖, and codes as 1 for girls, and 0 for 
boys. µ𝑐𝑐 are class-level fixed effects. The error term is captured in 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. The unobservable 
characteristics of students belonging to the same class may be correlated, for example, 
because of exposure to similar teachers, but they are not correlated with students in 
other classes. Therefore, standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the class 
level to deal with any remaining correlation of the error term within classes. 
Vector 𝑉𝑉 captures a set of socioeconomic controls to reduce the risk of omitted 
variable bias. Socioeconomic characteristics correlate with gender as the results of the 
two-sample t-tests have demonstrated in Table 3. Omitting socioeconomic variables 
allows the compositional differences between boys and girls to influence the gender 
coefficients, and as girls come from a relatively better socioeconomic background than 
boys, this may result in downward-biased estimates for gender on economic aspiration 
levels.  
We use the same set of controls for each pair of aspirations. The first control is 
a household wealth index score. In Uganda, girls enrolled in high school generally 
come from wealthier families (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018b), but in our sample, 
boys come from wealthier households.10 The household wealth index is primarily 
based on the assets of economically productive household members, and as students 
are unlikely to contribute significantly to the household wealth, we tackle potential 
endogeneity between economic aspirations and wealth. Moreover, we add a locus of 
control index to our set as the results from the two-sample t-test in Table 3 reveal 
statistically significant gender differences, with girls feeling more in control than boys. 
As we expect locus of control to also have an effect on economic aspirations, not 
controlling for it could bias the gender coefficients. We also include monthly religious 
participation, as girls in our sample participate more in religious services than boys 
although the difference is only marginally significant.11 Religious participation may 
                                                     
10 Although a two-sample t-test (Table 3) did not show any gender difference in household wealth levels, 
regressing the wealth index scores on gender reveals a statistically significant negative coefficient for 
girls (-0.699, p < .05) in our sample. As girls do better on all of the other socioeconomic characteristics, 
we expect boys to have over-reported their household assets. 
11 When regressing monthly religious participation on gender, the results indicate that girls participate 
1.2 times (p < .1) more in religious services than boys per month. 
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increase the importance of social aspirations like marriage and children and omitting 
it from the regression may lead to downward biased gender coefficients. Moreover, 
the socioeconomic characteristics of the parents shape the aspirations they have for 
their children, which in turn affects the aspirations of the students (Schoon, Martin, & 
Ross, 2007). This often differs for boys and girls. First, the type of work of the parents 
differs for boys and girls, as shown in Table 3. Therefore, we include income-
generating activities of the father and mother and add dummies for whether the parent 
farms, runs a business, has salaried employment, has other employment, or has died. 
Adding a category per parent to capture whether the parent has deceased or not allows 
us to also include students who have lost one or both parents. Without that category 
we could only include students of which both parents are still alive, which is not 
representative for the student population (25% of the respondents indicate they lost 
their father, and 10% indicate they lost their mother). Second, we add dummies for 
whether the father and mother have followed higher education (secondary school or 
higher) as highly educated parents not only transmit the importance of education to 
boys but invest in the education of girls more than low educated parents. Last, birth 
order is included, as girls have a statistically significantly higher birth order than boys.  
Several socioeconomic characteristics are not included as controls. First, 
despite statistically significant gender differences, age is excluded due to reliability 
issues (i.e. students not knowing their age or date of birth). Second, girls perform better 
at school than boys. However, including school results as control variable could lead 
to endogeneity issues (i.e. do aspirations shape school results or do school results shape 
aspirations?). We also exclude household size as no gender differences are found. 
Tribe is also excluded from our model. Not only do we not find any gender differences, 
but we also expect any potential aspirational differences to be caused by differing 
levels of traditionalism and customary beliefs, rather than differences between tribes.  
The regression results are presented in Table 6.12 We use two models to check 
the robustness of potential gender effects; a first simple linear model with class-level 
                                                     
12 As our sample is stratified based on location, we have also analysed rural/urban differences and 
gender differences in the two location subsamples. Without class-level fixed effects, a gender dummy 
and the set of control variables, we find location effects in pair 3 (peaceful relations) and pair 6 
(education). Mbale students aspire statistically significantly more to economic independence than 
Sironko students. These results are robust when adding a gender dummy and socioeconomic controls. 
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fixed effects but no socioeconomic controls, and a second multiple linear model with 
class-level fixed effects that adjusts for socioeconomic variables, which uses the fully 
specified model in equation (1). Each row in Table 6 represents a regression where the 
number of tokens assigned to economic independence in each of the pairs is regressed 
on gender. The full regression results that include the estimates for the socioeconomic 
controls can be found in Appendix A.6.  
 
Table 6. Gender differences in weights given in paired aspirations 
Paired aspirations (1) (2) 
Economic Independence - Getting Married -0.115 -0.281** 
 (0.158) (0.118) 
Economic Independence - Getting (more) Children -0.229 -0.382** 
 (0.182) (0.171) 
Economic Independence - Living in Peace with Relatives 0.070 0.002 
 (0.188) (0.192) 
Economic Independence - Living Near Family / Friends -0.200 -0.313** 
 (0.171) (0.154) 
Economic Independence - Active Community Member -0.513*** -0.651*** 
 (0.146) (0.175) 
Economic Independence - Obtaining Higher Education -0.620*** -0.644*** 
 (0.155) (0.157) 
Observations 572 572 
Controls No Yes 
Notes. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. OLS regressions with class-level fixed effects. Bootstrapped 
standard errors clustered at the class level and in parentheses. The gender base level is boy, and the 
coefficient represents the effect of girl=1. Each row represents a separate regression where a different 
pair of aspirations (i.e. the number of tokens assigned to economic independence) is regressed on 
gender, while each column represents a different model (i.e. with and without control variables). 
 
As can be seen in the first column of Table 6, the results of the simple linear model are 
corresponding with the findings of the two-sample t-test in Table 5. Including gender 
                                                     
However, apart from pair 5, we do not find differing gender effects in the two location subsamples when 
using a Chow test. Many students from rural areas attend school in Mbale, which could explain the lack 
of location effects. These regression results are also in line with the open-ended interviews that did not 
reveal substantial differences between Sironko and Mbale. For the sake of statistical power, we use the 
full sample in the remainder of the paper. 
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as a single explanatory variable reveals effects in the 5th and 6th pair at the 1% level. 
However, this model does not reduce the risk of omitted variable bias. Therefore, we 
add socioeconomic controls and find statistically significant gender effects on 
aspiration levels in five of the six pairs, as the last column in Table 6 shows. The 
gender effect no longer captures the partial effect of the omitted socioeconomic 
variables. For gender, all statistically significant estimates are negative. With boys 
being the reference category, this means that girls attach, on average, statistically 
significantly more value to the competing alternatives of economic independence than 
boys. 
All estimates need to be interpreted on a measurement scale of 0 to 10 (i.e. 
participants allocated ten tokens over two aspirations). To help interpret any gender 
differences we add graphs in Appendix A.7 illustrating the predicted weights (i.e. 
marginal effects) that boys and girls assign to economic independence in each pair of 
aspirations. Per pair, the difference in predicted weights of boys and girls is the 
corresponding coefficient presented in Table 6. In the first pair, the coefficient of -
0.281 indicates that girls aspire to marriage more than boys, which represents a 5% 
gender difference in the predicted weights. The coefficient of 0.382 in the second pair 
shows that girls aspire to bear children more than boys, and the predicted margins 
reveal a 6% difference in the weights assigned. No gender effect is found in the third 
pair, which means that boys and girls trade off economic independence with living in 
peace with relatives similarly. In the fourth pair, girls aspire to live near family and 
friends more than boys, and the predicted margins reveal a 6% gender difference. The 
most substantial gender effects are found in the last two pairs. Girls aspire more to be 
an active community member than boys, and the gender difference in the weights given 
to the two paired aspirations is 11%. Last, the negative coefficient in the sixth pair 
illustrates that girls aspire to obtain higher education more than boys, and the 
coefficient of 0.644 reveals a 16% gender difference. Altogether, the differences 
between boys and girls are considerable in size, confirming our hypothesis that boys 
and girls value different aspirations that fit their gender prescribed roles.  
 
2.4.5. Regressions; individual fixed effects 
 
So far, we have examined the paired aspirations independently, assessing the 
importance of competing aspirations only in direct relation to economic independence. 
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We are also interested in testing the importance of each competing aspiration relative 
to the importance of other alternatives, and whether the order of importance of 
alternatives differs for boys and girls. This test reveals whether some aspirations are 
more aspired to, and thus more competing to economic independence than others and 
whether that effect is moderated by gender. To investigate the relative importance, we 
reshape the data in a long format so that each student has six observations that represent 
the scores assigned to the alternative aspirations (i.e. panel data). This allows using an 
individual fixed effects regression. The first model includes the six competing 
alternatives as single regressor: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + µ𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖              (2) 
 
with 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 being the score assigned by individual i to the alternative aspiration in pair p. 
For each of the six alternatives, a dummy variable is included in vector 𝐴𝐴. The error 
term is captured in 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. We add individual-level fixed effects in µ𝑖𝑖 to capture any 
individual-specific confounding factors and cluster standard errors at the level of the 
individual. Table 7 illustrates the results of six models, using a different competing 
alternative to economic independence as the reference category in each model. So, in 
principle, each model in Table 7 presents the same regression model, but for 
interpretation reasons we use a different alternative aspiration as base category, 
resulting in six regressions. This allows us to observe how each alternative aspiration 
relates to the other five alternatives. Consequently, the regression coefficients are 
mirrored on both sides of the diagonal axis of Table 7. 
The results reveal that the values assigned to the six competing aspirations 
differ significantly from one another. Starting with obtaining higher education, Model 
(6) in the last column shows that higher education is statistically significantly more 
aspired to than any of the other five competing alternatives to economic independence 
at the 1% level, and obtaining higher education is, therefore, the most important 
competing alternative to obtaining economic independence. Obtaining higher 
education as most important aspiration is then followed by living in peace with 
relatives, which is statistically significantly less important than education, but more 
important than community engagement, children, and marriage, as can be observed in 
Model (3). No significant difference is found between living in peace with relatives 
and living near family and friends. The third most aspired to alternatives are 
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community engagement and living near family and friends which are considered less 
important than education and living in peace with relatives, but are given significantly 
more weight than marriage and children as shown in Models (5) and (4). Fertility and 
marriage are considered the least competing alternatives to economic independence, 
as shown in Model (1) and Model (2) in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. The relative importance of competing alternatives 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Getting Married Ref 0.068 -0.862*** -0.722*** -0.575*** -2.184*** 
 
(.) (0.098) (0.105) (0.107) (0.112) (0.115) 
Getting Children -0.068 Ref -0.930*** -0.790*** -0.643*** -2.252*** 
 
(0.098) (.) (0.100) (0.102) (0.108) (0.111) 
Peace with Relatives 0.862*** 0.930*** Ref 0.140 0.287*** -1.322*** 
 
(0.105) (0.100) (.) (0.090) (0.102) (0.104) 
Living near Family 0.722*** 0.790*** -0.140 Ref 0.147 -1.462*** 
 
(0.107) (0.102) (0.090) (.) (0.093) (0.105) 
Community 0.575*** 0.643*** -0.287*** -0.147 Ref -1.608*** 
 
(0.112) (0.108) (0.102) (0.093) (.) (0.107) 
Higher Education 2.184*** 2.252*** 1.322*** 1.462*** 1.608*** Ref 
 
(0.115) (0.111) (0.104) (0.105) (0.107) (.) 
Constant 3.958*** 3.890*** 4.820*** 4.680*** 4.533*** 6.142*** 
 
(0.072) (0.067) (0.062) (0.061) (0.068) (0.073) 
Adjusted R2 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 
N 3432 3432 3432 3432 3432 3432 
Notes. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Individual fixed effects regression. Standard errors clustered 
at the individual level and in parentheses. Each model represents the same regression model but takes a 
different aspiration as reference category. 
 
To examine whether the order of importance of alternatives differs for boys and girls, 
we add an interaction with gender to the regressions in the following way: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  + µ𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖             (3) 
 
The interaction term 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 estimates a gender difference in the relative importance of 
alternative p. As individual fixed effects are captured in µ𝑖𝑖, we do not add a separate 
term for gender in model (3). The regression results are presented in Table 8. 
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Table 8. The relative importance of competing alternatives by gender 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A.  
Getting Married Ref 0.114 -0.967*** -0.721*** -0.446*** -2.036*** 
 
(.) (0.121) (0.129) (0.130) (0.138) (0.140) 
Getting Children -0.114 Ref -1.081*** -0.836*** -0.560*** -2.150*** 
 
(0.121) (.) (0.123) (0.127) (0.136) (0.140) 
Peace with Relatives 0.967*** 1.081*** Ref 0.245** 0.521*** -1.070*** 
 
(0.129) (0.123) (.) (0.106) (0.122) (0.130) 
Living near Family 0.721*** 0.836*** -0.245** Ref 0.276** -1.315*** 
 
(0.130) (0.127) (0.106) (.) (0.112) (0.130) 
Community 0.446*** 0.560*** -0.521*** -0.276** Ref -1.591*** 
 
(0.138) (0.136) (0.122) (0.112) (.) (0.137) 
Higher Education 2.036*** 2.150*** 1.070*** 1.315*** 1.591*** Ref 
 
(0.140) (0.140) (0.130) (0.130) (0.137) (.) 
Panel B.  
Getting Married * Girl Ref -0.124 0.281 -0.002 -0.348 -0.396 
 
(.) (0.205) (0.219) (0.227) (0.236) (0.244) 
Getting Children * Girl 0.124 Ref 0.405* 0.122 -0.224 -0.272 
 
(0.205) (.) (0.208) (0.212) (0.223) (0.229) 
Peace with Relatives * Girl -0.281 -0.405* Ref -0.283 -0.629*** -0.677*** 
 
(0.219) (0.208) (.) (0.193) (0.217) (0.214) 
Living near Family * Girl 0.002 -0.122 0.283 Ref -0.346* -0.394* 
 
(0.227) (0.212) (0.193) (.) (0.197) (0.219) 
Community * Girl 0.348 0.224 0.629*** 0.346* Ref -0.048 
 
(0.236) (0.223) (0.217) (0.197) (.) (0.218) 
Higher Education * Girl 0.396 0.272 0.677*** 0.394* 0.048 Ref 
 
(0.244) (0.229) (0.214) (0.219) (0.218) (.) 
Constant 3.958*** 3.890*** 4.820*** 4.680*** 4.533*** 6.142*** 
 
(0.072) (0.067) (0.062) (0.061) (0.068) (0.073) 
Adjusted R2 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.179 
N 3432 3432 3432 3432 3432 3432 
Notes. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Individual fixed effects regression. Standard errors clustered 
at the individual level and in parentheses. Each model represents the same regression model but takes a 
different aspiration as reference category.  
 
Again, we use each alternative aspiration as base category in the regression, resulting 
in six regressions presented in the columns of Table 8. Panel A of the table shows the 
relative importance of the competing aspirations for boys relative to becoming 
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economically independent. Starting with the most aspired to alternative, we observe in 
Model (6) that boys aspire the most to obtaining higher education, which is considered 
statistically significantly more important than any of the other alternatives. As second-
most important aspiration, boys aspire to living in peace with relatives as shown in 
Model (3). In contrast to the pooled sample, we observe a significant difference 
between living in peace with relatives and living in the proximity of family and friends. 
Model (4) illustrates that living near family and friends is the third most important 
aspiration. Community engagement is aspired to less than obtaining higher education, 
living in peace with relatives, and living near family and friends, but is aspired to more 
than marriage and childbearing. Similar to the pooled sample, these two aspirations 
are aspired to the least, as all coefficients in in Model (1) and Model (2) are negative. 
Boys are indifferent, however, in the extent to which they aspire to children and 
marriage.  
We now move to panel B of Table 8, which reveals how girls differ from boys 
in valuing the competing aspirations relative to becoming economically independent. 
The significant coefficients in Model (6) suggest that girls aspire to obtaining higher 
education statistically significantly more than boys when compared to living in peace 
with relatives and living near family and friends. The results for community 
engagement in Model (5) reveal similar findings. Girls aspire to becoming an active 
community member statistically significantly more than boys when compared to living 
in peace with relatives and living near family and friends. Moreover, girls aspire to 
childbearing more than boys when compared to living in peace with relatives, but 
Model (2) shows this difference is only marginally significant. We do not observe a 
gender difference in the extent to which boys and girls aspire to getting married in 
Model (1).  
In sum, the individual fixed-effects regression results presented in Table 7 and 
Table 8 add to the previous OLS regression findings of Table 6 and demonstrate that 
boys and girls value the competing alternatives to economic independence differently. 
They illustrate that obtaining higher education is undoubtedly the most important 
competing alternative to economic independence for both gender groups but for girls 
statistically significantly more than for boys in Models (3) and (4). Girls also aspire to 
becoming an active community member and bearing children more than boys when 
compared to living in peace with relatives and living near family and friends. 
Alternatively, the regression results signify that after obtaining higher education, 
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maintaining peaceful relations with relatives and living near relatives and friends are 
important competing aspirations to economic independence for boys, to which they 
aspire more to than girls when compared with community engagement and 
childbearing. 
 
2.5. Discussion of the results 
 
This section brings together our results and positions the findings in relation to existing 
studies. We first discuss the relevance and importance of the pairs of aspirations to 
both gender groups and then elaborate on gender differences in economic aspirations. 
Last, we discuss the implications of our findings for policy and interventions that aim 
to increase girls’ economic empowerment.  
In the interviews, boys and girls reveal that their economic aspirations revolve 
around independence and autonomy and compete with six alternative aspirations. On 
the base of this, we paired economic independence with the six alternatives in our 
survey. The one-sided t-test results reveal that boys and girls consider all six pairs of 
aspirations competing. In the levels of competition between aspirations, we find one 
gender difference, which indicates that girls deem childbearing more competing to 
economic independence than boys. This finding corresponds with a large body of 
literature (Agüero & Marks, 2011; Aldaz-Carroll & Morán, 2001; Cáceres-Delpiano, 
2012; Canning & Schultz, 2012; Cao, 2019; Wong & Levine, 1992) that shows that 
childbearing has a direct adverse effect on the economic opportunities of women in 
developing countries, especially regarding labour force participation and the type of 
work pursued.  
The one-sample t-test results in Table 4 provide evidence that boys and girls 
aspire to economic independence statistically significantly more than to most of its 
alternatives, apart from obtaining higher education. That girls, like boys, strongly 
aspire to economic independence relates to Narayan, Patel, Schafft, Rademacher, and 
Koch-Schulte (2000), who claim that gender identities are shifting, and an increasing 
number of women contribute financially to the household now. Also, Langevang and 
Gough (2012) show that the social status of working young women has improved, 
while Kabeer (1997) states that women consider greater independence as highly 
desirable, accomplished through an own income. However, when we regress the 
aspiration scores on gender and control for socioeconomic variables, we find five 
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gender effects. These gender differences reveal a significant gap in the economic 
aspirations of boys and girls, where girls aspire statistically significantly more to the 
competing alternatives that affect their economic empowerment. In the next sections, 
we discuss the five gender effects in relation to studies on similar issues and elaborate 
on their implications.  
The regression result of the first pair of aspirations (economic independence vs 
marriage) indicates that girls aspire to marry more than boys as an alternative to 
economic independence. To relate our findings to marital behaviour in Uganda, we 
look at the 2016 Uganda Demographic and Health Survey (Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics, 2018b), which shows that 1.9% of boys aged between 15 and 19 are in union 
(i.e. marriage or cohabitation), whereas for girls in the same age range this percentage 
is ten times higher at 19.9%. The age category 20 to 24 also demonstrates large gender 
discrepancies in being in union, with 33.8% of boys and 64.0% of girls living in union. 
Naturally, dominant social norms prescribe that girls should marry at an early age, 
which means that girls are often forced to marry younger than boys. In addition, girls 
are also more frequently victims of early child marriages, and are forced to marry to 
avoid the shame of pregnancy outside the marriage, all causing a gender discrepancy 
in union. Our findings demonstrate that girls also aspire stronger to getting married 
than boys as an alternative to economic independence, which could also be the result 
of these dominant social norms. Girls then aspire to certain life goals that society 
considers the most appropriate for them. This means that these norms not only have a 
direct effect by forcing young girls into marriage, but they also indirectly shape the 
aspirations of girls, ultimately contributing to marrying at a younger age than boys. 
This gender difference in marital aspiration is thus anchored in existing gender 
systems, as Mason (2001) states, where society pressures girls to marry at an earlier 
age than boys. However, in addition to this pressure there may also be an economic 
explanation which is relevant for girls but not boys. Girls who want to get married 
early may also act out of economic rationality. Zwang (2004), for example, 
demonstrates that South African girls’ marital aspirations are driven by the desire to 
obtain financial support from spouses. 
The regression results also demonstrate that girls aspire to childbearing more 
than boys as competing alternative to economic independence (second pair of 
aspirations). This concurs with findings that illustrate that gender norms shape 
childbearing aspirations of girls (Adams et al., 2013) and young women’s status 
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largely depends on their fertility, defining entry into adulthood (Gupta, 1995). 
However, fertility desires of girls in sub-Saharan Africa are also motivated by the idea 
of having an extended family and relying on economic support from children in later 
life (Caldwell & Caldwell, 1987). Moreover, infertile and childless women are 
stigmatised, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, and often experience domestic violence, 
economic deprivation, and psychological distress (Larsen, Hollos, Obono, & 
Whitehouse, 2010; McCloskey, Williams, & Larsen, 2005). Childless men share these 
consequences less (Fledderjohann, 2012). Even though Ugandan fertility preference 
statistics illustrate that boys want more children (5.4) than girls (4.8) (Uganda Bureau 
of Statistics, 2018b), our result may signpost that girls aspire stronger to the actual 
‘accomplishment’ of bearing a child, showing their fertility potential at young age, 
securing social status and avoiding stigmatization.  
When pairing the aspiration to living near family and friends with economic 
independence (third pair of aspirations), we find a third gender difference, with girls 
aspiring to the former more than boys. An explanation of this effect could lie in the 
differing levels of freedom boys and girls experience from family. Aspirations of 
independence are formed in interaction with family members, and the explicit and 
implicit expectations they place on youngsters, and the gender norms that come with 
them (Whitehead, Hashim, & Iversen, 2007). As a consequence, women are more 
under patriarchal control of kinship and community than boys. Boys are then more 
likely than girls to leave family behind to migrate and find employment, pursue 
economic opportunities, and build new human capital which is believed to accelerate 
economic independence (Langevang & Gough, 2009). 
We also find a gender difference in the fifth pair (economic independence vs 
community engagement). The regression results reveal that girls aspire to actively 
engage with their community more than boys as an alternative to economic 
independence. This result is linked to studies that have shown that women in sub-
Saharan Africa struggle to build social capital, especially nonfamilial, which affects 
their ability to obtain and exchange information and their economic output (Fafchamps 
& Minten, 2002; Katungi, Edmeades, & Smale, 2008). Frequently mentioned causes 
relate to gender norms and the abundance of responsibilities around the household. 
Therefore, communal activities provide the scarce opportunity to build social capital 
for women outside the household. Such community engagement can take various 
forms, from informal interactions with neighbours to more fixed, gender-based forms 
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like church groups, savings and micro-finance groups, who can stimulate girls in 
collective action and improve their autonomy and decision making power (Alemu et 
al., 2018; De Hoop, van Kempen, Linssen, & van Eerdewijk, 2014). In that way, 
community engagement is a more subtle, nuanced mechanism for girls to obtain 
influence and autonomy, which can motivate women to invest in social networks with 
other women in particular (Narayan et al., 2000). 
Last, we find that both gender groups aspire to obtaining higher education more 
than to obtaining economic independence (sixth pair of aspirations). This is not 
surprising, as our participants are high school students and belong to a relatively highly 
educated elite. Students are, therefore, very much aware of the merit of their education 
and the employment opportunities it offers them, especially when compared to the 
opportunities of peers who have dropped out of school. However, also here we find a 
gender difference in the aspiration to obtain higher education. Girls find education 
more important than boys. A plausible explanation for this difference in our research 
context could be that educated girls not only belong to a relatively more elite group 
than educated boys, but education also qualifies them for a type of employment that is 
more beneficial to them, like office jobs that require less manual labour (Duflo, 2012). 
Altogether, the gender differences reveal an aspiration gap between boys and 
girls that needs to be closed. To feel economically empowered, young girls need to 
break a poverty trap where girls aspire to their gender prescribed roles. Our result 
concurs with studies that demonstrate that gender norms define women’s roles, which 
lower aspirations and limit what young girls consider possible employment in society 
(Field, Jayachandran, & Pande, 2010). These gender norms are difficult to change, as 
Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov (2012) show in their study on Afghanistan. To break 
that cycle, development policies should not only aim to raise the economic aspirations 
of girls but also aim to address the social empowerment issues that maintain gender 
inequalities. As aspirations are shaped in early life, interventions that target adolescent 
girls are then more effective than interventions that target women at later stages in life 
(Heckman & Mosso, 2014).  
Vocational training and entrepreneurship promotion among young women, in 
combination with social empowerment, has most potential to accelerate women’s 
empowerment. There are a number of policy interventions that have taken an intensive, 
multi-faceted approach and have proven successful. One of the main programmes is 
The Adolescent Girls Initiative (AGI), launched in 2008 by The World Bank to get an 
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understanding of how best to facilitate girls’ transition from school to productive 
employment. The interventions that are part of this programme are aimed at addressing 
the challenges girls face in their economic endeavours from competing pressures like 
childbearing and early marriage, and negative gender norms regarding women’s 
employment. Some impact evaluations have demonstrated the success of this 
programme in sub-Saharan Africa. Adoho, Chakravarty, Korkoyah, Lundberg, and 
Tasneem (2014) provide evidence that the Liberia programme largely increased the 
employment and earnings of treated girls, relative to non-treated girls. It also increased 
their confidence in personal relationships with spouses and partners, relaxing existing 
gender norms. Botea, Chakravarty, and Haddock (2015) evaluated the Rwanda 
programme and show a strong increase in girls’ employment, especially in businesses, 
wage employment and internships, and a substantial increase in the earnings and 
savings of girls. As a consequence of this, entrepreneurial confidence grew, and social 
networks of girls expanded. Also outside this programme, similar initiatives have been 
implemented, as shown by Bandiera et al. (2017) who evaluate a programme that 
focused on school going girls and girls that had dropped out of school. Their evaluation 
reveals that a combination of technical skills and life skills increased employment, 
mainly driven by self-employment activities. The programme also reduced teen 
pregnancies, early marriage and cohabitation, and, more importantly perhaps, it 
impacted the long-term aspirations of girls, with girls shifting the ideal age for 
marriage and childbearing upwards. 
When interpreting our main findings, we should bear in mind that the female 
students have a relatively better socioeconomic position than the male students. Their 
socioeconomic background is presumed to come with a more liberal outlook on life 
that is less bound to gender norms and provides better access to employment 
opportunities that make higher economic aspirations more realistic and attainable. 
When comparing these female students with male students from socioeconomically 
less prosperous families, we still find significant gender differences in their economic 
aspirations. Our results are thus very likely underestimations and conducting a similar 
analysis with a more representative sample from our research area would probably 
lead to more substantial aspiration differences between boys and girls. That said, the 
girls in our sample will still very likely experience substantial competing pressures 
from other alternatives that will limit their future economic opportunities in the 
70 
 
transition from school to employment, which the boys in our sample will suffer to a 
much lesser degree. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
Our study examines gender differences in the aspirations of adolescents in Uganda in 
the economic, social and educational domains, which compete with each other for 
time, effort and resources. Using semi-structured interviews to identify the relevant 
aspirations of boys and girls in the greater Mbale area in Uganda we found that their 
economic aspirations revolve around independence and autonomy. The results of these 
interviews also showed that economic aspirations compete with six alternative 
aspirations in the social and educational sphere. In random order of importance, these 
alternatives are childbearing, marriage, living near family and friends, living in peace 
with relatives, engaging with the community, and obtaining higher education. In a 
second step, we paired the aspiration to become economically independent with the 
six competing alternatives in a survey to elicit the individual aspirations of high school 
students. The one-sample t-test results show that apart from obtaining higher 
education, boys and girls aspire to obtaining economic independence statistically 
significantly more than to each of the alternatives. Boys aspire to economic 
independence the most when paired with getting children, while girls aspire to 
economic independence the most when paired with getting married. Although boys are 
undecided between economic independence and living in peace with relatives and girls 
between economic independence and community engagement, our results stress the 
importance of economic aspirations to boys and girls.  
As the male and female students have different socioeconomic backgrounds, 
with girls coming from socioeconomically ‘better’ households than boys, we control 
for socioeconomic variables in our OLS regression model. We observe that girls aspire 
to five of the six alternative aspirations statistically significantly more than boys do. 
In order of largest to smallest absolute gender difference, the results reveal that girls 
aspire more to engaging actively in the community, obtaining higher education, getting 
children, living in the proximity of family and friends, and getting married than boys 
do. We do not observe a gender difference in the trade-off between living in peace 
with relatives and economic independence.  
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We also studied the relative importance of each alternative to economic independence 
and examined whether their order of importance differed for boys and girls. The results 
from the individual fixed effects regressions show that obtaining education, living in 
peace with relatives and living in the proximity of family and friends are the most 
important alternatives to economic aspirations. From the six alternatives we list in this 
study these aspirations have the most constraining influence on the aspiration to 
obtaining economic independence. Getting married and getting children are the least 
important alternatives to the economic aspirations of youngsters. However, in the order 
of importance we also found gender differences. For boys, maintaining peaceful 
relations with relatives is significantly more constraining to their economic 
independence than for girls, whereas for girls obtaining higher education and engaging 
with the community are significantly more constraining to their economic 
independence than they are for boys.  
In sum, our results reveal important gender differences in the economic 
aspirations of youngsters with girls aspiring to alternative aspirations more than boys. 
Policies that are aimed at increasing the economic empowerment of girls should, 
therefore, not only focus on vocational training and entrepreneurship promotion. Our 
result demonstrate that interventions can only be successful if they also include an 
empowerment component that alleviates the internal constraints of girls’ economic 
aspirations which result from negative gender norms regarding women’s employment 
and strong social pressure to obey dominant gender roles. 
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Chapter 3. Peer effects in aspirations through social 
networks in Uganda 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the extent to which the aspirations of adolescents are influenced by the 
aspirations of their friends. For this, we elicit data on the aspirations of more than 500 high 
school students in Uganda. Aspirations are made context-specific and operationalised, 
identifying trade-offs between economic aspirations and three competing aspirations in the 
social sphere. Considering classmate friends as important friends, we elicit the friendship ties 
students have with their classmates. To identify peer effects in aspirations, we instrument the 
aspirations of friends with the characteristics of non-overlapping friends. In two of the three 
pairs of aspirations, we find positive peer effects. High school students influence each other in 
the weight given to aspirations to live in the proximity of family and friends, and aspirations 
to engage with the wider community, relative to economic aspirations. Our results imply the 
existence of important peer effects among high-school students, which can be useful for 
development programmes aimed at lifting the aspirations of young people.  
 
Keywords: aspirations, peers, social networks, non-overlapping peers, instrumental variable 
estimation, GMM.  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
There is a strong link between poverty and aspirations. The ability of people to invest 
effectively in their future, which is essential to escape poverty, draws heavily on their 
‘capacity to aspire’ (Appadurai, 2004). To identify pathways out of poverty, it is 
therefore important to understand how aspirations are formed. We assume that most 
aspirations take shape during adolescence, as it is during this period in life that one 
starts to develop an idea of what one could and would like to achieve in their life. 
Moreover, aspirations are “formed in interaction and the thick of social life” 
(Appadurai, 2004, p. 67). An important channel through which adolescents’ 
aspirations are formed is through peer influences among classmates. The aspirations 
of classmates function as important reference points, which help shape what is 
considered important and achievable in the future. 
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To improve our understanding of the role of peer effects among adolescents in the 
formation of aspirations, we identify trade-offs between economic independence and 
three aspirations in the social sphere. We assume that aspirations are competing, and 
youngsters experience competition from social alternatives when trying to obtain their 
economic independence. These social alternatives are often the result of social norms 
and obligations that hinder the economic empowerment of young people. Various 
development programmes endorse this rationale and have demonstrated that in order 
to improve economic empowerment, social empowerment issues need to be addressed 
as well (see, for example, Bandiera et al. (2017) on a programme that targets Ugandan 
girls). Peer influences could help shape economic aspirations while lowering the 
perceived importance of social alternatives.  
We elicit the weight given to the aspirations in each pair of a sample of 538 
high school students in Uganda. We also collect data on the friendship ties students 
have with their classmates. To identify the extent to which aspirations are influenced 
by the aspirations of friends in the classroom, we instrument friends’ aspirations with 
the socioeconomic characteristics of non-overlapping friends. We also control for 
class-level fixed effects and a number of individual and contextual characteristics. We 
find evidence in support of positive peer effects in two of the three pairs of aspirations. 
Several studies are related to ours. First, some studies paid attention to peer 
influence on aspirations in a developing country context. Beaman et al. (2012) 
demonstrate that female leadership inspires adolescent girls’ career aspirations in 
India. Bernard et al. (2014) provide evidence from Ethiopia that watching a 
documentary about successful people from similar communities significantly 
increases the aspirations of individuals, which stimulates their educational spending 
and time they spent on work. Macours and Vakis (2014) use geographical proximity 
and communication patterns to analyse the role of social interactions in shaping 
aspirations in Nicaragua. They provide empirical evidence that local leaders affect 
households’ capacity to aspire, which stimulates productive investment behaviour. 
Second, outside development economics, a growing number of studies have 
focused on peer effects within social networks. Bramoullé et al. (2009) validate the 
use of friendship networks of secondary school students to identify peer effects in the 
consumption of recreational services. De Giorgi et al. (2007) use a similar 
identification strategy and present evidence that an individual is more likely to choose 
a college major when peers make the same choice. Also, Cingano and Rosolia (2012) 
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and Arcidiacono et al. (2012) use individual specific networks to investigate peer 
effects in employment rate and school performance respectively. Goldsmith-Pinkham 
and Imbens (2013) add to this and develop models that allow endogeneity of peer 
group formation. 
In sum, while several studies have looked at peer influence in the formation of 
aspirations in a developing country context, none of them has taken account of the 
social networks through which such peer effects take place. Our study bridges both 
literatures, by following the approach developed by a growing number of economists 
that look at social effects within social networks. We also contribute to the latter 
literature, as peer effects in networks on aspirations have not been studied yet. While 
most studies focus on peer effects in behaviour, we examine peer effects in stated 
preferences. Our study highlights the potential of social interactions in changing 
aspirations.  
First, we present an economic model in section 2 which explains the 
mechanism behind social effects. This is followed by our identification strategy in 
section 3. Section 4 describes the results and section 5 concludes and discusses the 
implications for development policy.  
 
3.2. Social effects: conforming to the norm of friends 
 
In the next section, we present an economic model to explain why individuals adapt 
their aspirations to their peers, and to increase our understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms of peer effects. Various studies provide theoretical frameworks that 
explain this behaviour. Kandel and Lazear (1992), for example, provide a framework 
that demonstrates that peer pressure incentivises workers and that they get penalised 
when working less (e.g. free-riding) than the norm. Moreover, not conforming to social 
norms increases the distance between the individual and the group average, resulting 
in a loss of reputation and social status. Also, the model Bernheim (1994) proposes 
highlights the importance of status. Individuals have heterogeneous preferences but 
act homogeneously, as deviating status will impair social status. In addition, Akerlof 
(1997) presents a model of social distance, implying that individuals with similar 
social status and hierarchy interact, while interaction with those further away is 
limited. Acting differently from like-minded peers may then lead to negatives like 
envy or jealousy, providing incentives to keep distances between peers low. 
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We take these frameworks as a starting point and adjust a social network model that 
considers the average aspirations of friends as the social norm in an individual’s social 
neighbourhood. The individual incurs a cost when deviating from this norm. 
Therefore, each individual wishes to conform to the average aspirations (i.e. social 
norm) of their friends as much as possible to maximise his or her utility. In the 
literature, this model is also known as the local average model and is used in Boucher, 
Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2014), Liu, Patacchini, and Zenou (2014), and 
Patacchini and Zenou (2012), amongst others. In this model, conformism positively 
influences the utility of the individual. Patacchini and Zenou (2012, p. 2) define 
conformism as “the idea that the easiest and hence best life is attained by doing one’s 
very best to blend in with one’s surroundings and to do nothing eccentric or out of the 
ordinary in any way”. In sum, conformism revolves around the action to integrate into 
the social environment and to obey dominant norms that prescribe preferences and 
corresponding behaviour.  
Each individual derives utility from having certain initial aspiration levels. But 
each individual has an individual-specific set of close friends in his or her class. We 
assume that an individual’s utility decreases with the distance from the average 
aspiration levels of his or her close friends. The individual maximises his or her utility 
by keeping the distance between the individual aspiration levels and the average 
aspiration levels of their own individual-specific reference group as small as possible. 
To formalise this, we use the economic framework suggested by Patacchini 
and Zenou (2012) and Liu et al. (2014) and apply it to students and their classmates. 
The direct social connections (i.e. close friends) between students are registered in the 
adjacency matrix 𝐆𝐆 = [g𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖], where g𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 if student 𝑖𝑖 reports student 𝑗𝑗 as close friend, 
and g𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0 otherwise. The set of 𝑖𝑖’s friends is 𝑖𝑖’s reference group and is denoted as 
𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = �𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖�g𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1�. The size of 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 is then g𝑖𝑖= ∑ g𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 , and assuming that there are 
no isolates in the classroom (i.e. every student reports at least one close friend) g𝑖𝑖 > 0. 
As we look at the average aspiration level of friends, the adjacency matrix 𝐆𝐆 is row-
normalised, as denoted by 𝐺𝐺∗ =  [g𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ], with g𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  = g𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  / g𝑖𝑖. It means that we always 
have 0 ≤ g𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  ≤ 1 and ∑ g𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 . 
The aspiration level of individual 𝑖𝑖 is denoted as 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖, and the average aspiration 
level of the population in 𝑖𝑖’s individual-specific network 𝑟𝑟 is denoted as 𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟 =(𝑦𝑦1𝑟𝑟 , … ,𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟). The average aspiration level in 𝑖𝑖’s network 𝑟𝑟 is established by all 
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students in the network at the same time to maximise their individual utility. Based on 
Becker (1996) and Liu et al. (2014) we suggest the following utility function 
 u𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(y𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟) = u𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(y𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟;  Y𝑟𝑟 , G𝑟𝑟) = 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟∗ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 − 𝜆𝜆 �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 −� g𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟∗ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖=1
�     (1) 
 
which has a structure with two components that represent the benefits and costs of, in 
our case, aspiration levels. The first component is denoted as a linear function of a 
student’s own aspiration level y𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟, and the term 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟∗ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 represents the return to the 
individual aspiration level. The ex-ante heterogeneity in the return to the aspiration 
level is denoted as 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟∗  and captures the differing initial aspiration levels of students 
(i.e. before social comparison). This means that not every student has the same 
aspiration base level before exposure to others, and students may have a different 
ability to aspire to a certain level and dimension. The term 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟∗ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 implies that a 
different location of student 𝑖𝑖 in the network 𝑟𝑟 does not influence the benefits of an 
aspiration level.  
The cost component of the utility function is denoted as �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 − ∑ g𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟∗ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖=1 � 
and reflects the cost of deviating from the social norm of the network, represented by 
the average aspiration level of the friends of student 𝑖𝑖. The parameter 𝜆𝜆 is the social 
conformity coefficient, which reflects the desire for conformity. In the utility function 
(1), 1 ≥ 𝜆𝜆 ≥ 0, where 1 implies that a change in an individual’s aspiration level 
correlates fully with a change in the average aspiration level of the local network (full 
social conformity), or 0 if the individual is not affected at all (no social conformity). 
As each student reports a different set of friends, they have individual-specific 
networks, which implies that the entire social conformity term is heterogeneous.  
A student’s utility decreases with the deviation from the average aspiration 
level of his or her individual-specific network of close friends. The closer student 𝑖𝑖’s 
aspiration level is to the average aspiration level of friends, the higher the utility of 
student 𝑖𝑖. On the base of this, we expect the aspiration levels of student 𝑖𝑖 to positively 
correlate with the average aspiration levels of student 𝑖𝑖’s friends. 
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3.3. Research methods 
 
To elicit the aspirations of students we use a questionnaire with interdependent 
choices, requiring respondents to value their aspirations in relation to competing 
alternatives. A Likert scale is used to indicate the strength of preference. The 
questionnaire also has a section to elicit friendship ties. Students are provided with a 
list of the names of all classmates, and for each individual in their class, they are asked 
to indicate whether they are close friends.  
 
3.3.1. Eliciting aspirations and friendship ties 
 
To elicit the aspirations of students and their friendship ties we conducted two phases 
of fieldwork. First, at the end of 2015, we conducted 38 open-ended interviews with 
young men and women in the urban Mbale district and the rural Sironko district in the 
east of Uganda to provide input for the development of the instrument. The interviews 
formed the base for the development of the pairs of aspirations. For these interviews, 
we sampled respondents from rural and urban areas, purposively selected to represent 
a diverse set of young people, ranging from young teenagers to older adolescents. the 
age limits in Sironko were set at 18 to 21, while in Mbale the age limits were less strict 
and set at 18 to 23. The reason for using different upper age limits is that we expect 
young people living in rural communities to face life-determining decisions at a 
younger age than adolescents in urban areas, particularly decisions in the social 
domain. Rural areas often have fewer educational and economic opportunities that 
could motivate young people to reconsider and postpone their social aspirations. 
Therefore, extending the age limit beyond the age of 21 in Sironko would potentially 
allow the inclusion of respondents who have already reached life-determining 
achievements or experienced life-determining incidents such as marriage or getting 
children.  
During the interviews, we collected stories on how young people and those 
around them experienced trade-offs between their economic aspirations and several 
alternatives in their attempt to improve their future lives. The economic aspirations 
that were referred to during the interviews revolved around wealth, independence, 
autonomy, and nurturing of others, while their alternatives addressed issues of 
marriage, fertility, education, sense of belonging, peaceful relations, and community 
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engagement. Respondents also explained how they experienced competition between 
them. From this, we distilled a selection of three pairs of competing aspirations that 
both girls and boys in Uganda experience in their daily lives. 13 In each of the pairs, 
the aspiration to become economically independent stands central and competes with 
an alternative aspiration in the social sphere: the aspiration to have peaceful relations 
with family, the aspiration to live in the proximity of family and friends, and the 
aspiration to engage in the wider community. The three competing social aspirations 
all share a communal component (i.e. focused on friends, family, or community), 
which helps with the relevance of the selected instruments and the identification of 
possible peer effects in the third section of this paper.  
In a second stage of the fieldwork period, we conducted a questionnaire that 
included questions on the pairs of aspirations and questions on socioeconomic 
background. The questions on the pairs of aspirations invited the respondents to 
allocate ten fictive tokens over the two aspirations in one pair, allocating more tokens 
the stronger they preferred one aspiration over the other. As a result, responses have 
cardinal properties that not only reveal which aspiration is preferred over the other but 
also captures the intensity of the preference. When both aspirations are perceived as 
good alternatives, interdependent valuation allows respondents to indicate one 
aspiration is considered the better of two, without discarding the opportunity also to 
allocate a value to the second-best aspiration. Without this imposition, participants 
could potentially have reported high aspiration levels on every dimension included in 
the questionnaire, irrespective of one another, which could have led to invalid 
responses. The number of tokens that could be allocated ranged from 0 to 10. Although 
such a precise valuation of alternatives is cognitively demanding, eleven answer 
categories ensure best measurement validity for contingent valuation, resulting in the 
highest consistency of answers and lowest levels in transitivity compared to nine or 
                                                     
13 In the open-ended interviews, the respondents reported a total of six alternative aspirations to 
economic independence. For identification reasons this paper only focuses on peaceful relations with 
family, the proximity of family and friends, and community engagement, as they share a communal 
component. Consequently, this paper does not assess endogenous peer effects in marriage, fertility, or 
education. Moreover, we expect the three selected pairs to be the most relevant to the students (as 
evidenced by the individual fixed effects regression results presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis), which 
means that students are believed to interact with other students on these three trade-offs more frequently 
than on other trade-offs.  
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seven scale points (De Beuckelaer et al., 2013). In addition, the numerical values of 
tokens were not given ordinal labels to guarantee responses held their cardinal 
properties. 
The questionnaire also elicited the perception of students on the level of 
competition between the two aspirations paired together. Using a five-point Likert 
scale with ordinal labels, ranging from completely disagree (1), to completely agree 
(5), we aimed to triangulate the results from the open-ended interviews and examine 
whether participants’ perceptions were corresponding with the conceptualisation that 
aspirations compete with each other. Per pair, a question on the level of competition 
preceded the allocation of coins.  
To investigate the effects of social interactions on aspirations, friendship ties 
were elicited with the help of an exhaustive list of classmates. Students were asked to 
indicate whom of their classmates they considered close friends by putting marks 
behind their names.14 We did not impose a maximum limit on the number of close 
friends, which allowed us to capture the entire friendship network of each respondent. 
By capturing the entire friendship network, we expected to improve the identification 
of peer effects.15  
The questionnaire, the description of paired aspirations, the wording of the 
questions, and response categories were tested extensively with adolescents before 
presenting them to the sampled respondents. An overview of the pairs of aspirations 
and descriptions can be found in Appendix A.4. An example of the friendship ties 
questionnaire is presented in Appendix B.1.  
 
                                                     
14 When we elicited the friendship ties among students, we also aimed to elicit ‘aversive' ties. We asked 
participations also to indicate with whom they could not get along with in their class, to investigate 
whether conformity would work the other way around for such ties. In practice, this turned out difficult 
to implement as students did not report many aversive ties, most likely because they did not want to be 
disloyal on any of their classmates to outsiders (e.g. enumerators).  
15 We did not make use of images or photographic material and considered lists with the names of 
students sufficient for respondents to identify their friends for two reasons. First, respondents were 
students in their final year of high school and were expected to be literate, and second, we asked them 
about their relationship with other students with whom they interacted in a delineated space (the 
classroom) on a daily base, instead of asking about relationships with others in a less delineated space 
like a village or town with whom they may have interacted on a less frequent base.  
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3.3.2. Sampling 
 
In our sampling procedure, high school classes are the sampling unit. We define a class 
as a formalised group of students enrolled in a particular form at school. We randomly 
selected eleven Ugandan high school classes from a sampling frame that lists all sixth 
form high school classes in the Mbale district and Sironko district. The focus on school 
classes has several advantages when measuring peer effects in aspirations. First, the 
sixth form classes consist of students that soon need to make life-determining decisions 
but have not yet accomplished life goals like owning a business, getting children, 
getting married, or obtaining tertiary education. This makes their aspirations very 
relevant, as they will not justify the accomplishments they have had or the decisions 
they have made in the past. Second, schools provide an environment wherein students 
interact with a fixed, distinct set of peers (e.g. self-contained network). Peer effects 
can only be examined when the information about the network is accurate and 
complete, requiring the full participation of the entire population. Third, as pupils are 
physically present at school most of their time, therefore mainly interacting with 
classmates, adolescents’ aspirations are expected to be strongly influenced by 
classmates' aspirations (social interaction effect). Also, existing survey data suggests 
that the vast majority of young people selects their most important peers from the 
schools they are enrolled in (Gaviria & Raphael, 2001). 
We elicited the aspirations and friendship ties of 538 students at the school 
location. We also collected information on important socioeconomic characteristics 
like gender, family structures and household wealth. The questionnaire was self-
completed in the interview room at the school location, and we did not let more than 
six students enter this room at the same time. After a student completed his or her 
questionnaire, a new respondent was invited, so the number of respondents in the room 
would never go beyond six. Survey questions were posed in English, and participants 
took approximately 90 minutes to answer all questions. Two Ugandan enumerators 
invited students into the interview room and provided instructions and assistance when 
filling in the questionnaire.  
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3.3.3. Identification strategy: the use of non-overlapping peers 
 
We estimate the peer effect by making use of a modified version of the linear-in-means 
model of social interactions, originally introduced by Manski (1993): 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑌𝑌�−𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝛾𝛾�−𝑖𝑖 + µ𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,  𝐸𝐸 [ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 | 𝐱𝐱 ] = 0.     (2) 
 
Here, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is the score on one aspiration in a pair of aspirations of individual 𝑖𝑖. Individual 
characteristics of individual 𝑖𝑖 are collected in vector X.16 In addition, we assume that 
aspirations are also influenced by the interactions of individuals in friendship 
networks, in the following two ways. First, the contextual effects, which are the 
exogenous characteristics of peers, may have an indirect influence on an individual’s 
aspiration level through its effect on peers’ aspirations. For example, individual 𝑖𝑖’s 
economic aspirations may not only be affected by individual 𝑖𝑖’s own household 
wealth, but also by the average household wealth of the peers. Peer characteristics are 
then measured as individual 𝑖𝑖’s network averages (i.e. the average characteristics of 
individual 𝑖𝑖’s friends) of vector X minus the individual and illustrated as 𝛾𝛾�−𝑖𝑖. 
Second, the endogenous peer effect, which is the average aspiration level of 
peers, influences individual aspirations directly. The average aspiration levels of peers, 
not including the scores of the individual, are labelled  𝑌𝑌�−𝑖𝑖. The extent to which 
individual aspirations are influenced by those of peers is then represented by 𝛽𝛽, which 
is the peers’ effect we are interested in. If the estimate of 𝛽𝛽 is positive, a change in the 
aspiration levels of individuals within a reference-group would be predicted to spill-
over to other individuals in the same reference group (e.g. social multipliers).  
Both the contextual effect and the endogenous peer effect are social effects, 
but they suggest different policy interventions. The endogenous peer effect provides 
the possibility of social multiplier effects, where a change in an individual’s set of 
aspirations spills over to peers. The effect of a policy intervention can then spill-over 
from treated individuals to non-treated individuals, while exogenous effects point out 
                                                     
16 We treat the underlying concept of assigning importance to aspirations as continuous, and intervals 
between the 11 answer categories as equal. Therefore, the cardinal responses allow ordinary least 
squares regression as analysis technique. 
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that a change in group composition can have an effect on the aspirations of individual 
𝑖𝑖. 
When estimating both social effects, we also need to take account of the 
correlated effect (also called the confounding effect), which implies that individuals 
face a similar institutional environment which allows a set of network invariant 
unobserved characteristics to influence both an individual’s and peers' aspiration 
levels. For example, students are exposed to the same school policies, have lessons 
from the same teachers, and students’ families may base the choice of school to send 
their children to on the same unobserved factors. Moffitt (2001) states this is not a 
social effect and needs to be controlled for to avoid biased inferences about the 
relevance of social influences that arise from social interaction: the endogenous peer 
effect estimate will most likely be overestimated. Although it seems unlikely that 
selection of schools by families would be based on aspirations, the selection of friends 
within schools may be. Friendship ties could, therefore, be based on factors plausibly 
correlated with aspirations, such as similar levels of household wealth, family 
composition, or age.  
To control for correlated factors (i.e. network invariant unobserved variables), 
class-level fixed effects are represented in µ𝑐𝑐. Each class is considered a fixed entity 
in which friendship networks are formed. For this model with class-level fixed effects 
to work, we must assume [ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 | 𝐱𝐱 ] = 0, implying all regressors are exogenous and class-
level unobservables that have an effect on the aspirations of individual 𝑖𝑖 and the 
aspirations of 𝑖𝑖’s friends are absent.  
The linear-in-means model as proposed in equation (2), however, does not 
solve the reflection problem first suggested by Manski (1993). The reflection problem 
points out simultaneity of aspiration levels of interacting individuals in a group. It 
implies that the mean aspiration levels of a group and the individual belonging to the 
group move in the same direction, which poses a challenge to distinguish between the 
various social effects in equation (2). Not correcting for the reflection problem would 
lead to an overestimation of the endogenous peer effect.  
In addition to this reflection bias, the linear-in-means model in equation (2) 
also does not solve the exclusion bias, first mentioned by Guryan, Kroft, and 
Notowidigdo (2009). Caeyers and Fafchamps (2016) elaborate further on this bias and 
point out that it stems from the non-random assignment of friends, as an individual 
𝑖𝑖 cannot be included as their own friend. They explain that the exclusion of the 
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individual 𝑖𝑖 in the potential group of friends (i.e. the classroom) leads to a negative 
mechanical relationship between 𝑖𝑖’s aspiration and the aspiration of potential friends 
in the classroom (as the pool to select friends from). If 𝑖𝑖 has a higher aspiration level 
than the average aspiration level of the classroom, the average aspiration level of the 
remaining potential friends in the classroom is lower than 𝑖𝑖. If 𝑖𝑖 has a lower aspiration 
level than the average aspiration level of the classroom, the average aspiration level of 
the remaining potential friends in the classroom is higher than 𝑖𝑖. It leads to a negative 
correlation between individual 𝑖𝑖’s aspiration level and the average aspiration level of 
friends that are eventually nominated to be friends (Caeyers & Fafchamps, 2016). 
Using ordinary least squares as estimator as suggested in the linear-in-means model in 
equation (2) will then result in a downward bias because of the negative mechanical 
relationship.  
To solve the reflection bias and the exclusion bias, we use the approach 
suggested by Bramoullé et al. (2009) which demonstrates that partly overlapping 
networks (i.e. variation in reference groups) allow the identification of endogenous 
effects. To explain this approach in more detail, we label the individual 𝑖𝑖 as ego from 
here on. Each ego has an individual-specific social network, also called the reference 
group, and ego’s aspirations are shaped by their friends’ aspirations, but also indirectly 
through the aspirations of their friends’ friends. In the absence of correlated effects, 
the presence of intransitive triads (the friends of ego’s friends who are not ego’s 
friends) in ego’s network is a condition for the identification of social effects. 
Therefore, we extend model (2) and change the model into a matrix form:  
 
𝐲𝐲 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽𝐆𝐆𝐲𝐲 + 𝛾𝛾𝐱𝐱 + 𝛿𝛿𝐆𝐆𝐱𝐱 + µ + 𝜀𝜀,  𝐸𝐸 [ 𝜀𝜀 | 𝐱𝐱 𝐆𝐆 ] = 0.      (3) 
 
In equation (3), 𝐆𝐆 is an n × n interaction matrix for n students in the network, with 𝐆𝐆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
=1 if student 𝑖𝑖 and student 𝑗𝑗 are friends, and 𝐆𝐆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0 otherwise. Individual 
characteristics are collected in the n × 1 vector 𝐱𝐱. Class-level fixed effects are 
represented in µ which control for the correlated effect and sorting of students into 
classes. We assume that including class-level fixed effects also simultaneously 
captures any unobservable influence experienced by ego and its non-overlapping 
peers. Instrumenting the aspirations of ego’s friends with the exogenous 
socioeconomic variables of the non-overlapping friends of ego should therefore also 
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capture any correlated effects at the level of friends. Under equation (3), 𝜀𝜀 is 
independent from 𝐱𝐱 and 𝐆𝐆, but not independent or uncorrelated with 𝐲𝐲, and thus also 
with 𝐆𝐆𝐲𝐲 (Goldsmith-Pinkham & Imbens, 2013). However, the parameters 
𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽, 𝛾𝛾 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝛿𝛿 are only identified when E [ 𝜀𝜀 | 𝐱𝐱 ] = 0 (no correlated effects), and when 
we apply restrictions on the interaction matrix 𝐆𝐆 of a single network: First, the 
restrictions require that 𝐆𝐆𝟐𝟐𝐱𝐱 correlates with 𝐲𝐲 through 𝐆𝐆𝐲𝐲. Second, the restrictions 
necessitate injectivity, which means that the interaction matrix needs to be exogenous 
and cannot include mutually-exclusive groups nor fully-overlapping groups of friends. 
Each network of friends needs to be individual-specific (i.e. each network of friends is 
unique) and cannot fully overlap with other networks, which allows individuals that 
are not ego’s friends to be included in the network as friends of other friends. To 
address simultaneity and get an unbiased estimator for 𝛽𝛽, we need to compute the 
reduced form of equation (3):  
 
𝐲𝐲 = 𝛼𝛼(𝐈𝐈 − 𝛽𝛽𝐆𝐆)−1𝛼𝛼 + (𝐈𝐈 − 𝛽𝛽𝐆𝐆)−1(𝛾𝛾𝐈𝐈 + 𝛿𝛿𝐆𝐆)𝐱𝐱 + (𝐈𝐈 − 𝛽𝛽𝐆𝐆)−1𝜀𝜀.     (4) 
 
Here, 𝐲𝐲 is a vector of aspiration scores for the classroom 𝐈𝐈 (identity matrix) and 𝛼𝛼 the 
corresponding n × 1 vector of 1s. We follow Bramoullé et al. (2009) who demonstrate 
that, as critical rank restriction, the model is identified if and only if 𝐈𝐈,𝐆𝐆, and 𝐆𝐆𝟐𝟐 are 
linearly independent (so no bipartite network where each individual is directly linked 
to all other individuals and friends are overlapping), and the network does not partition 
the population. 𝐆𝐆𝟐𝟐 then captures the friends of friends’ interactions. It implies that 
𝐸𝐸 [ 𝜀𝜀 | 𝐱𝐱 𝐆𝐆 ] is not perfectly collinear with 𝐆𝐆𝐱𝐱, meaning 𝐆𝐆𝟐𝟐𝐱𝐱, 𝐆𝐆𝟑𝟑𝐱𝐱, etc. are valid 
instruments for ego’s friends. As we only include the socioeconomic characteristics of 
friends of friends who are not ego’s friends in 𝐆𝐆𝟐𝟐𝐱𝐱, the covariance characteristics are 
unlikely to correlate with the error term. This is the exclusion restriction imposed. 
Moreover, Caeyers and Fafchamps (2016) explain that adding 𝑖𝑖’s value for the 
instrumental variables included in 𝐆𝐆𝟐𝟐𝐱𝐱 successfully removes exclusion bias that could 
lead to underestimating the peer effect of 𝐆𝐆𝐲𝐲. As the exogenous characteristics 
included as instruments in 𝐆𝐆𝟐𝟐𝐱𝐱 are averages of ego’s friends’ friends which correlate 
with 𝐆𝐆𝐲𝐲, then 𝑖𝑖’s values of the instruments should also correlate with 𝐲𝐲. In the second 
stage of the IV/2SLS, the covariance between 𝐆𝐆𝐲𝐲 and 𝑖𝑖’s own value of the instrument 
should be 0 (Caeyers & Fafchamps, 2016, p. 26).  
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Also, the class-level fixed effects included in equation (3) do not deal with correlated 
effects at the friends level (i.e. sorting into friendship networks), but only with sorting 
into classes. However, as we instrument 𝑌𝑌�−𝑖𝑖 with 𝐆𝐆𝟐𝟐𝐱𝐱, we also deal with correlated 
effects at the friends’ level, as the characteristics of non-overlapping friends are not 
expected to correlate with the characteristics of the ego. To control for possible 
correlated effects at the class-level, which include potential correlated effects at the 
individual network level, each class should consist of one interconnected network. We 
will test this assumption in the empirical section. 
For 𝐆𝐆𝟐𝟐𝐱𝐱, we use the average of eight exogenous characteristics of ego’s 
friends’ friends who are not ego’s friends as a set of identifying instruments. As we 
use more instruments than we have endogenous regressors our model is overidentified. 
The set includes gender, a household wealth index score, a dummy for whether the 
individual belongs to the Gisu tribe, birth order, age, a dummy for whether the 
individual lives with both parents, a dummy for whether the individual has a romantic 
partner (i.e. boyfriend or girlfriend), and a locus of control index score.17 As the same 
set of variables is also used to capture the effects of individual characteristics of the 
ego and as contextual effects (characteristics of the friends), we explain their expected 
relationship with aspirations first in light of how a change in the characteristics of ego 
may correlate with ego’s aspiration level. After that, we explain how the same 
variables are used again to capture the contextual effects.  
First, we include gender in our set of instruments because gender norms shape 
aspirations. Boys aspire to economic independence, while girls attach more relative 
importance to social alternatives (see Chapter 2 of this thesis on gender differences in 
economic aspirations). The average household wealth is also expected to have a 
positive effect on economic aspirations. The wealthier the household of ego, the more 
ego aspires to obtain economic independence. In addition, we add a dummy if ego is 
from the dominant Gisu tribe (1=Gisu tribe, 0=other tribe), which is anticipated to raise 
ego’s economic aspirations at the expense of social alternatives. Gisu culture puts a 
strong emphasis on individual levels of independence and autonomy (Heald, 1998). 
Birth order is also considered a determinant of the aspiration to obtain economic 
independence. Individuals of either sex with a low birth order are expected to be 
                                                     
17 The household wealth index is based on Filmer and Pritchett (2001). The locus of control index is 
based on Rotter et al. (1961). 
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among the first in line to marry and start a life of their own. On the base of this, we 
hypothesise that birth order correlates negatively with economic independence. We 
also expect the average age of ego to positively correlate with ego’s economic 
aspirations. Older youngsters experience pressure to rely less on their social network 
and become more responsible for their own income generation. Moreover, we add a 
dummy for having a romantic partner (1=partner, 0=no partner). Having a partner 
could increase ego’s felt necessity to become economically independent and start an 
independent life as a couple. Moreover, Dalton et al. (2018) shows that locus of control 
positively correlates with economic aspirations. An increased feeling of being in 
control of life could render ego’s belief that living standards can be improved through 
obtaining one’s own independence. Last, we add a dummy for living with both parents 
to our set of instruments (1=living with both parents, 0=other living arrangements). 
Living with both parents can highlight the importance of social aspirations like living 
near family and having peaceful relations with them. However, being a maternal, 
paternal, or full orphan, or living with foster parents like relatives or neighbours, can 
lower ego’ social aspirations while raising the aspiration to become individually 
economic independent as alternative.  
We use the same variables to capture the contextual effects, which capture a 
direct effect of the peers’ characteristics on ego’s aspiration levels, that do not work 
via the aspirations of ego’s friends. For example, a large proportion of friends with a 
boyfriend or girlfriend in ego’s peer group can have a direct effect on ego's economic 
aspirations, as he or she feels the necessity also to become more serious about an 
independent future and starts thinking about how to prepare for an independent life 
with a partner. Another example relates to the average household wealth of ego’s 
friends. A relatively wealthy group of friends (on average) could stimulate ego’s 
economic aspirations as he or she is encouraged by the wealth that friends and their 
households display (e.g. owning expensive mobile phones, a car or a motorcycle). In 
both examples, the contextual effect on ego’s aspirations does not necessarily work 
via the aspirations of ego’s friends. 
 
3.4. Results 
 
In this section, we present the results. In a first subsection, we present descriptive 
statistics on the individual exogenous variables of students, which also function as 
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contextual effects for friends. We also discuss whether the three pairs that we have 
drafted are considered competing, to examine whether our starting point of competing 
aspirations holds value. In a second subsection, we present the OLS regression 
estimates and the results of IV-2SLS and two-step GMM regressions, which estimate 
the peer effects using the non-overlapping peers' approach.  
 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 9 shows the average socioeconomic characteristics of the 538 students who 
participated in the study. Girls constitute more than a third of the sample, while Mbale 
based students make up slightly more than half of the sample.18 The vast majority of 
the students indicate they belong to the Gisu tribe. On average, students are 20 years 
old which indicates that their aspirations and the trade-offs they experience between 
them can be very different from non-school going peers at that age. This holds 
especially for female students. What also stands out is that students have a relatively 
high birth order and only half of them still live with both parents. Moreover, half of 
the students included in this study indicate they have a romantic partner (i.e. boyfriend 
or girlfriend). We do not discuss household wealth and the locus of control measure 
here as they are indexed (computed using the first component of a principal component 
analysis), and their mean scores are centred around 0.  
In terms of friendship characteristics, respondents report one fifth of all 
classmates as a close friend (i.e. 20% of all potential ties is reported as a friendship 
tie). In absolute numbers, this implies that a student nominates an average number of 
almost eleven close friends. In our initial dataset, 99.97% of the students are reported 
as friends by at least one other student, and 91% of the respondents have at least one 
other friend, confirming a nominated friendship tie. Nevertheless, only 30.67% of all 
nominated friendship ties are reciprocated by other students. As a result, using the 
reciprocated ties would cause difficulties with the non-overlapping peers' approach 
(i.e. for many students we would not find any non-overlapping peers, and their 
exclusion from the sample would lead to an impracticable small sample size), and we 
                                                     
18 Although we make use of a stratified sample with rural/urban as dimension, the sample sizes of the 
two location subsamples are too small to examine endogenous peer effects in the two locations 
separately with IV/2SLS estimation and our set of instruments.  
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therefore only use the nominated friendship ties to investigate peer effects in 
aspirations. 19  
 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics of socioeconomic characteristics 
Variable Mean  SD 
Mbale based 59% - 
Female 38% - 
Gisu tribe 69% - 
Birth order 3.80 2.84 
Household wealth index (PCA) 0.06 2.56 
Partner (i.e. boyfriend or girlfriend) 54% - 
Age (years) 19.67 1.52 
Locus of control index (PCA) 0.01 1.26 
Living with both parents 53% - 
Nominated friends* 10.84 10.52 
Ratio class size / reported friends 19.93 17.51 
Observations  538 
Notes. *Minimum of nominated friends needs to be at least 1, as a student is otherwise an isolate in the 
network.  
 
Per pair, the perceived level of competition between the aspirations is presented in 
Table 10. When comparing the mean scores of all three pairs, we find that pair 3 – 
economic independence vs community engagement – has been assigned the highest 
competition score out of a total of 5. The lowest competition score is assigned to the 
second pair where economic independence is paired with living near family and 
friends. The results of the one-sample t-test, where we test whether the competition 
scores are statistically significantly higher than the neutral value of 3 (which represents 
the ordinal label ’neither agree nor disagree’), reveal that all average mean scores in 
the three pairs are statistically significantly higher. Therefore, the one-sample t-test 
                                                     
19 In total, 19 isolated students (i.e. no nominated ties) are removed from our dataset. Students are 
isolated if they do not nominate any friends in the classroom, and hence do not have a reference group. 
After deletion of the 19 isolates, we also deleted 1 student with no non-overlapping peers from the 
dataset. In addition, 31 students nominated only 1 outgoing tie which was reciprocated for 18 of these 
students but this was sufficient for the non-overlapping peers' approach to work. 
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results in Table 10 confirm our conceptual starting point that aspirations are 
competing.20 
 
 Table 10. One-sample t-test; perception of competition scores 
Pair Mean SD 
Economic independence - peaceful relations with relatives 3.56*** 1.21 
Economic independence - proximity of family/ friends 3.44*** 1.22 
Economic independence - active community member 3.67*** 1.17 
Observations  538 
Notes. * p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<0.01. One sample t-test, with H0: average conflict score = 3. Perception 
of competition scale ranges from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). 
 
Table 11. Descriptives of aspiration scores 
Pair Mean* SD 
Economic independence - peaceful relations with relatives 5.12 2.17 
Economic independence – proximity of family/ friends 5.29 2.15 
Economic independence - active community member 5.49 2.14 
Observations  538 
Notes. * The mean scores for egos represent the average score assigned to the first aspiration of the pair.  
 
Table 11 presents the mean aspiration scores of ego. Per pair, only the mean score 
referring to the first aspiration mentioned in the pair is presented, as the scores of 
paired aspirations correlate perfectly. The mean of the third pair where the aspiration 
to become economically independent is traded off against becoming an active 
community member has the most substantial difference in ego’s scores between two 
aspirations. This is followed by the second pair where the aspiration to become 
economically independent is traded off against living near family and friends. The pair 
with the smallest difference is then the first pair where economic independence is 
                                                     
20 We also find a strong correlation in pair 1 and 2 between the perceived level of competition and the 
level of outspokenness (i.e. distance from the neutral point 5, where both aspirations receive an equal 
weight) regardless of the aspiration preferred. This suggests that the more a respondent perceives the 
two aspirations as impossible to attain at the same time, the more it warrants preferring one aspiration 
over the other. 
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traded off against living in peace with relatives, which implies that the alternatives 
paired are aspired to more equally than in other pairs. Nevertheless, in all three pairs 
the aspiration to become economically independent is aspired over the three 
alternatives.  
 
3.4.2. Average peer effects; OLS, 2SLS, and GMM 
 
We run a linear-in-means model as proposed in equation (2) to investigate the 
existence of peer effects. This allows discussion of the 2SLS / GMM regression results 
with reference to the OLS regression results. To control for heteroskedastic standard 
errors in the OLS regressions, we bootstrap cluster the standard errors at the class-level 
in each of these models. We need to bootstrap cluster the standard errors because we 
only have a limited number of 11 clusters (i.e. 11 classrooms).  
First, however, we need to test whether the class-level fixed effects are valid. 
Therefore, we graph nominated network ties for each of the 11 classes which are 
presented in Appendix B.2. Although substantially dense, the network graphs show 
that each class consists of one interconnected network without any non-connected 
subgroups of students. This ensures that we control for possible correlated effects at 
the class-level, which include potential correlated effects at the individual network 
level. If we would have had multiple non-connected networks per class, we should 
have controlled for correlated effects at the individual-specific network level using the 
first-difference approach. 
In addition, based on our econometric specification in the third section of this 
paper, we have reason to believe that any OLS estimate is affected by reflection bias 
and exclusion bias. While both go in the opposite direction, it is important to correct 
for both of them as we do not know the size of these biases. To do so, we conduct an 
IV/2SLS regression and an IV/GMM two-step regression based on the model in 
equation (3), where we instrument friends’ aspiration levels with the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the friends of friends who are not ego’s friends (i.e. non-overlapping 
peers approach).21 The IV/GMM two-step is a generalised methods of moments 
estimation method that can be used when a violation of the assumption of i.i.d. errors 
                                                     
21 We use the xtivreg2 Stata module to perform IV/2SLS regression and IV/GMM two-step regression 
(Schaffer, 2015). 
91 
 
is expected. Compared to the IV/2SLS method, the GMM two-step method is better 
suited to make standard errors and test statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and intra-
class correlation of unknown form. Wooldridge (2001, p. 91) explains that it generates 
more efficient estimates of the coefficients by creating a weighting matrix after the 
first step of regressing the instruments on the endogenous regressor. The weighting 
matrix inverts a consistent estimator of the variance-covariance matrix of 
orthogonality conditions. When instrumenting the endogenous regressor with the 
instrument in a second step, the GMM two-step method gives less weight to moment 
conditions with relatively larger variance while giving more weight to moment 
conditions with relatively smaller variance (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007; 
Wooldridge, 2001).  
The IV/2SLS and IV/GMM regressions exploit the structure of the social 
network and rely on the existence of intransitive triads and non-overlapping peers. 
However, Bramoullé et al. (2009) point out that when exploiting the structure of the 
network the density of the social networks and the degree to which all possible ties are 
nominated as friendship ties affect the strength of the instrumental variables, which in 
turn determines the quality and accuracy of the peer effect. So, if students in a 
classroom are very well-connected to others and nominate a large number of possible 
ties as close friends, the class network becomes substantially dense. Consequently, the 
number of intransitive dyads decreases, which means that the number of non-
overlapping peers also decreases: the more friends an ego nominates in the classroom, 
the smaller the pool of remaining students becomes from which ego’s friends can 
select friends who are not ego’s friends. This weakens the exclusion restriction, 
making it challenging if not impossible to identify a possible peer effect with a local 
average model (Bramoullé et al., 2009). Altogether, estimating the endogenous peer 
effects more efficiently requires relatively small-individual-specific networks, which 
is supported by the studies of L.-f. Lee (2007) and Boucher et al. (2014).  
Discussing the influence of network density on the identification of the peer 
effects in relation to our study design is relevant, as we allowed respondents to 
nominate as many friends as possible. Unlike some peer effects studies like Fortin and 
Yazbeck (2015), Trogdon, Nonnemaker, and Pais (2008), Calvó-Armengol, 
Patacchini, and Zenou (2009) and Lin (2010), who make use of the National 
Longitudinal Survey on adolescent health in the United States where the number of 
nominated ties are restricted up to five male and five female friends, we did not restrict 
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respondents to a maximum number of ties they were allowed to nominate. We 
considered capturing all social interactions in a classroom fundamental to our 
approach, as the identification of the local average model requires full network 
inclusion. Another advantage of capturing all ties is that it allows for the inclusion of 
different levels of network density per class, as some classes are better connected than 
others. L.-f. Lee (2007) shows that identification of peer effects with fixed effects (a 
within analysis) relies heavily on varying group sizes (i.e. each ego in the class has a 
different number of outgoing ties). The opportunity to report all possible ties is then 
more likely to guarantee different group sizes than putting a maximum on the number 
of friends. Moreover, the effect of exclusion bias is believed to be smaller in large 
individual-specific friends networks, as removing the aspirations of ego from the mean 
has a greater effect if ego has only a few friends compared to many friends (Boucher 
et al., 2014). 
Altogether, not using a maximum for the number of nominated ties resulted in 
our study in an average number of almost eleven outgoing ties per ego (see Table 9), 
which equals to nominating approximately 20% of all students in the classroom as 
close friends. The relatively dense networks per class that result from this may affect 
the strength and relevance of our instruments, together with the number of instruments 
needed for sufficient identification, which could lead to a biased and imprecise 
estimation of a peer effect. Alternatively, instead of the nominated ties we could have 
used the reciprocated ties to reduce the network density per class. Reciprocated ties 
can potentially improve identification, but as only less than one third of the ties are 
reciprocated in our study, this approach would exclude students with no reciprocated 
ties leading to a sample size that is too small for instrumental variable estimation to be 
useful.  
With the role of network density in mind, we first discuss how the eight 
instruments that we have selected correlate with the average aspiration level of ego’s 
friends as the endogenous regressor. Table 12 presents the first-stage results of the 
IV/2SLS estimation (this first step is similar for 2SLS and GMM) for each of the three 
pairs of aspirations. In each regression, we use class-level fixed effects. Appendix B.3 
presents a complete overview of the first-stage results, including the individual 
characteristics and the contextual effects, which we have left out of Table 12.  
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Table 12. Regressing instruments on endogenous regressor (1st stage IV/2SLS) 
 Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 
Dep var = aspiration 
level friends 
Economic 
independence – 
peaceful relations 
with relatives 
Economic 
independence – 
proximity 
family/friends 
Economic 
independence – 
community 
engagement 
Instruments (characteristics of non-overlapping peers) 
Gender  -0.138 -0.746** -0.319 
 (0.413) (0.357) (0.362) 
Wealth index (PCA) -0.286*** -0.349* -0.300* 
 (0.090) (0.190) (0.154) 
Gisu tribe 0.091 -0.318 -0.485 
 (0.658) (0.389) (0.474) 
Birth order  0.090 0.162* 0.194 
 (0.064) (0.089) (0.136) 
Age -0.232 -0.309 -0.293 
 (0.220) (0.222) (0.233) 
Partner 0.112 0.191 0.999*** 
 (0.386) (0.435) (0.292) 
Locus of control (PCA) 0.095 -0.512** -0.068 
 (0.187) (0.207) (0.283) 
Live with both parents 0.669 0.316 0.642 
 (0.445) (0.551) (0.501) 
Characteristics of ego Yes Yes Yes 
Contextual effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 13.712*** 12.860*** 13.641*** 
 (5.166) (4.786) (5.108) 
R2 within 0.094 0.120 0.117 
Observations 538 538 538 
Notes. * p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<0.01. Bootstrap clustered standard errors at the class-level and in 
parentheses. Class-level fixed effects used. The coefficients reported relate to the first aspiration 
mentioned per pair. For the second-mentioned aspiration in the pair, the results are exactly the opposite. 
The contextual effects include the full set of characteristics of friends.  
 
Looking at the instruments that have an effect, we find that in the first pair of 
aspirations where economic independence is traded off against peaceful relations with 
family, household wealth has a statistically significant negative effect. This means that 
ego's friends lower their aspiration to become economically independent when the 
average household wealth level of their friends increases. In the second pair of 
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aspirations, we find that gender has a negative effect on economic independence. The 
coefficient of -0.746 implies that an increase in the proportion girls of non-overlapping 
peers with 1 unit decreases ego's friends' aspiration to become economically 
independent when traded off against the proximity of family and friends. The results 
of the second pair also reveal that an increase in the average locus of control score of 
non-overlapping peers with 1 unit decreases ego's friends' aspiration to become 
economically independent with 0.512 when traded off against the proximity of family 
and friends. In addition, we see that birth order and household wealth only marginally 
influence the aspirations in pair 2. The aspirations in the third pair are strongly 
influenced by the proportion of non-overlapping peers that has a romantic partner. An 
increase in that proportion of 1 leads to an increase of 0.999 in the aspiration to become 
economically independent when traded off against community engagement. In the 
third pair of aspirations, the regression results also show that household wealth of non-
overlapping peers has a marginally significant negative effect on the economic 
aspirations of ego’s friends. 
The results in Table 12 show that per pair not all instruments have an effect on 
the endogenous regressor. The proportion of ego’s friends’ friends who are not ego’s 
friends that is of Gisu tribe, that live with both parents, and their average age do not 
affect the aspirations of ego's friends in any of the three pairs. Appendix B.4 presents 
scatterplots for each pair of aspirations that show how the predicted values of the first 
stage correlate with the endogenous regressors.  
Table 13 presents the results of the OLS regressions and the results of the 
second stage of the 2SLS, where we instrument the aspirations of friends with the 
characteristics of non-overlapping peers to allow comparison of the estimates. To 
interpret the validity of the endogenous peer effects estimated by IV/2SLS and 
IV/GMM, we need to examine the strength of the instruments. For IV/2SLS and 
IV/GMM the weak instruments test statistics are the same, as the test procedures for 
both estimation methods are the equivalent of an F-test from the first-stage regression 
with one endogenous regressor. Moreover, both methods use the same bootstrap 
clustered standard errors. We report a Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F statistic 
(Kleibergen & Paap, 2006) per pair of aspirations at the bottom of each 2SLS 
estimation in Table 13. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F statistic is based on the 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic and is appropriate when using (bootstrap) clustered 
standard errors. Studies on weak instruments when standard errors are not i.i.d have 
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not yet been conducted. As the threshold between strong and weak instruments 
depends on the type of violation of the i.i.d. assumption, which differs across studies 
(Bazzi & Clemens, 2013), critical values for the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F statistic 
have not yet been defined. Therefore, we apply the critical values normally used for 
the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, also because our model includes only one 
endogenous regressor, and use Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values to interpret the 
magnitude of the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic (Baum et al., 2007).  
We also test whether the overidentifying restrictions are valid. To obtain the 
statistics for overidentification we need to partial out the individual characteristics of 
ego and the contextual effects (i.e. characteristics of ego’s friends) using the Frisch-
Waugh-Lovell Theorem as our covariance matrix is not of full rank (Frisch & Waugh, 
1933; Lovell, 1963).22 The Sargan-Hansen J statistic in Table 13 represents the test of 
overidentification. The null hypothesis of this test states that the overidentifying 
restrictions are valid and that the excluded instruments are correctly left out of the 
reduced form of the model (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2010). This is crucial, as our 
identification strategy relies heavily on the exclusion restriction that excluded friends 
of friends who are not ego’s friends do not influence ego’s aspirations other than 
influencing the aspirations of ego’s friends.  
Last, we examine whether the coefficients of the OLS and IV/2SLS or 
IV/GMM regressions are statistically significantly different. For this, we use a robust 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity. The null hypothesis of the test states that 
the endogenous regressor (i.e. average aspiration level of ego’s friends) can actually 
be treated as exogenous. Therefore, if the test is significant and we reject the null, we 
should use the estimates from the IV/2SLS and IV/GMM regressions. If the test is not 
significant and we cannot reject the null, we should use the estimates from the more 
efficient OLS regression. 
In the first pair of aspirations where economic independence is traded off 
against peaceful relations with relatives, the OLS estimate is not statistically 
significant. The coefficient for the endogenous peer effect is 0.770 in the IV/2SLS 
estimation and 0.760 in the IV/GMM estimation, and these coefficients are, albeit very 
similar in size, also not statistically significant. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 
                                                     
22 This problem results from having fewer clusters than exogenous regressors and instruments (Baum 
et al., 2007). 
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is below the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value for the 10% maximal IV bias relative 
to OLS regression and below the 25% maximal IV size bias, which indicates that the 
instruments in our model are weak for pair 1. In addition, the Sargan-Hansen J statistic 
has a p-value of more than 10%, which means that the overidentifying restrictions are 
valid. Last, the non-significant endogeneity test statistic shows that in the first pair the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected, meaning we should use the non-significant estimate 
of 0.022 from the OLS regression for the peer effect. On the base of this estimate, we 
have to conclude that students do not influence other students when trading off 
economic independence against living in peace with relatives.  
Looking at the second pair of aspirations - economic independence vs 
proximity of family and friends - the OLS regression reveals a negative coefficient 
which is not statistically significant. However, both the IV/2SLS and IV/GMM 
estimation reveal a statistically significant positive peer effect. The peer effect in the 
second pair of aspirations implies that on a scale of 0 to 10, a shift of 1 in the average 
aspiration level of ego’s friends causes a shift of 0.699 in ego’s aspiration level in the 
same direction. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic of 33.426 in the model for the 
second pair of aspirations is above the 5% Stock and Yogo (2005) relative IV bias and 
between the 10% and 15% maximal IV size bias, and suggests that our instruments are 
strongly correlated with the aspiration levels of friends. Moreover, the Sargan-Hansen 
J statistic is not significant, which means that the overidentifying restrictions are valid, 
and we also reject the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressor is actually 
exogenous. This leads us to conclude that the IV/GMM estimate of the second pair is 
valid, precise and unbiased.  
In the third pair of aspirations - economic independence vs community 
engagement - the OLS estimate is statistically significant at the 10% level. In addition, 
the IV/2SLS and IV/GMM estimates reveal a statistically significant endogenous peer 
effect at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. An increase of 1 in the average aspiration 
level of ego’s friends leads to an increase of 0.988 in ego’s aspiration level. The 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic of 15.442 is between the 5% and 10 % Stock and 
Yogo (2005) critical values and between the 15 and 20% maximal IV size bias. Also 
here, we conclude that our instruments correlate sufficiently with the aspiration level 
of ego’s friends. The Sargan-Hansen J statistic has a p-value of above 10%, implying 
that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. In addition, the null hypothesis of the 
endogeneity test is rejected, meaning that we should treat the endogenous regressor as 
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endogenous. Altogether, we conclude that the peer effects estimate of the IV/GMM 
regression of our model for pair 3 is valid, the estimate is precise and unbiased. 
When we compare the estimates of the three estimation methods, we find that 
the effects estimated with IV/2SLS and IV/GMM in Table 13 are higher than the 
effects estimated with OLS, which may seem surprising, as the latter is often biased 
upwards due to reflection bias, correlated effects, and endogenous peer selection 
(Manski, 1993). It seems that the exclusion bias is stronger than the reflection bias as 
the OLS estimates of the three endogenous peer effects are biased downwards, and the 
use of class-level fixed effects may have amplified the downward bias. According to 
Roodman (2009), the use of lagged dependent variables (i.e. the aspiration level of 
friends can be considered a lagged variable of the aspiration level of ego) with fixed 
effects has a downward bias on OLS estimation. When we use IV/2SLS and IV/GMM 
and also include the values of ego for the variables selected as instruments (e.g. if we 
include gender of the non-overlapping peers as instrument we should also include the 
gender of ego as control variable in our model), the negative exclusion bias that affects 
OLS estimates is accounted for (Caeyers & Fafchamps, 2016).  
In addition, the use of class-level fixed effects in our estimation approach is 
crucial. When we do not control for correlated effects and leave out the class-level 
fixed effects, the IV/2SLS and IV/GMM estimates are larger for all peer effects and, 
apart from the estimates of the peer effect pair 3, significant at a smaller p-value. The 
regression results without class-level fixed effects are attached in Appendix B.5 for 
the OLS regressions and Appendix B.6 for the IV/2SLS and IV/GMM regressions. 
The results in Appendix B.6 suggest that aspirations may be influenced by correlated 
effects for which we need to control by adding class-level fixed effects.  
In sum, the IV/GMM in Table 13 provide two statistically significant 
endogenous peer effects. The Sargan-Hansen J statistics demonstrate that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics indicate 
that our instruments are strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor, meaning 
our estimates of peer effects in pair 2 and pair 3 are precise and unbiased, and the 
endogeneity test statistics show that we should treat our endogenous regressors as 
endogenous. Altogether, our results deliver evidence for the existence of endogenous 
peer effects on the aspirations of high school students. In two out of three pairs, 
students influence other students when trading off economic aspirations with 
competing social alternatives. 
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Table 13. Average peer effects (OLS, IV/2SLS and IV/GMM) 
  Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 
Dep var = aspiration level ego Economic independence – 
peaceful relations with relatives 
Economic independence – 
proximity family/friends 
Economic independence – 
community engagement 
 
OLS 2SLS GMM-2s OLS 2SLS GMM-2s OLS 2SLS GMM-2s 
Aspiration level friends 0.022 0.770 0.760 -0.007 0.765** 0.699** 0.184* 1.061** 0.988*** 
 
(0.130) (0.665) (0.555) (0.097) (0.385) (0.319) (0.103) (0.469) (0.350) 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic  7.697 7.697  33.426 33.426  15.442 15.442 
Sargan-Hansen J statistic 23  10.313 10.313  5.484 5.484  7.442 7.442 
Endogeneity test   0.490  0.490  4.237** 4.237**  4.416** 4.416** 
Adjusted R2 -0.018   0.017   0.014   
Observations 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 
    
Notes. * p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<0.01. Bootstrapped standard errors at the class-level in parentheses. Class-level fixed effects used. Each regression controls for ego’s own 
characteristics and friends’ characteristics. Excluded instruments: 1) gender friends’ friends, 2) birth order friends’ friends, 3) household wealth friends’ friends, 4) partner 
friends’ friends, 5) locus of control friends’ friends, 6) age friends’ friends, 7) living with both parents friends’ friends, and 8) Gisu tribe friends’ friends.
                                                     
23 To obtain statistics on the overidentification test for all instruments we use the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem and partial out the characteristics of the individual and contextual 
effects as exogenous regressors (Baum et al., 2007).  
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3.5. Discussion of results 
 
This section of the paper summarises the results and relates them to the existing 
literature on economic aspirations and on the technical aspects of estimating peer 
effects in social networks. First, we bring together the results and discuss their 
implications for development policy aimed at increasing economic empowerment of 
youngsters, where after we discuss the limitations of the study in relation to other peer 
effects studies.  
The results obtained via the IV/2SLS and IV/GMM estimation methods 
provide evidence that students influence other students’ aspirations in two of the three 
pairs of aspirations: we find endogenous peer effects in the weight students give to 
economic independence relative to the aspirations to live near family and friends and 
to engage with the wider community. No peer effects are found in the first pair, where 
students trade off the aspiration to become economically independent with the 
aspiration to have peaceful relations with family. However, the IV test statistics 
indicate that in the other two pairs we have sufficiently correlated instruments, valid 
overidentification, and have treated the endogenous variable as we should have, 
implying that the peer effects estimates are valid, precise, and unbiased.  
The findings of this paper provide useful input for economic empowerment 
programmes aimed at lifting or changing the mindsets and aspirations of youngsters, 
in particular of those that are still in school. The presence of endogenous peer effects 
suggests that students included in these programmes can influence the aspirations of 
non-selected friends in the classroom: the effects of an economic empowerment 
intervention can potentially spill-over to those students who have not been part of the 
programme but are part of the social network of the student included. This means that 
for achieving results (i.e. a change in mindset, or increase of economic aspirations), 
not the entire class has to be included in the programme, and the inclusion of smaller 
subsamples of students can influence friends in the classroom, creating a multiplier 
effect. The results demonstrate that this holds especially for programmes that also 
address social empowerment issues, and teach on how to deal with pressures to obey 
social obligations in the community (e.g. to remain living in the area or to fulfil an 
engaging role in the community).  
As we were mainly interested in the endogenous effects, we did not discuss the 
effects of the contextual variables in this paper, and how group composition has the 
100 
 
potential to influence the aspirations of the individual. Another, perhaps more 
convincing reason for not assessing the contextual effects relates to the type of 
contextual variables included in this study. Variables like gender, tribe, birth order and 
age are impossible to change, which means that in order to change the average 
characteristics of the group to raise aspirations, new groups of friends have to be 
defined (while other ties need to be severed). Although exposure to other students with 
specific characteristics that influence aspirations may potentially be useful, for 
example through the formation of extra-curricular groups (i.e. sports, religion, study, 
etc.), changing the group composition of friends in the classroom to raise the 
aspirations of youngsters seems to be an unrealistic intervention to implement in our 
research context. It would only bear relevance if educational policies insist on mixing 
classes on base of contextual effects, of which gender is the only feasible option. 
Altogether, this difficulty reaffirms the usefulness of the endogenous peer effects in 
aspirations for development programmes.  
We do not find an effect for the pair of aspirations where economic 
independence is traded of against having peaceful relations with relatives. 
Conceptually, a plausible cause for the lack of an effect in the first pair is that the trade-
off between economic independence and peaceful relations with relatives may be less 
relevant to school-going youngsters compared to the trade-offs represented in the other 
two pairs of aspirations. As a result, students may talk less about this trade-off, and 
consequently, do not influence each other’s aspiration levels. The measure of 
competition between the aspirations paired that we have included in the survey 
indicates that the first pair is considered competitive and has not been assigned the 
lowest score in Table 10, but unfortunately, this does not capture the intensity of how 
relevant the trade-offs between the two aspirations paired together are for the students.  
Furthermore, unlike most peer effects studies, we do not examine behaviour 
but individual attitudes that cannot be directly observed. For the average aspiration 
level of ego’s close friends to have an influence on the aspiration levels of ego, we 
must assume that students discuss their aspirations explicitly with each other and 
convey their preferences to friends. Without direct and indirect forms of 
communication on aspirations the average aspiration level of friends is not perceptible, 
and peer effects cannot influence individual aspirations. Therefore, we have to assume 
that endogenous peer effects shape attitudes and aspirations but they may not be as 
strong as they are in shaping observable behaviour.  
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Moreover, the lack of an effect in the first pair should also be related to our 
identification approach. Table 12 shows that, apart from wealth, none of the 
instruments correlates with the endogenous regressor in pair 1, suggesting that our 
model is not sufficiently specified to identify a peer effect in this pair. In addition, 
despite having sufficiently large Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics in two of the three 
pairs of aspirations, and a Sargan-Hansen J test statistic indicating we correctly leave 
out the excluded instruments, we have overidentified our model by including eight 
exogenous variables of the non-overlapping peers as instruments in our model. 
Leaving out one of the eight instruments in any of the 2SLS approaches results in weak 
correlation of the instruments with the average aspiration level of friends. Therefore, 
the set of instruments as a whole leads to sufficient identification, but the instruments 
do not correlate strongly with the endogenous regressor individually, apart from a few 
as shown in the first stage in Table 12. One of the reasons is that instrumental variable 
estimation requires a relatively large sample size, and our sample size of ‘only’ 538 
students may be too small. A second reason is the selection of instruments. In many 
studies that use instrumental variable estimation to find social interaction effects, 
identification of the instrument is challenging (Lin, 2010). An additional but highly 
relevant explanation is brought forward by Bramoullé et al. (2009) and revolves 
around network structure. Finding strong instruments in the non-overlapping peers' 
approach is dependent on the density of the social networks (i.e. the degree of all 
possible ties that are nominated as ties) and defines the quality of the peer effects. 
Instrument strength declines with network density, as the number of intransitive triads 
and the number of non-overlapping peers decreases. The more students in a classroom 
are connected, the smaller the number of non-overlapping peers, which makes 
identification more difficult. Also, L.-f. Lee (2007) suggests that an efficient 
estimation of the endogenous peer effects requires relatively small individual-specific 
network groups, which is further confirmed by the results of Boucher et al. (2014). In 
our study, we deliberately decided to put no cap on the total number of friends that 
students were allowed to nominate to capture all social interactions in a classroom: the 
identification of peer effects requires the full inclusion of the entire self-contained 
network. Consequently, however, identification in our study is largely dependent on 
network density, which could explain why we need to include eight instruments for 
sufficient identification.  
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3.6. Conclusion 
 
Aspirations take shape during adolescence. During this period in life, youngsters start 
to develop an idea of what they could and would like to achieve in life. An important 
means through which youngsters’ aspirations are shaped is through the peer influences 
of other classmates. The aspirations of friends in the classroom function as important 
reference points and help shape what is considered important and achievable in the 
future. More specifically, the local average model that is used in this study indicates 
that each student derives utility from his or her initial aspiration level (before social 
comparison). However, the average aspiration level of a student’s group of friends 
functions as the main reference point and deviating from that average is costly; not 
conforming to the group’s norm lowers the utility that a student derives from his or 
her aspiration levels. Therefore, a student aims to minimise the distance between the 
individual aspiration level and the average aspiration level of friends to maximise 
utility and avoid incurring costs.  
To study how the aspirations of youngsters are influenced by their peers, this 
study elicits the aspirations of high school students in Uganda. There are three main 
reasons for studying the effects of fellow students. First, students interact with(in) a 
fixed set of peers, and peer effects can only be identified with the participation of the 
entire population. Second, students are physically present at school most of their time 
and are expected to interact more frequently with fellow students than with non-school 
going peers and third, young people mainly select their friends from their schools.  
Through semi-structured interviews we draft a set of graded paired 
comparisons where the aspiration to become economically independent is paired with 
various alternative aspirations that compete for time, effort and resources. From this 
set we select three alternatives that contain a communal component: living in peace 
with relatives, living near family and friends, and engaging with the wider community. 
These alternative aspirations are largely shaped by social norms and obligations, and 
can hinder adolescents’ economic empowerment. We elicit the aspirations of high 
school students using a questionnaire in which respondents are asked to allocate ten 
fictive tokens over a pair of aspirations. The distribution of tokens indicates the extent 
to which respondents prefer one aspiration over the other or whether they value the 
paired aspirations equally. The study also elicits the nominated friendship ties among 
all classmates.  
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Using the linear-in-means model, which does not account for the reflection problem, 
we observe one endogenous peer effect in the three pairs of aspirations, but the effect 
is only marginally significant. Implementing the non-overlapping peers’ approach 
where we instrument the aspiration of ego’s friends with the characteristics of the 
friends of ego’s friends who are not ego’s friends, the IV/2SLS and IV/GMM two-step 
regression results reveal endogenous peer effects in two of the three pairs of 
aspirations. The coefficients of the IV/2SLS and IV/GMM two-step regressions are 
higher for each pair of aspirations than the coefficients of the linear-in-means 
regressions, which implies that the OLS coefficients are biased downward. Despite the 
fact that we have dense class networks and relatively large friends networks with on 
average eleven class mates nominated as close friends, the regression results suggest 
that the exclusion bias in the OLS estimates is stronger than the reflection bias, which 
is further amplified by the use of class-level fixed effects.  
Altogether, our regression results demonstrate that the aspiration level of ego’s 
friends and ego’s aspiration level move in the same direction, and an increase 
(decrease) in the average aspiration level of ego’s friends leads to an increase 
(decrease) in ego’s aspiration level. The existence of these endogenous peer effects in 
aspiration formation could be useful for development programmes that aim to lift the 
economic aspirations of adolescents. Both the local average model used in this study 
and our regression results suggest that the average aspiration level of the group to 
which an individual conforms to needs to be changed in order to change an aspiration 
at the individual level. To change that group average, the existence of endogenous peer 
effects in aspirations implies that not all members of the group need to be part of an 
intervention as aspirations may spill over to friends. This potential spill-over effect can 
make policy interventions more cost-effective, and with the same level of resources 
more people could be reached.  
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Chapter 4. Competitive versus destructive envy: experimental 
evidence from a real-effort experiment in Uganda 
 
Abstract 
Inequality generated by varying effort levels can create feelings of envy that reduce inequality 
either by stimulating competition (by trying to catch up with the best performers) or destroying 
the earnings of the best performers. Disentangling both effects is crucial to understand the 
costs and benefits of inequality for society. This paper disentangles the effect of competitive 
and destructive envy on effort, using a real-effort experiment in Ugandan high schools. 
Students perform a counting task in two consecutive rounds. In addition to a control treatment, 
we implement three treatments that provide relative performance feedback, money-burning, 
and the combination of both. Effort is operationalised as number of tables solved, number of 
correct answers, number of incorrect answers, and final earnings. Our results provide strong 
evidence that competitive envy (relative performance feedback) increases the number of 
correct answers and the final earnings, resulting in higher welfare. We also find evidence that 
destructive envy (the threat of money-burning) decreases the number of tables solved and the 
number of incorrect answers, but only when combined with relative performance feedback. 
Last, we find that household wealth of students influences both effects. 
 
Keywords: envy, competition, effort, money-burning, real-effort experiment.  
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Effort is crucial to escape poverty as it determines investments to improve social-
economic conditions. It is influenced by comparisons with others, which can have a 
positive and negative influence. Exposure to successful, similar peers has proven to 
raise effort (Falk & Ichino, 2006), as social comparison evokes envy rendered into the 
ambition to ‘keep up with others’. However, social comparison can also lead to another 
type of envy. Successful individuals may find themselves burdened by envious, less 
successful peers. In such circumstances, success has social costs and performing well 
could lead to social sanctions, and successful individuals may reduce their effort to 
avoid harassment (Di Falco & Bulte, 2011; Hadnes, Vollan, & Kosfeld, 2013). 
Grolleau, Mzoughi, and Sutan (2006) were among the first to divide both types of envy 
into competitive envy and destructive envy. 
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In this study, we disentangle the effects of both types of envy on effort to get more 
insight into the possible costs and benefits of inequality for society using a real-effort 
experiment. We design an innovative experiment that captures how successful 
individuals anticipate on destructive envy from less successful peers. The innovation 
of this study is manifested in an elaborate conceptualisation of effort. We look at the 
number of tables solved as the effort to work fast, the number of correct answers as 
the effort to work fast and accurate (i.e. dedication), and the number of incorrect 
answers, which covers the quality of effort. Another innovative element of our study 
is that we investigate how successful individuals anticipate on the envious behaviour 
of less performing individuals (i.e. people may dislike others for being better off), and 
how they adapt their effort. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first of its 
kind to take account of anticipated a priori behaviour in a real-effort experiment. First, 
we focus on whether people care only about their absolute performance, or also about 
their relative position in their subgroup. Individuals may generate feelings of 
competitive envy if performance is low compared to peers’ performance and try to 
reduce inequality by putting in more effort. The existence of such a mechanism can 
provide evidence that inequality can benefit and motivate the poor to catch up with 
successful individuals, who in return may want to outperform those directly under 
them. Second, we focus on a priori anticipated behaviour in the presence of destructive 
envy opportunities. Top performers may want to lower their effort if they anticipate 
that envious peers want to reduce their earnings, which reveals that destructive envy 
is costly. Successful individuals fear repercussions and lower effort, while less 
successful individuals spend resources on keeping income differences low. Altogether, 
investigating both types of envy provides a better understanding of how individuals 
trade off their desire for doing relatively well with wanting to avoid the destructive 
envy of others and the effect it has on their effort.  
We set up a real-effort experiment with high school students in Uganda 
organised in groups of four students. The real-effort task we use is a counting task of 
zeros in tables made up of ones and zeros, and participants earn money with each table 
correctly solved (i.e. piece-rate compensation). We organise two-rounds: while the 
first round is the same for all participants, the second round is different, leading to the 
following treatments. In the first treatment, we provide feedback on the relative 
performance (correct answers, incorrect answers, and earnings in relation to three other 
players) of all four group members at the start of the second round, which we expect 
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would generate competitive envy as it allows participants to compare themselves 
socially. This allows investigating whether income inequality motivates low 
performers. In a second treatment, the second round starts with an announcement that 
earnings can be lowered (so-called ‘money-burning’) by fellow participants if they pay 
a price for this. This gives more insight into whether subjects anticipate fellow 
participants to engage in destructive envious behaviour and lower their effort to avoid 
the social cost of performing well. In a third treatment, we combine both elements to 
investigate how relative performance feedback either stimulates or supersedes the 
threat of destructive envy. In the control treatment, both rounds are the same so that 
we are able to capture any learning effects. 
When controlling for effort imbalances in a first round and correcting the 
standard errors for non-independence within experimental sessions, we find evidence 
that relative performance feedback increases effort, demonstrated by an increase in the 
final earnings and an increase in the number of tables correctly solved. Our results do 
not show an effect of the threat of money-burning. However, when money-burning is 
combined with performance feedback, we find that the number of tables solved and 
the number of incorrect answers is substantially lower: the threat of money-burning 
lowers the output of participants in a second round only when previous performance 
is disclosed to other group members after a first round. This may point out that money-
burning becomes only a credible threat once individuals realise how well they 
performed in a previous round. In addition, our results suggest that wealth influences 
both treatment effects. The poorest participants are motivated by relative performance 
feedback, whereas the wealthiest participants are demotivated by the threat of 
destructive envy, with and without the provision of performance feedback. This could 
imply that wealthier students anticipate others to take account of their wealthier 
background during the experiment.  
Our study complements two strands of literature that investigate competitive 
and destructive envy, respectively. First, an increasing number of studies focuses on 
the positive effect of social comparison on effort in a wide variety of domains. 
Witnessing similar people succeed through effort may raise participants' perception 
that they hold comparable capabilities to master similar activities necessary for 
success, encouraging them to keep up with their peers (Bandura, 1993). Also, the joy 
of outperforming others (Dohmen, Falk, Fliessbach, Sunde, & Weber, 2011) and 
public recognition and dominance (Rustichini, 2008) may be fostered through social 
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comparison. Azmat and Iriberri (2010) and Carrell, Fullerton, and West (2009), for 
example, provide evidence that receiving relative performance feedback increases 
school performance. In addition, Mas and Moretti (2009) demonstrate that the 
introduction of highly productive workers leads to increased production of other 
personnel. In their study on performance rank and effort, Gill, Kissová, Lee, and 
Prowse (2018) show that individuals increase their effort the most when they are 
ranked first and last in their group, but the least when ranked in the middle of the 
group. Also, Herbst and Mas (2015) find that individuals put in more effort in the 
presence of their peers. 
Second, social comparison can also lead to unethical behaviour and sabotaging 
of the proceeds of other's effort, and a second strand of literature investigates the effect 
of this on individual effort. Dow (1981) demonstrates that individuals in what he calls 
’peasant’ societies reduced their effort to avoid social repression and envy from others. 
Bursztyn and Jensen (2015) show that students perform worse when fearing social 
punishment for trying too hard at school, and K. Lee, Duffy, Scott, and Schippers 
(2017) provide evidence that envy from others can elicit unpleasant mood and anxiety, 
negatively affecting job performance. Also, Kebede and Zizzo (2015) show that 
destructive envy limits investment in agricultural innovation in Ethiopia as potential 
profits are anticipated to be reduced by envious community members. Moreover, 
Charness, Masclet, and Villeval (2013) examine whether relative performance 
feedback stimulates subjects to cheat and engage in sabotaging the production of 
others. They assume that cheating is the result of a desire for having a higher rank, 
which is different from our explanation where we expect people in egalitarian societies 
to dislike others for being better off. Charness et al. (2013) also use a fixed-pay regime, 
while we use a piece-rate payment. Also, Grossman and Komai (2012) find evidence 
that envied individuals spend double the amount of resources on protection against 
envy than is spent on destructive envy by envious individuals, which highlights the 
overall cost of destructive envy.  
Up until now, most studies on the effects of envy on effort examine the effect 
of one specific form. To the best of our knowledge, no study combines the effect of 
competitive and destructive envy on effort, apart from Charness et al. (2013) on French 
students. With regard to the latter type of envy, few studies examine the anticipation 
of the social cost of success and focus mainly on the act of destructive envy. Our study 
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bridges this gap in the literature, using a real-effort experiment in Ugandan high 
schools that allows us to disentangle the effects of both types of envy. 
In the remainder of this paper, we present a review of the literature in section 
2, followed by our experimental design in section 3. Section 4 shows and discusses the 
estimates of relative performance feedback and anticipated money-burning of group 
members on effort levels and analyses the heterogeneous treatment effects. Section 5 
discusses the implications for development policy and section 6 concludes. 
 
4.2. Literature review 
 
4.2.1. Social comparison 
 
In the economic literature, individuals are often assumed to base their actions primarily 
on self-interest. However, a substantial number of studies demonstrates that 
individuals are affected by others and care a great deal about their relative position in 
their reference group, which is eventually reflected in their well-being and behaviour. 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) develop a model to explain behaviour related to equity, 
reciprocity, and competition. They demonstrate econometrically that, next to pure self-
interest, relative pay-off also motivates people. Moreover, E. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
use ultimatum and market games to show that some people are not only just pursuing 
self-interest, but are also driven by fairness considerations. They call this self-centred 
inequity aversion, which means that people are mainly interested in the fairness of 
their pay-off relative to others, leading inequity-averse individuals to behave very 
competitively. In addition, Luttmer (2005) uses survey data and shows that earnings 
of neighbours correlate negatively with self-reported happiness in the USA, which 
suggests that people’s utility depends on relative consumption. Also, Solnick and 
Hemenway (2005) use American survey data to demonstrate that positional concerns 
are greater for income than leisure, and Pingle and Mitchell (2002) find in their survey 
data that especially younger, more competitive Americans are concerned about their 
income relative to the income of others. 
This relationship between positional concerns and well-being is also tested in 
low-income countries. Results, however, are mixed, and highly dependent on context. 
Using survey data on Nepal, Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) find a negative effect of the 
consumption of neighbours on how satisfied individuals are with their own 
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consumption, which is not moderated by wealth levels. They also show that more 
isolated households care more about the consumption levels of neighbours. Ravallion 
and Lokshin (2010) examine relative deprivation in Malawi using a household survey 
and find conflicting results. They define relative deprivation as the decrease in the 
utility of an individual’s economic position relative to the average economic position 
of neighbours, and their results show that the well-being (i.e. ‘satisfaction with life’) 
of most individuals is not affected by the average well-being of neighbours. For the 
poorest individuals, economic welfare of neighbours even has a positive effect on their 
well-being, whereas the wealthiest individuals experience a negative effect of the 
economic welfare of neighbours on their well-being. In South Africa, Kingdon and 
Knight (2007) find similar results using a national household survey. Their analysis 
shows that relative income of individuals with similar race, but who are geographically 
distant, has a negative relationship with well-being (i.e. ‘satisfaction with life’) for 
individuals with higher levels of absolute income. For the poorest individuals, on the 
other hand, absolute income is more important for well-being than relative income. 
However, Akay and Martinsson (2011) use a similar approach in rural Ethiopia but do 
not find a relationship between relative income and subjective well-being. 
In the previous paragraph, we focused on positional concerns on well-being, 
and we now discuss the relationship between positional concerns and behaviour. In 
this relationship, envy plays an important role, and envious behaviour can close the 
gap in performance between the individual and the reference group. In the next 
sections, we elaborate on competitive envy and destructive envy and the opposing 
effect they have on the relationship between social comparison and behaviour.  
 
4.2.2. Competitive envy 
 
When individuals observe similar, like-minded people having success through effort, 
they may increasingly become aware that they also have the ability to achieve similar 
success, which in turn motivates them to keep up with well-performing others 
(Bandura, 1993). But social comparison can also stimulate the joy of performing better 
than others and the quest for social recognition (Dohmen et al., 2011; Rustichini, 
2008). As a result, social comparison positively impacts production. 
Individuals can only compare themselves when they receive feedback on how 
their performance relates to the performance of peers. Various studies demonstrate the 
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effect of relative performance feedback on output like school grades and work 
productivity. Starting with the former, Azmat and Iriberri (2010) use a natural field 
experiment to show that the quarterly provision of report cards with an individual's 
grade average across all subjects and a class grade average across all subjects increases 
the annual average grade of Spanish high school students by 4.5%. Tran and 
Zeckhauser (2012) find similar results in their field experiment with Vietnamese 
students. Their findings show that informing students about their class ranking on 
practice tests increases grades more than when students are not informed, even when 
rankings have no direct, tangible benefits. In terms of work productivity, Blanes i Vidal 
and Nossol (2011) use a quasi-experimental design and show that daily disclosure of 
private information on the position in the distribution of pay and production leads to 
an increase of 6.8% in the production of German workers, even when it does not have 
direct financial benefits or better career possibilities. Moreover, Kuhnen and Tymula 
(2012) implement a lab experiment in the USA and show that individuals increase their 
productivity more when told they may receive feedback on their performance, even 
when they did not, relative to individuals who did not receive such an announcement.  
However, the relationship between performance feedback and production is 
not always linear and depends on the rank in the performance distribution. Gill et al. 
(2018) conduct a real-effort experiment in the UK and demonstrate that the effect of 
rank-order feedback on effort provision is U-shaped, implying subjects work harder 
only when ranked first or last. Kuziemko, Buell, Reich, and Norton (2014) provide 
similar evidence using a lab experiment in the USA, showing that last placed 
individuals are more likely to take risks to move them out of last place. However, in 
cases where inequalities are too large, last-placed individuals may give up.  
How individuals are rewarded for their effort moderates this relationship 
between rank and production. Azmat and Iriberri (2016) design and conduct a lab 
experiment in Spain and show that relative performance feedback only has an effect 
when individuals are compensated following a piece-rate compensation, and not when 
pay is fixed and independent of performance.  
The differing effect of performance rank on effort points out different ways 
through which competitive envy has an effect on behaviour, and Roels and Su (2014) 
suggest two behavioural mechanisms. First, in behind-averse behaviour, people 
compare themselves upwardly and try to keep differences between them and those that 
perform better small. Agarwal, Mikhed, and Scholnick (2018), for example, link data 
111 
 
on lottery winners with credit data and data on bankruptcy of Canadians living in the 
same postcode. They demonstrate that a neighbour who wins the lottery increases 
subsequent borrowing and bankruptcy among other neighbours as a result of 
conspicuous consumption to keep up with successful (lottery winning) neighbours. 
Also, Linssen, Van Kempen, and Kraaykamp (2011) find evidence for behind-averse 
behaviour. They use household survey data to show that individuals motivated by 
positional concerns in low-income households in India consume conspicuous goods to 
keep up with others in their social environment. Individuals that spend more on 
conspicuous consumption also report lower scores of well-being.  
Roels and Su (2014) mention ahead-seeking behaviour as the second 
mechanism by which competitive envy motivates production. People compare 
themselves downwardly and try to increase the gap between them and those that 
perform worse. Bursztyn, Ferman, Fiorin, Kanz, and Rao (2017), for example, use 
three field experiments to investigate the use of platinum credit cards in Indonesia. In 
a first experiment, they find that the demand for platinum credit cards exceeds the 
demand for an unmarked alternative with equal benefits. They also find that the 
platinum cards are primarily used in visible, social situations. In a second experiment, 
they demonstrate that the demand increases when more people are believed to use it, 
which reveals behind-averse behaviour. However, high-status costumers start ignoring 
the product and move to more exclusive options, which is a clear-cut example of 
ahead-seeking behaviour.  
 
4.2.3. Destructive envy 
 
Some studies empirically demonstrate that individuals do not always compete with 
each other, but also engage in destructive envious behaviour when opportunities are 
provided. An example already mentioned in the introduction is the study by Charness 
et al. (2013) who find that relative performance feedback on rank increases effort on 
average, but when sabotage opportunities are offered participants cheat and sabotage 
the work of other participants. Furthermore, Henrich et al. (2006) conduct three 
behavioural field experiments with 15 diverse populations in North and South 
America, Africa, Oceania, and Asia. The first experiment comprises an ultimatum 
game, the second experiment is a third-party punishment game, and the final 
experiment is a dictator game. Especially the results of the punishment game provide 
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evidence that in cases of less-equal offers, punishment happens across all groups, 
implying that destructive behaviour is occurring in every society included in the study.  
The study by Bursztyn and Jensen (2015) is among the few that analyse the 
anticipated effect of destructive envy. The authors use a natural experiment, where the 
tabs in an online screen of a computer-based learning system would show the top 3 
performers by name, class, and school after an online exam. As a result of this, 
students’ performance drops with 24% when information on ranking performance is 
publicised, mainly because of fear for social punishment from classmates for doing 
too well in school. In a second field experiment, the authors investigate the influence 
of publishing the decision to sign up for an additional preparatory course. The number 
of non-honours students who were told that other students in the room would be 
informed about their decision to enrol in the course was 11% lower than non-honours 
students who were told that other students would not find out about their enrolment 
decision. Their study shows that educational investment carries social costs, especially 
for students who care about social status and popularity.  
In addition to the cost of performing well, the results from various money-
burning experiments reveal that people are even willing to pay a price to reduce fellow 
participants’ revenues. Zizzo and Oswald (2001) show that especially less performing 
peers reduce the earnings of better performing fellow participants in the UK. 
Moreover, Kebede and Zizzo (2015) investigate the effect of envious behaviour in 
Ethiopia and find that it correlates negatively with agricultural innovation at the village 
level. To investigate whether growing inequality affects money-burning behaviour D. 
Fehr (2018) combines a real effort task with a money-burning design. He finds no 
inequality effect and concludes that the money-burning decision depends mainly on 
how participants generated their income during the effort task. Only when income was 
believed to be generated unfairly, mainly because the best performing participants 
received a bonus at the end of the experiment or were allowed to cheat, more money-
burning took place. 
Altogether, the existing literature demonstrates that individuals are interested 
in the relative position in their reference group. Numerous studies show that relative 
performance feedback allows people to socially compare themselves, which translates 
into competitive envy that increases production to reduce inequality. There are also 
studies that show that inequality stimulates destructive envy, leading individuals to 
engage in sabotaging activities to reduce the earnings of peers. We aim to combine 
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both strands of literature by designing a real-effort experiment that allows us to 
examine the effects of both types of envy simultaneously. We also propose a more 
elaborate definition of effort, which is often limited to earnings only.  
 
4.3. Experimental design 
 
4.3.1. Real effort experiment 
 
For our real-effort experiment, we make use of a between-subject design with two 
rounds of effort. Figure 2 illustrates a schematic design of the real-effort experiment 
and indicates the sequence of events. The first round is the same for all participants, 
and each participant is asked to perform the same effort task. The second round, 
however, is different, resulting in the following treatments. We use a first treatment 
(T1) where both rounds are completely similar as control to capture individual learning 
effects (as measured by changes between both the two rounds).  
In a second treatment (T2), relative performance feedback is provided at the 
start of the second round, aimed at generating competition among participants that 
could increase their effort. The content of the feedback allows them to compare their 
performance in the first round with each of the three other group members.  
 
Figure 2. Design real-effort experiment  
    Relative performance 
    feedback round 1 
Announcement 
money-burning 
Relative performance 
feedback round 2 
   
 Round 1 Round 2 Money-burning Pay-out 
T1 Real effort task 0* 0 Real effort task 0  Random sampling round 
T2 Real effort task X 0 Real effort task 0  Random sampling round 
T3 Real effort task 0* X Real effort task X Money-burning Random sampling round 
T4 Real effort task X X Real effort task X Money-burning Random sampling round 
Notes. * In treatment 1 and 3, participants receive feedback on individual performance before the start 
of the second round. X means that a particular design feature (e.g. announcement money burning) was 
part of a treatment, 0 means that it was not.  
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Participants in a third treatment (T3) start the second round with the announcement 
that all participants will be offered the opportunity after that round to lower fellow 
participants' earnings of the second round if they are willing to sacrifice a part of their 
earnings for it. Participants need to pay 10% of the total amount they want to reduce 
from others.24 For instance, if participant X decides to reduce a fellow group member's 
earnings with 1,000 UGX, a fee of 100 UGX will be deducted from participant X’s 
second-round earnings. Money-burning decisions cannot affect any participant’s 
earnings in round 1. Therefore, participants are only informed at the beginning of 
round 2 about the money-burning opportunity, also to avoid any interference with the 
effort invested in the first round. This threat of money-burning from fellow participants 
is expected to lower effort invested in a second round as better-performing individuals 
may anticipate that they could be targeted by worse-performing group members for 
performing well. However, as participants in the third treatment do not receive relative 
performance feedback at the start of the second round, they do not know how they rank 
compared to fellow group members, and whether they belong to the better performing 
or worse performing participants on base of earlier performance (round 1).  
In a fourth treatment (T4), we combine the performance feedback and money-
burning interventions. While participants in the second and fourth treatment receive 
information on their relative performance, participants in the first and third treatment 
receive feedback on their individual performance. Adding the provision of individual 
performance feedback to the other two treatments is necessary to attribute any potential 
treatment effect to the relative performance feedback (i.e. social comparison). Per 
treatment, participants are sampled into sub-groups of four participants. 
We consider a counting task the most appropriate for the research context. The 
task entails counting the number of zeros in a table of 110 (11x10) randomly ordered 
zeros and ones, and answers need to be written in a designated space above the table. 
See Appendix C.1 for an example. The format and dimensions of the table were 
extensively tested at a number of high schools in the research area. No prior knowledge 
is required to perform a counting task, performance is easy to measure, learning effects 
are relatively low, and the task is considered pointless, implying that task-fulfilment 
entails a positive cost of effort for participants.  
                                                     
24 Consistent with Kebede and Zizzo (2015).  
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In each round, participants have precisely 10 minutes to solve as many tables as 
possible, and earnings are based on a piece-rate compensation scheme. All participants 
receive a similar set of 25 tables per round. Although the sets of the first and second 
round are different, the ordering of the tables (i.e. table 1, table 2, table 3, etc.) per set 
is similar for each participant, and no feedback on performance is given during the 
effort task. Even though participants are rewarded for the number of correct answers, 
the number of incorrect answers is also recorded. Each incorrect answer infers a 
penalty on the earnings to discourage guessing (i.e. filling in answers randomly during 
the exercise hoping to guess the correct answer and earn 500 UGX without putting the 
necessary effort in). 
The relative performance feedback in treatments two and four provided at the 
start of the second round discloses the number of correct answers, the number of 
incorrect answers, and earnings (not including the show-up fee) and is individually 
specified for each of the four group members. The individual performance feedback 
in the first and third treatment contains the same three elements but does not disclose 
information on group members’ performance. After the second round of effort, 
participants in treatments three and four again receive relative performance feedback 
and are then given the opportunity to reduce the earnings of their fellow group 
members anonymously. To execute money-burning decisions, we randomly sample 
one of the four group members' scenarios per subgroup and deduct any ‘burning’ from 
second-round earnings.  
Last, per treatment, we randomly sample one of the two rounds for pay-out to 
avoid that effort of the first round will influence effort of the second round (i.e. 
participants put in less effort because they have already gained significant earnings 
and reached an implicit income target or vice versa). This announcement is made 
before the start of the first round of effort.  
 
4.3.2. Hypotheses 
 
This section presents three hypotheses. First, we discuss whether relative performance 
motivates subjects in the absence of money-burning. After that, we elaborate on 
whether subjects adjust their effort out of fear of punishment from fellow participants 
when provided with a money-burning opportunity. Last, we consider how the effect of 
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money-burning on effort is moderated by relative performance feedback, and whether 
competitive envy prevails or the anticipated threat of destructive envy. 
 
The following hypothesis is tested to investigate the effect of competitive envy on 
effort levels:  
 
H1. In the absence of a money-burning opportunity, individuals 
increase their effort levels when socially comparing themselves. 
 
The provision of relative performance feedback in a second treatment (the first 
treatment serves as control) enables upward and downward social comparison, which 
allows subjects to see how they perform relative to the three other group members. 
Therefore, worse-performing individuals will exert behind-averse behaviour, 
increasing their effort in a second round to keep up with fellow group members, while 
better-performing participants will increase their earnings as a result of ahead-seeking 
behaviour, concerned that fellow participants may outperform them and drop in rank 
in a subsequent round of effort provision.  
 
The third treatment aims to capture anticipated destructive envious behaviour, leading 
to a second hypothesis:  
 
H2. In the presence of a money-burning opportunity, individuals fear 
repercussions from less-successful fellow participants when 
performing well and lower their effort. 
 
Announcing the existence of an opportunity to reduce the earnings of fellow group 
members in a third treatment may prompt better-performing individuals to reconsider 
their effort in a second round, anticipating that worse-performing individuals may 
target especially better-performing participants to reduce inequality between them. 
This a priori punishment-evasive behaviour will lower effort compared to a situation 
where a money-burning opportunity is absent.  
 
In a fourth treatment, both the provision of relative performance feedback and a 
money-burning opportunity are included, leading to a third hypothesis: 
117 
 
 
H3. When relative performance feedback and the announcement of 
money-burning are combined in one treatment, the effect of the threat 
of destructive envy is stimulated by the provision of relative 
performance feedback. 
 
When relative performance feedback is provided, participants have a better 
understanding of what information is disclosed to fellow group members and on which 
parameters they will be ranked. Moreover, relative performance feedback gives 
participants an impression of whether they would be highly ranked in a second round 
or not, and whether they may become a target for envious less performing group 
members after the second round of effort. As a consequence, they take more account 
of the threat of money-burning than participants who do not receive relative 
performance feedback and have no understanding of how they perform relative to 
others. Therefore, relative performance feedback increases the effect of anticipated 
destructive envy, and well-performing individuals in a fourth treatment may lower 
their effort more than participants in the third treatment.  
 
4.3.3. Implementation and sampling 
 
We use a fixed show-up fee of 2,000 UGX (Ugandan shillings), and a variable reward 
of 500 UGX for every correct answer.25 Per round, 25 tables can be solved, potentially 
resulting in a total amount of 12,500 UGX, excluding the show-up fee. This is almost 
double the amount an average Ugandan household in the eastern region spends on 
daily consumption.26 To discourage gambling (i.e. guessing of answers), a penalty of 
100 UGX (representing 20% of the earnings for a correct answer) for each incorrect 
answer is imposed, but earnings could never go below 0 UGX and penalties were not 
deducted from the show-up fee. Calculators were not allowed, but pen and paper were 
provided. Two enumerators organised each session. Before the experiment started, 
enumerators were randomly allocated to sessions to avoid experimenter bias. After the 
instructions, but before the start of each round, each participant was given a sheet with 
                                                     
25 Based on the exchange rate during the fieldwork period in July-August 2016, 1 USD = 3,600 UGX. 
26 Information retrieved from the statistical abstract of the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2017, p. 37). 
118 
 
three treatment specific control questions (multiple choice) to test whether they had 
understood the instructions sufficiently. After the participants filled out the control 
questions, the enumerators gave a standard summary of the most critical aspects of the 
treatment to increase understanding, regardless of the answers to the control questions. 
The first round was similar for each treatment, so the summary given at the beginning 
of the first round was also similar. The second round was different for each treatment, 
and the summaries given at the beginning of the second round were treatment specific.  
Our sample includes students from Mbale district (urban) and Sironko district 
(rural). Focusing on students avoids illiteracy and cognitive ability issues that could 
have affected the understanding of the experiment. A minimum class size of 30 
students was set as a precondition for the inclusion of classes in the sampling frame, 
ensuring sufficient participants when invited students did not show up for the 
experiment. Classes were randomly sampled from an exhaustive list of schools and 
classes in Mbale and Sironko, provided by the Ugandan municipality offices. This led 
to a sample of five classes in Mbale dispersed over five different schools, and five 
classes in Sironko dispersed over three different schools.27 To avoid cross-
contamination (i.e. students from one class telling students from another class in the 
same school about the experiment), classes belonging to the same school participated 
in the same experimental session. In total, eight experimental sessions were conducted 
in the period July – August 2016. Sessions took place at the school location on a 
Saturday morning between 10.00 and 12.00, avoiding interference with school 
activities. 
At the class level, we randomly sampled 50% of the students per class to 
participate in the effort experiment. A week before the experimental session, 
participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire at the school location, eliciting their 
socioeconomic characteristics, and after completion, students received an invitation to 
take part in the experiment. Information on the experiment was kept brief, and students 
were only informed they could earn money by completing exercises. In total we invited 
332 students, and eventually, 276 of them participated in the experiment. In the Mbale 
                                                     
27 In the Sironko district, we initially sampled a second class of an already included school. However, 
the data on the students in this class are not included as only 12 students showed up for the experiment 
and we did not have enough students to cover all four treatments. Students from this class are also not 
included in the comparison of non-participants with participants in Table 14.  
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district, 186 students were invited, and 164 students participated, resulting in a 
participation rate of 88%. In the Sironko district, 146 students were invited, and 112 
students participated, which led to a participation rate of 77%. Overall, the 
participation rate was 83%. 
In each session, each of the four treatments required a minimum of one 
subgroup of four students, which meant a minimum of 16 students per class was 
needed to run the experiment successfully. For reasons of comprehension, we allowed 
a maximum of four subgroups per treatment, implying a maximum of 16 subgroups 
and 64 students could participate in the experiment simultaneously. Students were 
randomly sampled into subgroups and treatments, and sampling took place in a 
classroom. First, students were randomly allocated into subgroups of four participants, 
after which subgroups were randomly allocated into treatments. Per session, multiple 
subgroups could be sampled into a similar treatment. To avoid cross-contamination 
between treatments, each treatment was assigned a classroom where participants 
received treatment specific instructions. The full sampling of schools and classes into 
treatments is provided in Appendix C.2. 
 
4.4. Results 
 
4.4.1. Socioeconomic characteristics by participation 
 
To examine if our study is suffering from non-response bias, we compare the 
socioeconomic demographics of students who were invited but did not participate with 
the participating students’ socioeconomic demographics. The descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 14. 
Table 14 reveals three significant discrepancies between the two groups. A 
larger proportion of non-participants identify as Bagisu, a larger proportion of them 
are firstborn children, and the household dependency ratio is also higher in the group 
of non-participants than in the group of participants. The latter implies that non-
participating students come from households where the average number of children 
per adult is higher than for participating students. The differences are probably partly 
the result of a higher non-response in rural Sironko than in urban Mbale. However, 
using a two-sided t-test we also observe that the household dependency ratio is 
statistically significantly higher (p = 0.000) for firstborn students (1.48) than it is for 
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non-firstborn students (1.02). Therefore, as experiments were conducted on Saturday 
mornings to avoid any interference with school-related activities, a possible 
explanation for students not showing up for the experiment could be that members of 
the family or household placed stronger obligations on them outside school time. As a 
result, they could have been more likely to be asked to contribute to the household by 
providing labour, care for family members (e.g. younger siblings), or financial 
assistance.28 
 
Table 14. Descriptive statistics; non-participants vs. participants 
 Non participating 
students 
Participating 
students 
Mean difference 
Female 35.7% 41.3% 5.6% 
Household wealth index (PCA) 0.04 -0.09 -0.13 
Bagisu tribe 85.7% 67.8% 18.0*** 
Number of siblings 5.9 6.1 0.2 
Firstborn 33.9% 19.6% 14.4** 
Household dependency ratio a 1.36 1.07 0.28** 
Father higher education 42.9% 50.4% 7.5 
Mother higher education 37.5% 40.2% 2.7 
Observations 56 276 332 
Notes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01. To test for statistical differences, we use a chi-square test for 
binary variables. For continuous variables we use a two-sided t-test. a The household dependency ratio 
is calculated as the number of household members under the age of 18 years divided by the number of 
household members over the age of 18 years.  
 
 
 
                                                     
28 We run a logistic regression with class-level fixed effects (random sampling took place at class-level) 
and bootstrapped standard errors at the class-level to explore which socioeconomic characteristics in 
Table 14 determine participation among invited students. We observe that Gisu tribe and firstborn are 
significant predictors, supporting our findings in Table 14. For robustness reasons we also run a linear 
probability model with class-level fixed effects and bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the class-
level. The results are qualitatively similar and reveal that a Gisu student is 15 percentage points less 
likely to participate in the experiment, while being a firstborn reduces the probability of participation 
with 16 percentage points. Appendix C.3 presents the results. 
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4.4.2. Socioeconomic characteristics by treatment 
 
We use the complete data of 256 high school students in this study.29 To test for 
socioeconomic differences across treatments we use a two-sided ANOVA or chi2 test. 
Students are allocated to treatments randomly, so differences across treatments would 
be due to chance. Panel A in Table 15 shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the socioeconomic characteristics are balanced across treatments.  
However, the descriptive statistics in panel B of Table 15 show that the effort 
invested in round 1 is not balanced across treatments. Using pairwise comparisons, we 
find that on average the participants in the control treatment (T1) have provided 
significantly more correct answers than participants in the fourth treatment who were 
exposed to performance feedback and money-burning in the second round (two-sided 
p-value of a t-test < 0.05). We also observe that participants in T1 have significantly 
lesser incorrect answers than participants who experienced money-burning in the third 
treatment (two-sided p-value of a t-test < 0.05). The pairwise differences among the 
non-control treatments are also statistically significant for the number of incorrect 
answers in round 1. The two-sided p-values of a t-test are 0.001 when comparing T2 
(feedback) with T3 (money-burning) and 0.005 when comparing T2 (feedback) with 
T4 (feedback and money-burning). In addition, we find that participants in T1 (control) 
and in T2 (feedback) earned significantly more in round 1 than participants in T4 
(feedback and money-burning). The t-test results of both pairwise comparisons have a 
two-sided p-value smaller than 0.05. In the analyses, we will deal with these 
imbalances when estimating the treatment effects using individual fixed effects 
regressions. 
 
 
 
                                                     
29 As guessing answers does not represent effort, we have trimmed the mean on the 95th percentile of 
the largest range of consecutive errors in round 1 and round 2. Moreover, students belonging to this top 
five percentile also need to have attempted to answer at least ten tables to be excluded. Overall, 20 
‘gambling’ students were deleted, equally balanced over the treatments with no statistically significant 
differences between them. Appendix C.4 provides a scatterplot on the largest range of consecutive errors 
in both rounds, together with distribution plots of the effort variables for the 20 excluded students and 
the 256 included students. 
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Table 15. Descriptive statistics of participants 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 P-value 
Performance feedback No Yes No Yes  
Money-burning No No Yes Yes  
Panel A. Socioeconomic characteristics 
Female 33% 46% 48% 36% 0.225 
Household wealth index 
(PCA) 
-0.15 -0.32 0.07 0.11 0.743 
Bagisu tribe 77% 64% 66% 61% 0.225 
Number of siblings 6.75 5.75 5.87 5.86 0.304 
Firstborn 22% 16% 24% 19% 0.723 
Household dependency ratio 0.97 1.03 1.20 1.10 0.472 
Father higher education 48% 52% 50% 53% 0.926 
Mother higher education 43% 48% 34% 39% 0.448 
Panel B. Round 1 statistics 
Round 1 total answers solved 13.23 12.67 13.60 12.70 0.195 
Round 1 correct answers 10.45 10.30 9.68 9.13 0.074 
Round 1 incorrect answers 2.78 2.38 3.92 3.58 0.002 
Round 1 earnings (UGX) 4946.38 4909.84 4446.77 4204.69 0.043 
Number of subgroups 18 17 17 17 69 
Number of participants 69 61 62 64 256 
Notes. For continuous variables, the p-value is based on a two-sided ANOVA test, whereas for 
categorical variables the p-value is based on a chi-square test. 20 Students who ‘sabotaged’ the 
experiment by gambling their answers have been deleted from the sample, resulting in numbers of 
participants per treatment that are not necessarily a multiple of four. Treatment 1 (control): no relative 
performance feedback, no money burning; Treatment 2: relative performance feedback, no money 
burning; Treatment 3: no relative performance feedback, money-burning; Treatment 4: relative 
performance feedback, money-burning. 
 
4.4.2. Descriptive statistics of the change in effort variables 
 
In the remainder of this paper, we use five variables to measure effort. First, we use 
the number of tables attempted to solve, which primarily reflects the effort to work 
fast. The second variable we use to measure effort is the number of correct answers. It 
reflects both the effort to work fast and the effort to work accurately. Third, we look 
at earnings. We take the earnings before money-burning decisions have been taken and 
before any money-burning has taken place. Earnings are, therefore, not corrected for 
any potential money-burning, nor for the cost of money-burning. Earnings are 
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compiled of a 500 UGX reward for each correct answer minus a 100 UGX penalty for 
each incorrect answer. The more tables a participant solved correctly, the higher the 
earnings would be at the end of the experiment. The earnings variable reflects the effort 
to work fast, the effort to work accurately, and the effort to find the optimal balance 
between the two as mistakes lead to a reduction in earnings. Fourth, we include the 
number of incorrect answers. Although it does not reflect effort in the same way as the 
three other effort variables do, it helps to interpret the quality of effort and the possible 
effects of the treatments on the effort variables. Fifth, we add to the four effort 
variables the final earnings after money-burning. This variable does not capture the 
quantity or quality of effort but helps to assess what treatment is the most efficient and 
generates the highest welfare, including all costs. 
Each of the four effort variables is potentially confounded by ability. 
Therefore, we concentrate on the change between rounds, assuming that ability has an 
equal influence on effort levels in round 1 and round 2. Naturally, we realise that 
learning ability can influence performance in the second round and the change in 
effort, as some students may learn faster than others. However, the between-subject 
design allows us to allocate students into subgroups and treatments randomly, and 
students that learn faster should be equally divided over the subgroups and the 
treatments. Moreover, as all participants are Senior six students in their final year of 
high school, we expect the differences in learning ability to be relatively small.  
Per treatment, the descriptive statistics of the change in effort between round 1 
and round 2 are presented in Table 16. Participants in the control treatment (T1) where 
both rounds are similar increase the number of correct tables and earnings the least 
between both rounds. This may be plausible, as the first treatment functions as control 
and participants are not exposed to relative performance feedback and money-burning 
in the second round, and a learning effect may account for any change in effort between 
rounds. Individuals that are exposed to money-burning but not relative performance 
feedback in a third treatment increase their earnings and the number of tables correctly 
solved the most in round 2 compared to round 1. What further stands out is the lowest 
increase in the number of tables participants solve in the fourth treatment where 
relative performance feedback and money-burning are combined in the second round. 
Looking at the earnings after money-burning in the last column of Table 16 we see 
that the average change in earnings presented in the fourth column is reduced 
substantially with 39% in the third treatment and 44% in the fourth treatment. 
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Appendix C.5 provides histograms per treatment and effort variable to get a better 
impression of their distributions. These histograms, however, do not show large and 
noticeable differences between treatments.  
 
Table 16. Descriptive statistics per treatment  
 Change in 
tables 
attempted 
Change 
in 
correct 
answers 
Change 
in 
incorrect 
answers 
Change 
in 
earnings 
Change in 
earnings 
after money-
burning 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
T1: Round 2 = Round 1 (control) 2.38 0.54 1.84 84.06 84.06 
 (2.99) (2.76) (3.62) (1618.34) (1618.34) 
T2: Feedback 2.49 1.38 1.11 577.05 577.05 
 (1.67) (2.37) (2.62) (1401.59) (1401.59) 
T3: Money-burning 2.32 1.53 0.79 687.10 417.58 
 (2.35) (2.90) (3.37) (1709.14) (1606.45) 
T4: Feedback and money-burning 1.52 1.22 0.30 579.69 326.56 
 (2.31) (2.63) (2.78) (1506.20) (1578.05) 
Notes. Standard deviation in parentheses. The change in effort represents the difference between effort 
invested in round 2 and effort invested in round 1. Earnings are in UGX.  
 
To examine whether the changes in effort between both rounds are statistically 
significantly different across the four treatments we use a two-sample t-test. Table 17 
displays the mean differences of all possible pairwise treatment comparisons per effort 
variable and a two-sided p-value of a two-sample t-test. The t-test results are not 
adjusted for testing multiple comparisons, and for that reason, we only discuss 
differences at the 5% or 1% level.30 We first compare the control treatment (T1) with 
the three other treatments in Panel A and find three statistically significant differences. 
First, the results in the second column reveal that participants in the third treatment 
(money-burning) increase the number of tables they solved correctly more than the 
first treatment (control). Second, they also increase their earnings more than 
participants in the first treatment (control), as can be seen in the fourth column of Table 
17. These two results provide initial, contrasting evidence to our second hypothesis 
                                                     
30 Multiple comparisons increase the likelihood of a type-I error.  
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that states that the threat of money-burning would decrease effort levels. In addition, 
the third row of the third column in Table 17 shows that participants in the fourth 
treatment (feedback and money-burning) increase the number of incorrect answers 
they submit less than the participants in the control treatment (T1). We do not find any 
differences between the second treatment (feedback) and the control treatment. 
 
Table 17. Two-sample t-test effort variables  
 Change in 
tables 
attempted 
Change in 
correct 
answers 
Change in 
incorrect 
answers 
Change in 
earnings 
Earnings 
after 
money-
burning 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A.      
Treatment 2 – Treatment 1 0.11 0.84 -0.73 492.99* 492.99* 
 (0.43) (0.45) (0.56) (267.24) (267.24) 
Treatment 3 – Treatment 1 -0.05 1.00** -1.05* 603.04** 333.5227 
 (0.47) (0.49) (0.61) (290.82) (282.21) 
Treatment 4 – Treatment 1 -0.86* 0.68 -1.54*** 495.63* 242.5045 
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.56) (271.67) (277.51) 
Panel B.      
Treatment 2 – Treatment 3 0.17 -0.16 0.32 -110.05 159.4685 
 (0.37) (0.48) (0.54) (282.09) (272.02) 
Treatment 2 – Treatment 4 0.98*** 0.16 0.82* -2.64 250.4867 
 (0.36) (0.45) (0.48) (260.56) (267.44) 
Treatment 3 – Treatment 4 0.81* 0.31 0.49  107.41 91.02 
 (0.41) (0.49) (0.55) (286.76) (283.70) 
Notes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01. Two-sample t-test. Mean differences reported. Standard error 
in parentheses. The change in effort represents the difference between effort invested in round 2 and 
effort invested in round 1. Earnings are in UGX. Treatment 1 (control): no relative performance 
feedback, no money burning; Treatment 2: relative performance feedback, no money burning; 
Treatment 3: no relative performance feedback, money-burning; Treatment 4: relative performance 
feedback, money-burning. 
 
Comparing the remaining treatments in Panel B only brings forward one statistically 
significant difference. The first column of Table 17 shows that participants in the 
second treatment (feedback) increase the number of tables they solve more than 
participants in the fourth treatment (feedback and money-burning). All other pairwise 
comparisons do not differ on any of the effort variables. We find no differences 
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between the second treatment (feedback) and the third treatment (money-burning), and 
between the third and fourth treatment (feedback and money-burning). We summarise 
this finding in a first result. 
 
Result 1. The t-test results show that money-burning increases the number of correctly 
solved tables and the final earnings more than the control treatment. Combining 
money-burning with relative feedback reduces the increase in the number of incorrect 
answers, compared to the control treatment; and increases the number of tables solved 
more than the provision of feedback in a second treatment. 
 
4.4.3. Regression results 
 
In the following section we will run a regression to correct for effort imbalances in the 
first round and to correct the standard errors for non-independence. As the effort 
invested in round 1 is not balanced between treatments, we use an individual fixed 
effects regression to test the robustness of the two-sample t-test results of Table 17. 
We use the treatment variable as the main explanatory variable:  
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇1𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇2𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇3𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇4𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟  (1) 
 
Here, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 is the effort of individual 𝑖𝑖 in round r as measured by the number of tables 
attempted, number of correct answers, number of incorrect answers, or earnings before 
and after money-burning. The coefficients corresponding to the interaction terms 𝑇𝑇1𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟, 𝑇𝑇2𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟, 𝑇𝑇3𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟, and 𝑇𝑇4𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 capture the expected change in effort between 
round 1 (with 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 = 0) as the base category and round 2 (with 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 = 1), for each 
treatment separately. We make use of individual fixed effects and add 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 to our model. 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 is the error term. Experimental sessions took place at school level, and as classes 
belonging to the same school participated in the same experimental session, we 
bootstrap cluster the standard error at the school level to adjust for non-independence 
within experimental sessions.31 Table 18 shows the estimates of 𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2, 𝛽𝛽3, and 𝛽𝛽4 for 
each effort variable.  
                                                     
31 Bootstrapping is required as we have eight clusters (schools), which is not enough to cluster the S.E. 
at the school level.  
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We discuss the results of the regression models in Table 18 per treatment and compare 
the estimates of that treatment with the estimates of the control treatment. First, we 
discuss the change in the effort variables for the control treatment (T1), where the 
conditions in both rounds were the same. Column (1) shows that participants in the 
first treatment statistically significantly increase the number of tables they attempt to 
solve in round 2 compared to round 1. The estimate in Colum (2) for the number of 
correctly solved tables does not indicate a significant change, but the estimate for the 
number of incorrect answers does. Column (3) reveals that participants in the control 
treatment give more incorrect answers in the second round than in the first round. Last, 
the estimate in column (4) shows that participants earned 84.058 UGX more in round 
2 than in round 1, but this difference in earnings is not statistically significant. No 
money-burning took place in the control treatment, which explains why the change in 
earnings before and after is the same.  
We now move to the regression results of the remaining treatments. The second 
row of Table 18 presents the regression results of the second treatment where 
participants received relative performance feedback at the beginning of the second 
round. The participants in this treatment statistically significantly increase their 
performance on all of the effort variables in the second round, compared to the first 
round.  
To discuss the results of the third treatment where participants were exposed 
to the threat of money-burning, we examine the estimates in the third row of Table 18. 
Column (1) reveals that after the money-burning announcement, participants still 
increase the number of tables they attempted to solve. They also increase the number 
of tables correctly solved as shown in column (2), but column (3) does not reveal a 
significant increase in the number of incorrectly solved tables in a second round. As a 
result of more correctly solved tables, participants in T3 significantly increase their 
earnings in a second round (fourth column). When deducting the money-burning 
scenarios per subgroup, the round 2 earnings are not statistically significantly different 
anymore from the round 1 earnings (fifth column). 
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Table 18. Average treatment effects  
 Tables attempted Correct answers Incorrect answers Earnings Earnings after money-
burning 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment 1: round 2 = round 1 
 
2.377*** 0.536 1.841*** 84.058 84.058 
(0.392) (0.402) (0.413) (225.715) (225.715) 
Treatment 2: feedback 2.492*** 1.377*** 1.115*** 577.049*** 577.049*** 
(0.184) (0.270) (0.142) (145.967) (145.967) 
Treatment 3: money-burning 2.323*** 1.532*** 0.790 687.097** 417.581 
(0.343) (0.479) (0.573) (287.334) (268.219) 
Treatment 4: money-burning & feedback 1.516*** 1.219** 0.297 579.688* 326.563 
(0.255) (0.554) (0.424) (315.824) (261.127) 
Constant 13.055*** 9.895*** 3.160*** 4631.250*** 4631.250*** 
 (0.211) (0.183) (0.144) (95.521) (95.521) 
R2 within 0.459 0.166 0.118 0.097 0.052 
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 
Notes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01. Individual fixed effects regression. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the school level and in parentheses. Round 1 is the base 
category for each treatment, and the coefficients represent the change in effort between round 2 and round 1. Earnings are in UGX.  
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For the fourth treatment (relative performance feedback and money-burning), the 
result in the first column shows that participants significantly increase the number of 
tables they attempted to solve. They also significantly increase the number of correct 
tables (second column), but column (3) reveals they do not change the number of 
incorrectly solved tables between both rounds. Column (4) shows that participants in 
the fourth treatment increase their earnings in the second round but that increase is 
only marginally significant. After deducting the money-burning scenarios, column (5) 
demonstrates that the earnings of round 2 are not statistically different from the 
earnings in round 1 anymore.  
To find out whether the changes in effort between the first and second round 
are statistically significantly different across the treatments, we use a Wald Chi-Square 
test and present the test results in Table 19. We only discuss significant differences 
and start with Panel A. The first row provides the results of comparing the effect of 
relative feedback in a second treatment with the control treatment. The significant 
Wald Chi-Square test statistic in column (2) reveals that participants in a second 
treatment (feedback) increase the number of correct answers between round 1 and 
round 2 more than participants in the control treatment. This implies that the provision 
of relative performance feedback in a second treatment results in more dedicated 
behaviour to solve as many tables correctly as possible. This finding is supported by 
the Chi-Square test statistic in column (3), which reveals that the second treatment 
increases the number of incorrect answers less than the control treatment. However, 
this difference is only marginally significant. Having a large increase in the number of 
correct answers while making fewer mistakes than the control group has an effect on 
earnings. The Wald Chi-Square test statistic in column (4) shows that participants in 
the second treatment (feedback) increase their earnings statistically significantly more 
than the control treatment. Altogether, these significant differences in the change in 
correct answers, incorrect answers, and earnings between the second treatment and the 
control treatment confirm our first hypothesis that the provision of relative 
performance feedback generates competitive envy, which increases the effort to work 
faster and more dedicatedly.  
The second row of Panel A in Table 19 presents the effects of money-burning 
in a third treatment. The Wald Chi-Square test statistics in this row of Table 19 are all 
insignificant. The absence of statistically significant differences in effort between the 
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third treatment and the control treatment rejects our second hypothesis that participants 
anticipate on destructive envy of fellow participants and decrease their effort. 
The third row of Panel A in Table 19 presents the differences between the 
control treatment and the fourth treatment, where money-burning is combined with 
relative performance feedback. In combination with the results from Table 18, the 
Wald Chi-Square test result in column (1) reveals that participants in the fourth 
treatment increase the number of tables they attempt to solve statistically significantly 
less than participants in the control group. The Wald Chi-Square test statistic in column 
(3) also provides evidence that the increase in the number of incorrect answers of the 
fourth treatment is smaller than the increase of the control treatment.  
 
 
In addition, we compare the fourth treatment with the two other treatments in Panel B 
of Table 19 and find that the fourth treatment (feedback and money-burning) differs 
from the second (feedback) and the third treatment (money-burning) mainly in the 
increase of total tables attempted. The Wald Chi-Square test result column (1) shows 
that the increase in the number of tables solved in the fourth treatment is smaller than 
the increase in the second treatment where money-burning was not included. 
Table 19. Pairwise comparisons average treatment effects 
 Tables 
attempted 
Correct 
answers 
Incorrect 
answers 
Earnings Earnings after 
money-
burning 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. 
Treatment 2 – Treatment 1 0.07 5.64** 2.93* 6.69*** 6.69*** 
Treatment 3 – Treatment 1 0.01 2.01 1.47 2.21 0.89 
Treatment 4 – Treatment 1 5.64** 0.75 4.31** 1.18 0.37 
Panel B. 
Treatment 2 – Treatment 3 0.41 0.07 0.29 0.11 0.34 
Treatment 2 – Treatment 4 6.80*** 0.07 3.52* 0.00 0.76 
Treatment 3 – Treatment 4 4.03** 1.24 0.94 0.37 0.30 
Notes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01. Wald chi2 test, Chi2 (1) reported. The pairwise comparisons 
test whether the change in effort (round 2 – round 1) is statistically different across treatments. 
Treatment 1 (control): no relative performance feedback, no money burning; Treatment 2: relative 
performance feedback, no money burning; Treatment 3: no relative performance feedback, money-
burning; Treatment 4: relative performance feedback, money-burning. 
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Comparing the fourth treatment with the third treatment where feedback on first-round 
performance was not provided, we also find that the increase in the number of tables 
solved in the fourth treatment is smaller than the increase in the third treatment. 
Altogether, even though the participants in the fourth treatment increase their effort in 
a second round significantly, the results indicate that they lower their effort to work 
fast and accurately not only in comparison to the participants in the control treatment 
but also to the participants in the other two treatments. These findings confirm our 
third hypothesis that individuals lower their effort when threatened with destructive 
envy from fellow participants in a situation where feedback is provided on relative 
performance in a previous round. A reduction in effort is then mainly reflected in the 
effort to work fast. We summarise these findings in a second result. 
 
Result 2. The individual fixed effects regression results show that relative feedback 
increases the number of correct tables solved and the final earnings more compared 
to the control treatment. Combining money-burning with relative feedback reduces the 
increase in the number of tables solved and the number of incorrect answers, 
compared to the control treatment; and reduces the number of tables solved compared 
to the money-burning treatment without feedback.  
 
4.4.4. Heterogeneous treatment effects 
 
To provide further evidence that envy drives the treatment effects, we compare the 
results of the poorest and wealthiest participants.32 We expect to find differences 
driven by one of two alternative hypotheses. First, we expect students to bring existing 
social relations into the experiment. Students know each other, and therefore know 
who is from a wealthier background. As a result, the wealthier participants may 
anticipate that their wealthier background makes them more likely to be targeted in 
                                                     
32 Although we used a stratified sample based on a rural/urban dimension, we find only one statistically 
significant difference between the treatment effects in the Sironko and Mbale subsamples in the effort 
variables. In the number of tables attempted to solve Mbale participants are affected more by to the 
threat of money-burning (third treatment) than Sironko participants. This effect may be caused by the 
fact that Mbale participants are wealthier than Sironko participants (two-sided p-value in a t-test is < 
0.1).  
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situations of money-burning. Especially when performing well, their wealth may 
justify money-burning decisions. In contrast, poorer students are less worried about 
the role of their wealth in money-burning decisions of fellow group members, and their 
effort will be less affected by the threat of money-burning. Alternatively, we expect 
the relative value of money that can be earned during the experiment to decrease when 
wealth levels increase, which reduces the importance of positional concerns. The 
wealthiest students are then less motivated by relative performance feedback, but also 
less discouraged by the threat of money-burning, while for the poorest students the 
treatments will have the opposite effect.  
The wealth index is compiled using a method proposed by Filmer and Pritchett 
(2001).33 They base their index on household assets and not on consumption or income, 
which is often difficult to measure in a developing country context. As the effect of 
household wealth may be non-linear, we do not use the entire index, but compute five 
wealth quintiles and use subsamples for the poorest quintile and the wealthiest quintile. 
As they represent the most extreme values on both sides of the wealth index, we expect 
to find the largest differences. We use equation (1) for both subsamples and use Wald 
Chi-Square tests per subsample to explore statistically significant differences between 
the control treatment and the three other treatments.  
Table 20 presents the treatment effects per wealth quintile. The first five 
columns show the treatment effects for the poorest students, while the last five columns 
present the treatment effects for the wealthiest students. We first discuss the treatment 
effects in the poorest wealth quantile. The results in the first column show that all four 
treatments significantly increase the number of tables attempted to solve in round 2 
compared to round 1. Apart from a marginally significant positive effect in the second 
treatment, column (2) does not reveal statistically significant increases in the number 
of correctly solved tables in any of the remaining treatments. In the third column, 
however, we find that only the second treatment significantly increases the number of 
incorrectly solved answers in round 2. Also, no evidence is found that proves that the 
poorest participants significantly increased their earnings in the second round in any 
of the four treatments. When looking at earnings after money-burning, we find that 
                                                     
33 To calculate the wealth quintiles, we weigh the household wealth index on the total number of 
household members. Without these weights, large but poor families would still score high on the wealth 
index because of pooled assets. 
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money-burning combined with feedback in a fourth treatment has a marginally 
significant negative effect on round 2 earnings compared to round 1. Altogether, these 
results suggest that providing relative performance feedback in a second treatment 
affects the round 2 effort of the poorest participants the most. The large increase in 
incorrect answers in T2, however, results in higher penalties as 100 UGX is deducted 
from the earnings in that particular round for each incorrect answer, eliminating a 
positive effect of working faster on the earnings of the poorest participants.  
We now look at the last five columns of Table 20, which present the average 
treatment effects for the wealthiest subsample. Column (6) demonstrates that all four 
treatments statistically significantly increase the number of tables attempted to solve 
in the second round. In addition, only the control treatment (T1) significantly increases 
the number of correct answers in round 2, as shown in column (7). The second 
treatment also increases the number of correct answers, but the effect is only 
marginally significant. Moving to the number of incorrect answers in column (8), the 
results reveal that only the third treatment with money-burning increases the number 
of incorrectly solved tables in round 2. Last, we examine the earnings, and column (9) 
presents evidence that participants in the control treatment (T1) significantly increase 
their earnings in the second round. The results also indicate that participants in the 
third treatment with money-burning decrease their earnings in round 2, but this effect 
is only marginally significant. The post-money-burning treatment effects on earnings 
presented in column (10) are similar to those in column (9). In sum, the results suggest 
that exposure to money-burning without relative performance feedback in a third 
treatment affects the effort of the wealthiest participants the most.  
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Table 20. Average treatment effects: poorest and wealthiest subsample 
 Wealth index 1st quintile subsample (poorest students)  Wealth index 5th quintile (wealthiest students) 
 Attempted Correct  Incorrect Earnings Earnings 
after money-
burning 
 Attempted Correct Incorrect Earnings Earnings 
after money-
burning 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
T1: round 2=round 1 
 
1.615*** 0.308 1.308* 23.077 23.077  1.583*** 1.167*** 0.417 541.667*** 541.667*** 
(0.610) (1.010) (0.753) (566.779) (566.779)  (0.512) (0.281) (0.650) (189.719) (189.719) 
T2: feedback 3.429*** 1.071* 2.357*** 300.000 300.000  2.500*** 1.667* 0.833 750.000 750.000 
(0.501) (0.571) (0.881) (362.995) (362.995)  (0.414) (0.853) (0.677) (491.209) (491.209) 
T3: money-burning 1.692*** 0.846 0.846 338.462 330.000  2.600*** -0.400 3.000*** -500.000* -610.000* 
 (0.521) (0.681) (1.000) (430.877) (434.378)  (0.878) (0.491) (0.801) (268.172) (328.336) 
T4: money-burning &  1.333** 0.222 1.111 0.000 -577.778*  1.000*** 0.077 0.923 -53.846 -361.538 
feedback (0.675) (0.716) (0.810) (412.852) (325.172)  (0.383) (0.506) (0.728) (326.583) (342.352) 
Constant 13.367*** 10.388*** 2.980*** 4895.918*** 4895.918***  12.617*** 9.404*** 3.213*** 4380.851*** 4380.851*** 
 (0.387) (0.540) (0.239) (288.693) (288.693)  (0.307) (0.370) (0.323) (208.021) (208.021) 
R2 within 0.569 0.028 0.163 -0.022 -0.000  0.522 0.138 0.276 0.100 0.123 
Observations 98 98 98 98 98  94 94 94 94 94 
Notes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01. Individual fixed effects regression. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the school level and in parentheses. Round 1 is the base category for each 
treatment, and the coefficients represent the change in effort between round 2 and round 1. Earnings are in UGX. 
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Table 21. Pairwise comparisons treatment effects per wealth subsample 
 Wealth index 1st quintile subsample (poorest students)   Wealth index 5th quintile (wealthiest students) 
 Tables 
attempted 
Correct 
answers 
Incorrect 
answers 
Earnings Earnings 
after money-
burning 
 Tables 
attempted 
Correct 
answers 
Incorrect 
answers 
Earnings Earnings 
after money-
burning 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A. 
Treatment 2 – Treatment 1 5.40** 0.75 1.27 0.28 0.30  2.08 0.35 0.31 0.19 0.20 
Treatment 3 – Treatment 1 0.01 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.11  0.66 6.56** 3.98** 8.21*** 7.50*** 
Treatment 4 – Treatment 1 0.29 0.01 0.03 0.00 1.28  0.89 3.24* 0.31 2.38 5.59** 
Panel B. 
Treatment 2 – Treatment 3 5.40** 0.05 1.12 0.00 0.00  0.01 4.75** 2.69 4.66** 5.22** 
Treatment 2 – Treatment 4 7.40*** 1.73 1.23 0.57 6.13**  14.99*** 1.73 0.01 1.21 2.65 
Treatment 3 – Treatment 4 0.17 0.40 0.05 0.33 2.24  2.31 0.52 3.37* 1.28 0.28 
Notes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01. Wald chi2 test. Chi2 (1) reported. The pairwise comparisons test whether the change in effort (round 2 – round 1) is statistically different across 
treatments. Treatment 1 (control): no relative performance feedback, no money burning; Treatment 2: relative performance feedback, no money burning; Treatment 3: no relative performance 
feedback, money-burning; Treatment 4: relative performance feedback, money-burning.  
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To study whether the changes in effort are significant different across treatments we 
need to conduct Wald Chi-Square tests for each of the two wealth groups. Table 21 
presents the test statistics. We first discuss the results of Panel A for the poorest 
subsample. The Wald Chi-Square test statistic in column (1) implies that the poorest 
participants that received feedback (T2) increase the number of tables solved 
significantly more than the poorest participants in the control treatment (T1). No other 
differences are found between the three treatments and the control treatment. However, 
when comparing the second, third and fourth treatment in Panel B we find additional 
differences across the treatments. The first two Chi-Square test statistics in column (1) 
reveal that the increase in the number of tables attempted is larger for the poorest 
participants in the second treatment (feedback) than for the poorest participants in the 
third (money-burning) and fourth treatment (feedback and money-burning). 
Altogether, these findings reveal that performance feedback (T2) motivates the poorest 
students to work fast, mainly because they increase the number of incorrect answers, 
revealing a low quality of effort. They are, however, not susceptible to the threat of 
money-burning (T3), also not in combination with feedback (T4).  
To examine whether the estimates are significantly different between the 
control treatment and the three other treatments for the wealthiest subsample, we look 
at the last five columns in Table 21. Starting with Panel A, we compare the change in 
effort of the third treatment (money-burning) with the control treatment, and the result 
in column (7) points out that in the third treatment (money-burning), the increase of 
the number of tables correctly solved is smaller than in the control. The increase in the 
number of incorrect answers is also larger in the third treatment than in the control 
(T1), as can be seen in column (8). In addition, column (9) provides evidence that the 
increase in earnings for participants in the third treatment is statistically significantly 
smaller than for the participants in the control treatment. The same effect also holds 
for earnings after money-burning in column (10). Moreover, the change in effort of 
the fourth treatment (feedback and money-burning) also differs from the change in 
effort in the control treatment. First, the increase in correct tables is smaller in the 
fourth treatment than in the control, but the difference is only marginally significant 
as shown in column (7). Second, the result in column (10) demonstrates that the 
increase in change in earnings after money-burning is also significantly smaller in the 
fourth treatment (feedback and money-burning) than in the control treatment. 
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In sum, the regression results for the wealthiest subsample reveal that the wealthiest 
students are sensitive to the threat of money-burning in the third treatment. Compared 
to the control treatment (T1), the threat of money-burning (T3) leads to a lower number 
of correctly solved tables, an increase in the number of incorrectly solved tables, and 
a decrease in the earnings in round 2 for the wealthiest participants. Altogether, 
wealthiest students respond to the threat of money-burning with less dedicated, lower 
quality effort and lower final earnings. The results also show that money-burning 
combined with feedback in a fourth treatment is costly for the wealthier students as 
earnings after money-burning are significantly lower than in the control (T1).  
A possible explanation for this result could refer to existing social relations that 
are brought into the experiment. The experiment is not anonymous and students know 
who they are grouped with, and as they are class mates they also know their fellow 
group members’ wealth background. Therefore, if a wealthy participant performs 
relatively well in the second round, other participants may perceive this as unfair or 
undeserving in combination with the existing wealth distribution brought into the 
experiment, and could justify their decision to reduce the second-round earnings of 
that wealthy participant. Wealthy students can therefore anticipate this mechanism and 
lower their effort in round 2 in order to avoid being targeted during the money-burning 
process. 
To examine whether the effects of the treatments for each wealth subsample 
are statistically significantly different for the poorest and the wealthiest students we 
compare their estimates per treatment. For this, we take a subsample that only includes 
the poorest and wealthiest students, and we interact a dummy variable that represents 
belonging to the wealthiest quintile (yes = 1, no = 0) with the treatments. The poorest 
wealth quintile is the base category. Per treatment, the interaction coefficient 
represents the difference in effort between the poorest and wealthiest subsample and 
indicates whether the difference is statistically significant. Because of this approach, 
we do not need a Wald Chi-Square test to compare estimates. The regression results 
and coefficient plots are attached in Appendix C.6. The results show that the wealthiest 
participants make more mistakes and earn less in the third treatment (money-burning) 
than the poorest participant in the same treatment, but this difference is only marginally 
significant. However, both subsamples include only 98 and 94 observations, and this 
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limited number of observations may hinder finding significant differences between the 
subsamples.34 
To increase statistical power, we use the same approach as we did to compare 
the poorest and wealthiest subsamples (wealth dummy * treatment), but now we 
compare the effects of each of the two wealth quintiles with the entire pool of 
remaining students. For the poorest subsample, we use a dummy variable with a value 
of 1 for the poorest quintile and 0 for all other quintiles and interact it with the 
treatments, while for the wealthiest quintile we replace that dummy variable with a 
variable that takes a value of 1 for the wealthiest quintile and 0 for all other quintiles. 
This means that student who do not belong to the poorest quintile are inherently 
wealthier than the students in the poorest quintile, and students who do not belong to 
the wealthiest quintile are inherently poorer than the students in the wealthiest quintile. 
The results are presented in Appendix C.7.  
With this approach, we observe strong interaction effects which are similar to 
the results from the subsample regressions already presented in Table 20 and Table 21. 
Looking at the difference in treatment effects between the poorest wealth quintile and 
the remaining pool of students, the results reveal that providing relative performance 
feedback to the poorest participants in the second treatment increases the number of 
tables they try to solve more in round 2 compared to wealthier participants in the same 
treatment. This confirms our finding that especially the poorest students are sensitive 
to relative performance feedback (T2) as they work faster than the other students.  
When we look at the difference in treatment effects between the wealthiest 
quintile and the remaining pool of students we observe that exposing the wealthiest 
participants to the threat of money-burning in the third treatment affects their effort 
statistically significantly more than the effort of the remaining pool of students in the 
third treatment: they increase the number of correct tables significantly less, increase 
the number of incorrect answers significantly more, and increase their earnings 
significantly less in the second round than the other students in the third treatment. For 
the fourth treatment (feedback and money-burning), we find that the wealthiest 
                                                     
34 As we use an individual fixed effects regression, we need to reshape the dataset into long. This results 
in two observations for each participant (an observation for effort in the first round and an observation 
for effort in the second round), meaning that the 98 and 94 observations represent 49 and 47 participants, 
respectively. 
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subsample is more sensitive to money-burning in combination with feedback than the 
remaining pool of students, but the difference in treatment effects is only marginally 
significant. The wealthiest students increase the number of correct tables less than the 
remaining students, which results in a lower increase in earnings. All in all, these 
results confirm our finding that wealthier students are more sensitive to money-
burning (T3) as it lowers the quality of their effort and their earnings. 
In sum, the regression results in this section show that wealth influences the 
treatment effects. The poorest quintile is more sensitive to relative performance 
feedback in the first treatment, increasing the number of tables attempted, albeit at low 
quality (i.e. incorrect answers), whereas the wealthiest quintile is more sensitive to the 
threat of money-burning in the third and fourth treatment, which lowers their number 
of correctly solved answers, earnings, and quality of effort (i.e. incorrect answers). We 
summarise the findings in a third result: 
 
Result 3. In the poorest subsample, relative feedback increases the number of tables 
solved more compared to the control treatment, the treatment with money-burning, 
and the treatment that combines money-burning and feedback. In the wealthiest 
subsample, money-burning without relative feedback increases the number of tables 
solved and the final earnings less, and increases the number of incorrect answers more 
compared to the control treatment. The treatment effects of both subsamples do not 
differ, but when comparing the treatment effects in the subsamples with the remaining 
pool of students independently, the results indicate that the poorest students are more 
sensitive to relative feedback, while the wealthiest students are more sensitive to 
money-burning. 
 
4.5. Discussion of results 
 
In this section, we interpret our results and position them in the existing literature on 
competitive and destructive envy. We first discuss the effect of relative performance 
feedback on effort. We then elaborate on why the threat of money-burning does not 
affect effort, but when combined with relative performance feedback it does, and 
clarify the influence of wealth on both effects. We end with discussing what our results 
mean for development policy and inequality in small-scale societies.  
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Our first main result indicates that relative performance enables social comparison 
which stimulates competitive behaviour among participants in the second treatment. 
When receiving relative performance feedback, participants increase the number of 
correctly solved answers, which reflects both the effort to work fast and the effort to 
work accurately. This translates into increased earnings. Our findings are in line with 
studies like Azmat and Iriberri (2010), Azmat and Iriberri (2016), Falk and Ichino 
(2006), Gill et al. (2018), Herbst and Mas (2015), and Mas and Moretti (2009), 
amongst others, that use lab and field experiments to show the positive effect of social 
comparison on performance. Overall, the second treatment generates the highest 
welfare of all treatments. 
Moreover, our results reveal that the poorest participants are more sensitive to 
the provision of relative performance feedback than others. They increase the number 
of incorrect answers significantly more than wealthier participants in round 2, which 
explains a significantly large increase in the number of tables attempted. The number 
of correct answers remains unaffected. As the money that can be earned during the 
experiment can bear more value for the poorest participants than for the wealthier 
participants, the provision of relative performance feedback may have caused anxiety 
amongst the poorest subjects, which in combination with the effort to work fast had an 
adverse effect on accuracy and quality of work in the second round. Altogether, a 
high(er) reward can increase pressure which can have an adverse effect on 
performance and the quality of work. 
Our second key result reveals that even though the threat of envious behaviour 
in itself does not affect effort, when combined with relative performance feedback in 
the fourth treatment it lowers effort. Informing participants on fellow group members’ 
performance, while subsequently announcing the potential threat of money-burning 
significantly lowers effort. Our empirical evidence of the anticipated cost of 
performing well connects to the findings of Bursztyn and Jensen (2015), who 
demonstrate that high school students take account of the social cost of educational 
performance, fearing social punishment from classmates when doing well in school. 
A plausible explanation for the moderating role of relative performance feedback 
singles out that when informed on relative performance before the start of the second 
round, participants know better how they would be ranked after the second round of 
effort. This feedback informs students what it takes to rank as a top performer, which 
makes that top-performing subjects take more account of money-burning than less 
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performing subjects. We find no evidence though that relative performance feedback 
influences actual money-burning behaviour (i.e. no differences in behaviour between 
the treatment with and the treatment without relative feedback).35 Perhaps having 
added a third round of effort would have shed more light on the relationship between 
information disclosure and anticipated money-burning behaviour. It could have 
shown, for example, how participants respond once their earnings have been reduced, 
or how they respond when they find out they have not been targeted.  
In addition, the heterogeneous treatment effects demonstrate that household 
wealth of participants plays a role in participants' anticipation of potential money-
burning behaviour. The wealthiest participants react stronger to the threat of money-
burning than poorer participants in the third treatment. This result shows that even 
without the provision of relative performance feedback the wealthiest participants 
lower their effort after the threat of money-burning (in the third treatment), whereas 
less wealthy participants do not. It implies that feedback on round 1 performance 
affects other participants’ anticipation of money-burning but bears less relevance for 
the anticipation of the wealthiest students. 
This wealth effect is in line with our hypothesis that states that existing social 
relations are brought into the experiment. As students in subgroups are classmates with 
existing social relationships outside the experiment, the wealthiest participants may 
anticipate on their fellow group members to take account of their wealthy background. 
In combination with performing well, their wealthy background could fuel and justify 
the decision of fellow group members to target them and reduce their earnings. This 
explanation links to empirical evidence that shows that a large proportion of people 
challenge the fairness of the existing wealth distribution, which affects people’s 
response to growing inequality (i.e. a wealthy participant also being a top performer 
in the effort experiment could be considered unfair) (Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, & 
                                                     
35 In terms of money-burning, the participants in the third treatment decided to reduce the earnings of 
others in 17% of the decisions (our design allows a participant one money-burning decision per fellow 
group member, resulting in three decisions per participant) and 4% of the total earnings was reduced 
(on average 201 UGX per participant and 1176 UGX per participant that was actually targeted). In the 
fourth treatment, students decided to reduce the earnings of others in 22% of the decisions, and 5% of 
the earnings were reduced (on average 277 UGX per participants and 1280 UGX per participant 
targeted). There are no statistically significant differences in money-burning behaviour between 
participants in the third and the fourth treatment.  
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Tungodden, 2007; D. Fehr, 2018; Norton & Ariely, 2011). So, the wealthiest 
participants may anticipate that when doing well in a second round their poorer fellow 
group members may consider their relatively high earnings unfair in light of the 
existing wealth distribution in real-life. This would justify targeting them when offered 
an opportunity to reduce earnings.  
In addition, when interpreting all these results on money-burning, we should 
bear in mind that although the threat of money-burning combined with feedback 
lowers effort, both money-burning treatments do not have higher costs and do not lead 
to lower welfare than the control treatment, apart for the wealthiest subsample. Only 
for the wealthiest students, money-burning in both treatments is costly and results in 
lower welfare before and after actual money-burning. 
As we do not find an effect of relative performance feedback on the effort of 
the wealthiest students, we can only partly confirm our second, alternative hypothesis 
that states that the money that can be earned during the experiments holds less value 
for the wealthiest participants, which are therefore significantly less motivated by 
relative performance feedback than the poorer participants.  
Regrettably, this paper has not been able to investigate whether group 
composition and the interaction with participants’ own characteristics has a 
moderating effect on the anticipated threat of destructive envy. Such an analysis would 
allow investigating whether homogeneity in gender, tribe, and wealth, amongst other 
characteristics, either stimulates competitive envy or destructive envy among like-
minded peers, or whether heterogeneity drives competitive and destructive envy, and 
whether it has an effect on the anticipation of destructive envious behaviour. Also, 
investigating the role social interactions play would add to our understanding, and 
would shed more light on why certain communities fare better than others. Angelucci, 
De Giorgi, Rangel, and Rasul (2009), for example, shows that egalitarian villages with 
dense social networks are more likely to be poor, while Charness et al. (2013) show 
that people engage less in destructive behaviour when belonging to the same group, 
pointing out the importance of group identity. 
In terms of development policy, our findings on competitive behaviour are 
essential for interventions that aim to stimulate productivity by emphasising income 
inequalities, for example through exposure to successful peers. Studies like Bernard et 
al. (2014) on Ethiopia and Macours and Vakis (2014) on Nicaragua demonstrate that 
exposing the poorest in society to successful, similar people can increase the effort 
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they invest in improving their livelihoods. Inequality can then have a positive effect 
on the productivity of the poor and stimulates them to catch up with top performing 
individuals to reduce that inequality, while top performers are stimulated to stay ahead 
of them.  
Such a mechanism, however, only works in the absence of a destructive envy 
environment. Development policy aimed at empowering the poor need to pay ample 
attention to cultural and psychological factors that enable destructive envious 
behaviour, especially in egalitarian societies with high levels of social capital. Grolleau 
et al. (2006) state that creating visible differences by exposing poor people to 
successful peers in their communities can have a harmful effect on the success and 
productivity of these peers, as they themselves may become the target of destructive 
envy. But even without being the target of destructive behaviour, the anticipation of 
the threat will already suffice to lower the productivity of successful individuals. 
Inequality then has a potentially destructive effect on the productivity of individuals, 
especially of top performers. Under such conditions, strategies that emphasise equality 
will be more effective in increasing the productivity of the poor in egalitarian societies. 
To allow equal opportunity, such policies should focus on enabling poor people equal 
access to capital, land and information while eliminating legal and customary barriers.  
 
4.6. Conclusion  
 
Inequality that is generated by varying levels of effort can render feelings of envy that 
reduce inequality either by stimulating competition and trying to catch up with the top 
performing individuals or by destroying their earnings. This study disentangles the 
effect of competitive and destructive envy on effort and uses a real-effort experiment 
in Ugandan high schools where students perform a counting task in two consecutive 
rounds. In addition to a control treatment, the experiment implements three additional 
treatments: the second treatment provides students feedback on their relative 
performance, the third treatment includes the threat of a money-burning opportunity, 
and a fourth treatment combines both elements. We implement an individual fixed 
effects regression to correct for effort imbalances in round 1 as the effort invested in a 
first round is not balanced across treatments. The regression results reveal that 
competitive envy generated by the provision of relative performance feedback in a 
second treatment increases the effort to work accurately and dedicatedly, which leads 
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to higher welfare. We also find that the destructive envy, operationalised as the threat 
of money-burning, is only credible when combined with relative performance 
feedback on round 1 performance, lowering the effort to work fast.  
Analysing the treatment effects further, we find that wealth of the students 
moderates the effects of relative performance feedback, money-burning and a 
combination of both. The interaction effects between wealth and treatment reveal that 
the poorest students are more sensitive to the provision of relative performance 
feedback than wealthier students, increasing their effort to work fast but at low quality. 
A plausible explanation for competitive envy causing low quality of effort among the 
poorest participants could be that the reward for each correct answer represents a 
relatively higher value for poorer students than for wealthier students, which can 
generate anxiety that affects performance.  
In addition, we observe that the wealthiest students are more sensitive to the 
threat of destructive envy than the poorer students, lowering their effort to work fast 
and accurately. For them, not only the threat of money-burning but also actual money-
burning is costly and lowers their welfare. A possible explanation refers to the existing 
wealth distribution among students which is brought into the experiment. Wealthy 
students who perform well anticipate that they are more likely to be targeted than less 
wealthy students who do well. As a result, they work less dedicatedly and less 
accurately and their effort is of lower quality in round 2. Therefore, in contrast to the 
other students, destructive envy is costly for the wealthiest students and results in lower 
welfare before and after money-burning is implemented.  
In terms of policy recommendations our results suggest that exposure to 
successful, like-minded individuals can be a successful community-level intervention 
to encourage competitive envy and increase welfare, although not for the poorest 
participants. However, such a policy is not effective in the presence of destructive 
envy, and even has the potential to lower the welfare of the wealthiest individuals.  
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
5.1. Aspirations and the social environment 
 
Aspirations and poverty are interconnected. Aspirations determine human capital 
investments, which are important to escape poverty. Crucial in this stands the capacity 
to aspire, which is the capacity to formulate aspirations in straightforward goals and 
results, and to shape clear pathways that should lead to their attainment in the existing 
social, cultural, and economic context. Lacking this capacity to aspire means that 
people do not always aspire to the most ‘advantageous’ or ‘correct’ alternatives, or do 
not aspire to levels that would fulfil their potential.  
Often, the poor lack this navigational capacity to aspire and as a result, have 
lower or less optimal aspirations than the non-poor. Being poor has a direct effect on 
psychological cognitive abilities, which in combination with a lack of resources limits 
the capacity to obtain and process information, experiment with different pathways to 
successful outcomes, and explore promising opportunities. Eventually, poor people 
may come to terms with their marginal living conditions and internalise their identity 
of ‘the poor’. As a result, they lower their aspirations or adopt nonoptimal aspirations 
which manifest their economic hardship. 
This thesis followed Appadurai (2004, p. 67), and took as starting point that 
the capacity to aspire is shaped in ‘the thick of social life’. It demonstrates that through 
gender norms and peer influences like peer effects and envy the social environment 
shapes the aspirations of young people, which can either manifest or alleviate their 
poverty. The following sections summarise the results of the three empirical chapters 
and highlight the contributions they make to the existing literature. Thereafter, their 
implications for development policy are discussed. This concluding chapter ends with 
a discussion section on the limitations of the study and provides avenues for future 
research.  
 
5.2. Main results 
 
This section summarises the main findings on the relationship between the social 
environment and aspirations of high school students. Each empirical chapter addressed 
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on of the following three research questions introduced in the first chapter of this 
thesis: 
 
1. To what extent do boys and girls aspire to economic independence and what is the 
influence of competing alternative aspirations?  
2. How are the aspirations of youngsters affected by the aspirations of their friends?  
3. What are the effects of competitive and destructive envy on effort?  
 
5.2.1. Economic independence and competing alternative aspirations; gender 
differences 
 
Gender differences in aspirations are the product of gender norms, which have the 
potential to perpetuate gender inequalities among young people. The second chapter 
of the thesis provides insight into how boys and girls experience competition from six 
alternative aspirations in the social and educational spheres while trying to obtain their 
economic independence. The qualitative data obtained through 38 open-ended 
interviews established that economic independence is a highly valued aspiration that 
revolved around issues like income, ownership, and wealth. As underlying motivators, 
respondents described increased levels of maturity and autonomy and being able to 
take care of others. The open-ended interviews also revealed three distinct categories 
of aspirations that competed with economic independence. The first category included 
traditional family aspirations like marriage and fertility, which were motivated by the 
quest for social status and conformation to dominant social and religious norms. The 
second category included communal aspirations like peaceful relations with relatives, 
living in the proximity of family and friends and community engagement. These three 
aspirations were driven by socioeconomic safety, inclusion in social networks, and 
access to resources and social capital. The third category contained the aspiration to 
obtain a higher educational degree, which was considered the main gateway to a better 
life.  
In addition to the open-ended interviews, 572 students self-completed a 
questionnaire. The results showed that students considered each of these six pairs of 
aspirations competing, which validated the starting point of this chapter that young 
people face constant trade-offs between aspirations when trying to better their lives. In 
the analysis of the questionnaire data collected, the weights given to economic 
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independence, relative to the competing alternative aspirations, were regressed on 
gender. Socioeconomic controls were added to the OLS regression with class-level 
fixed effects as boys and girls enrolled in the most senior year of high school came 
from inherently different socioeconomic backgrounds. The results revealed that even 
though boys and girls both aspired more to economic independence than the 
alternatives (apart from education), girls aspired more to five of the six alternatives 
than boys. In addition, an individual fixed-effects regression was used to investigate 
the importance of the relative weights given to the six alternative aspirations. The 
regression results revealed that students gave the aspiration to obtain higher education 
most weight, followed by the communal aspirations maintaining peaceful relations 
with relatives, living near family and friends, and community engagement. Also here, 
gender differences were found. For girls, education and community engagement were 
more important alternatives, while boys gave more weight to peaceful relations with 
relatives and living near family and friends. Altogether, the results of the second 
chapter present clear evidence that girls aspire less to economic independence and 
more to its alternatives than boys.  
 
5.2.2. Peer effects in aspirations 
 
The third chapter zooms in on three pairs of aspirations where economic independence 
is traded off against communal aspirations. The main assumption in this chapter is 
based on an economic model of conformity also known as the local average model 
(Patacchini & Zenou, 2012). Individuals gain maximal utility if they conform their 
aspirations to the average aspiration level of their friends. The closer to that average, 
the higher the utility, and vice versa. This assumption implies that the aspirations of 
the individual and the aspirations of the group of which the individual is a member 
correlate positively and move in the same direction. The simultaneity of aspirations 
poses a challenge to studying the effect that friends can have on the aspirations of the 
individual. This complication is also known as the reflection problem.  
This chapter added the individual-specific friendship networks of 538 students 
within 11 classes to the aspirations data of the second chapter, which allowed the use 
of the non-overlapping peers’ approach as suggested by Bramoullé et al. (2009). In 
this approach, the aspirations of friends were replaced with the exogenous 
characteristics of friends of friends who were not friends of the individual (hence the 
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name non-overlapping peers). These characteristics were expected to correlate with 
the aspirations of friends as endogenous regressor, but not with the aspirations of the 
individual as dependent variable. To implement the non-overlapping peers’ approach, 
students without friends or non-overlapping peers were deleted from the sample, after 
which IV/2SLS and IV/GMM twostep methods were used to estimate the peer effects. 
Only nominated ties were included to uphold the restriction that individual-specific 
friendship networks partly overlapped. When instrumenting the endogenous regressor 
with the exogenous variables of non-overlapping peers, the results of both IV 
estimation methods revealed peer effects in two out of three pairs. The OLS estimates 
are smaller than the IV/2SLS and IV/GMM estimates, which reveals that the OLS 
regressions are downward biased. Therefore, we conclude that the exclusion bias in 
the OLS estimates is stronger than the reflection bias despite having relatively large 
friends networks.  
The instrumental variables regression results reveal that peer effects exist in 
trading off the aspiration to become economically independent against alternative 
aspirations in the social sphere. More specifically, when trading off economic 
independence against living near family and friends, the aspiration levels of the 
individual are positively influenced by the average aspiration level of friends. The 
same conclusion holds when trading off economic independence against community 
engagement. If the average aspiration level of ego’s friends increases in favour of one 
alternative at the expense of the other, ego conforms to the group average of his or her 
individual-specific network and starts aspiring accordingly. This will keep the distance 
between ego’s aspiration level and the average aspiration level of ego’s friends to a 
minimum. Our findings support the local average model which suggests that not 
deviating from the social norm avoids incurring costs and maximises utility. Moreover, 
our results also provide evidence that peer effects not only influence behaviour as 
suggested in most studies on peer effects but also shape individual attitudes that are 
not directly observable.  
The IV test statistics support our conclusions. They indicate that in the models 
of both pairs of aspirations the instruments (the exogenous characteristics of the non-
overlapping peers) correlated sufficiently with the endogenous regressors (the average 
aspiration level of friends) and show that the endogenous regressors should have been 
treated as endogenous. This validated the use of instrumental variable estimation and 
the peer effect results. Only in the first pair of aspirations the IV test statistics revealed 
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that the instruments were weak and that the endogenous regressor should have been 
treated as an exogenous variable. The OLS estimate, however, did not reveal a 
significant peer effect when students trade off economic independence against 
peaceful relations with relatives. The lack of a peer effect may be the result of students 
nominating many close friends and dense class networks which can cause weak 
identification. Alternatively, the trade-off between economic independence and 
maintaining peaceful relations with relatives may be less relevant to high school 
students, suggesting that students discuss this trade-off between the two aspirations 
with their peers less than the other two trade-offs. As a result, the aspiration levels of 
peers cannot be directly observed, and students are unable to conform their individual 
aspiration level to the average aspiration level of their friends. 
 
5.2.3. The influence of competitive envy and destructive envy on effort 
 
While the two previous empirical chapters focus primarily on aspirations, the fourth 
chapter takes effort as starting point. Effort is a crucial instrument in the process of 
attaining aspirations (i.e. from aspiration to behaviour) and is influenced by social 
comparison through two types of envy. The first type of envy is labelled competitive 
envy and exposure to other peers should increase effort to keep up with or stay ahead 
of others. Competitive envy implies that inequality between peers has benefits for 
society, which increase welfare. The second type of envy is labelled destructive envy. 
Here, inequality and exposure to successful peers may harness malicious feelings of 
aversion and dislike which result in social sanctions like exclusion and harassment. 
Under such circumstances, success has social costs, and successful peers may lower 
their effort to minimise differences with less successful peers. Destructive envy 
implies that inequality between peers bears costs for society which lower welfare. 
To get insight into the costs and benefits of inequality for society, the fourth 
chapter presented a real-effort experiment. In total, 256 students performed a counting 
task that measured their effort invested in two consecutive rounds. Students could earn 
money with each table correctly solved. Together with a control treatment, three 
treatments were implemented: a treatment where students received feedback at the 
beginning of the second round on their performance relative to fellow group members, 
a treatment where students received an announcement at the start of the second round 
of effort that money-burning opportunities would be offered afterwards, and a 
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treatment that combined both. For each treatment a hypothesis was tested: 1) exposure 
to relative performance feedback would increase effort, 2) exposure to the threat of 
money burning would decrease effort, and 3) a combination of both would decrease 
effort even more, as relative performance feedback on a first round of effort would 
give participants a better idea of how they would rank in a second round, which would 
make them more sensitive to the threat of money-burning. 
The chapter used an individual-fixed effects regression that allowed an 
examination of the change in effort between two rounds within treatments and between 
treatments. The results revealed that subjects who received feedback on how they 
performed relative to fellow group members increased the number of correctly solved 
answers and the final earnings more than subjects in the control treatment. The results 
also revealed no differences between the control treatment and the treatment with the 
money-burning announcement. However, when combined with relative feedback in a 
fourth treatment the change in number of tables attempted and the number of tables 
incorrectly solved was lower than in the control treatment. The chapter concluded that 
subjects anticipated on others to target them with money-burning if they performed 
well, and they pre-cautiously would lower their effort to avoid such costs.  
 To examine what drove the various forms of envy the treatment effects were 
interacted with wealth quintiles. The results demonstrated that the poorest students 
were sensitive to receiving feedback and increased their effort, whereas the wealthiest 
students were sensitive to the threat of money-burning and lowered their effort. This 
suggested that students expect others to take account of their wealth status outside the 
experiment. Wealthier students expected their fellow group members to target them 
mainly because of their wealthy background, which could justify money-burning 
decisions. 
 
5.3. New insights and contributions to the literature 
 
The introductory chapter of this thesis presented a large number of studies that 
examine youth aspirations and how they are shaped by the social context in developing 
countries. Most of these studies, however, are one dimensional and focus on one type 
of aspiration, or do not take account of the endogenous interaction between aspirations 
and the social context in which they are shaped. This thesis offers three clear-cut 
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contributions, and each of the empirical chapters in this thesis provides a distinct 
insight that adds to the existing literature on aspirations. 
First, the chapter on gender differences in aspirations provides an original 
conceptualisation of trade-offs in aspirations, and anchors them extensively in the local 
research context. Apart from Bernard and Taffesse (2014), the multidimensionality of 
aspirations is vastly under-researched, and the same type of indicators are applied to 
extremely diverse social and cultural contexts. The conceptualisation used in this thesis 
is in line with Camfield (2015), who made the observation that a lot of studies conclude 
that poor people are poor because they have an inadequate capacity to aspire, which 
neglects the structural causes of poverty that affect that capacity in the first place. The 
results in this study demonstrate that instead of focusing on a limited capacity to aspire, 
research should pay ample attention to the complex process of trading off aspirations 
poor people face when wanting to better themselves. Poverty does not allow any error 
of judgement, and there is no room to mitigate a ‘wrong’ trade-off decision, which 
adds to the difficulty of the trade-off. For the non-poor, this process is less difficult as 
mistakes can be corrected. In this thesis, the conceptualisation of trading off aspirations 
is applied to the aspiration to become economically independent, as it is a determinant 
of the economic empowerment of young people and girls in particular. Altogether, the 
data presented in the second chapter validate the concept of trading off aspirations, and 
present evidence that various alternative aspirations have an influence on the intensity 
to which youngsters aspire to obtaining their economic independence.  
The second contribution of this thesis is applying the non-overlapping peers’ 
approach to stated preferences. The literature on non-overlapping peers has mainly 
focused on peer effects in behaviour, like substance use, school enrolment, and school 
results. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, although peer influences in 
aspirations have been studied (Beaman et al., 2012; Bernard et al., 2014; Macours & 
Vakis, 2014), the influence of endogenous peer effects on aspirations through social 
networks has not yet been topic of study. The results of the third chapter add to the 
understanding of how aspirations are transmitted socially and provide evidence on the 
powerful role that social networks play therein.  
Third, the design of the real-effort experiment is innovative as it allows to 
disentangle two types of envy that result from social comparison. The results present 
evidence that envy is a double-edged sword, which can either be beneficial or costly 
to society. Apart from Bursztyn and Jensen (2015), and to the best of our knowledge, 
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no study has looked into anticipated behaviour, and how people aim to avoid the social 
cost of success that results from destructive envious behaviour (or antisocial behaviour 
as some studies like D. Fehr (2018) call it) of peers. It is often assumed that such costs 
are only reflected in the earnings reduced by envious peers, or in the willingness to 
pay to reduce the earnings of others. This chapter adds to that by showing that a 
reduction in effort to avoid social repercussions also bears hidden costs that should be 
added to the cost of inequality on welfare. Moreover, in contrast to most studies that 
use a real-effort experiment, this chapter adds to the literature by defining effort in 
different ways. Effort is not only quantified as final earnings before and after money-
burning, but by looking at the number of correct answers, the number of incorrect 
answers, and the total number of tables attempted to solve, the quality of effort is also 
taken into account. This allows capturing how the treatments affect respondents’ level 
of dedication in solving the effort task.  
 
5.4. Policy implications 
 
Despite the increased attention for secondary education in Uganda, most young 
Ugandans still work in subsistence agriculture, in informal sector jobs in urban centres, 
or are simply unemployed. However, in the greater Mbale area in Uganda, 50% of the 
population is under the age of 15, which holds a great potential for development of the 
region (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018b). For young people, and girls in particular, 
setting up small-scale businesses is a realistic and productive option for generating an 
(independent) income. The results presented in the second chapter, however, reveal 
that youngsters face various internal constraints when trying to become economically 
independent. Especially girls aspire to social alternatives more than boys, which could 
affect their economic empowerment in the long run and risks perpetuating existing 
gender inequalities. Policies that aim to address the economic empowerment of girls 
should therefore not only promote entrepreneurship and provide vocational training on 
the technical aspects of running a business, to lift the economic aspirations of those 
treated, but should also address social empowerment issues. More specifically, social 
empowerment should focus on raising awareness among youngsters on the 
consequences of early marriage, childbearing, and dependence on men to break down 
internalised dominant gender roles that shape aspirations, constrain young women’s 
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economic empowerment and maintain gender inequalities. Such programmes can then 
be very effective when targeting girls at a young age (Heckman & Mosso, 2014).  
After the design phase of an empowerment programme, deciding on who to 
target and include in the intervention is a second step. The results of the third chapter 
point out that peer effects have an influence on aspirations. Policy-wise, that means 
that potential treatment effects can spill over to individuals who have not been part of 
the programme. For example, to raise the economic aspirations of girls and address 
social empowerment issues in a classroom it is not required that every girl in that 
classroom takes part in the programme. Aspirations of non-treated girls can still be 
changed through the aspirations of treated girls in their group of close friends. The 
existence of endogenous peer effects in aspirations implies that a change in the average 
aspiration level of a girl’s group of friends spills over to the individual aspiration level 
of the girl, as she conforms her aspirations to that of her friends’. Reaching a desired 
outcome with less participants could then make empowerment programmes less costly, 
which means that with a similar budget successful interventions could be implemented 
in a larger area.  
Last, one of the elements of an empowerment intervention aimed at increasing 
the productivity of youngsters is exposing them to successful peers or role models with 
whom they can identify. The results of the fourth chapter demonstrate that such an 
intervention can be effective in the absence of the threat of destructive envy and could 
render feelings of competitive envy. The results of the second treatment show that 
relative performance feedback increased the average welfare (earnings), although not 
for the poorest individuals. However, in societies with strong egalitarian norms that 
motivate destructive envious behaviour the implementation of an intervention that 
emphasises inequality and differences between the treated individuals and the role 
models presented (i.e. similar to the fourth treatment of the experiment which reveals 
inequality in performance and provides the opportunity the reduce the earnings of 
fellow group members) may have an adverse effect. Not only are individuals not 
motivated to keep up with successful role models, role models may even become the 
target of destructive envious behaviour (Charness et al., 2013). Especially for wealthy 
individuals, and we assume that role models in the community are among those 
individuals relatively well off, a combination of the threat of destructive envy and 
destructive envious behaviour from others lowers their welfare. Under such 
conditions, policies that advocate for equal opportunity will be more effective. These 
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equal opportunities should then guarantee poor people equal access to financial capital, 
land ownership and rights, and education, while eliminating any discriminatory 
legalisation and social norms.  
 
5.5. Limitations and avenues for future research 
 
There are a number of limitations that need to be taken into account when interpreting 
the results presented in this thesis. For each empirical chapter the limitations of the 
conceptualisation or design are highlighted, together with avenues for future research. 
In the first empirical chapter, the aspirations of boys are compared with the 
aspirations of girls. These girls, however, come from very different socioeconomic 
background. The unequal gender composition of the sample already points at a gender 
gap in school enrolment, and the differences in socioeconomic characteristics also 
reveal that girls need to come from ‘better’ households to be enrolled in secondary 
school. These compositional differences raise the question whether a comparison 
between boys from low socioeconomic class and girls from higher socioeconomic 
class is valid. Moreover, to examine gender differences in aspirations of youngsters, a 
Senior six class is perhaps a place where one would find the smallest gender 
differences. In general, boys and girls enrolled in Senior six are among the elite youth 
who have been able to complete secondary school. This is evidenced by the official 
gross school attendance ratios.36 In Eastern Uganda, the gross attendance ratio for 
primary school is 132.5, but this ratio drops to 21.4 for secondary school attendance 
(Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018b). Favara (2017) shows that students with low 
educational aspirations drop out of school early in Ethiopia, and only a selected group 
of students with high educational aspirations, or with parents with high educational 
aspirations for them, are able to stay in school. Although this thesis presents a valid 
reason for conducting the study among students (e.g. to avoid justification bias), it is 
expected that focusing on boys and girls who have dropped out of school would result 
in larger gender differences. However, especially girls who have dropped out of 
schools have already made a ‘choice’ for, or are forced into, more traditional gender 
roles. Roles that are linked, for example, to marriage and fertility. Altogether, these 
                                                     
36 The gross attendance ratio is the total number of school students, expressed as a percentage of the 
official school- age population (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018b). 
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considerations indicate that our findings are most likely underestimates of gender 
disparities in aspirations.  
Another limitation that is relevant to the first two empirical chapters is the 
direct approach with which aspirations were elicited. The problem that Bernard and 
Taffesse (2014, p. 13) highlight with such a direct approach is that participants may 
have reported their general wishes, instead of their actual preferences. Perhaps it would 
have been an improvement to have developed the currently used stated preference 
technique into a behaviour choice experiment with a vignette approach. The 
aspirational dimensions would then be further developed into attributes (each 
aspiration would be an attribute in this approach) with at least two discrete levels (i.e. 
with minimum and maximum outcomes of what people consider realistic in the 
research area), providing a more detailed operationalisation for each dimension. This 
would tackle the problem that Bernard and Taffesse (2014) point out. After selecting 
the appropriate aspirations and their levels, a fully crossed design could be set up, 
resulting in a multitude of possible scenarios. Assuming that six aspirations are 
included with each two levels, the design would result in sixty-four possible scenarios 
(the number of levels to the power of the number of possible alternatives; 2⁶). To 
practically conduct the choice experiment, an orthogonal design would be carried out 
as part of a conjoint analysis, selecting a subset of the total set of possible alternatives. 
This would create a fractional factorial design, presenting a suitable subset of possible 
combinations of aspirations and their levels. This subset would capture the main effect 
for each level and reduces the correlation between any of the levels to determine what 
the trade-off between them would be. The response variable for each participant will 
then be a utility score per aspiration. To present the scenarios to respondents, the 
method could illustrate the scenarios on vignettes (e.g. sheets depicting different 
combinations of the levels of the six aspirations). In addition, this method would also 
allow transivity.  
A third limitation of this study relates to how friendship ties were elicited. In 
the non-overlapping peers’ approach suggested by Bramoullé et al. (2009) the strength 
of the instruments in the instrumental variable estimation is strongly related to the 
density of the networks. Some studies (Fortin & Yazbeck, 2015; Lin, 2010) that 
investigate peer effects use a questionnaire with a cap on the number of friends a 
respondent is allowed to report. This does not capture the entire friends network but 
ensures sufficient non-overlapping peers to allow identification. This thesis aimed to 
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capture the entire friends network and did not put a cap on the maximum number of 
friends. As a result, the networks elicited are more complete which allows us to capture 
potential peer effects. However, the networks per class are also denser, as can be seen 
in the network graphs in Appendix B.2, which makes that the group of non-
overlapping peers is smaller than when a cap on the number of friends would have 
been used. Consequently, as the number of non-overlapping peers is crucial in the 
approach used, the strength of the instruments weakens and identification of the peer 
effect becomes more difficult. A solution to this limitation would be to only study the 
mutual ties (i.e. nominated ties that are reciprocated) in the classroom, but due to the 
limited sample size this was impossible. A simple and straightforward, but more 
fruitful solution would have been to have let students make a distinction between their 
best friends, with a cap on five friends, and their remaining close friends. This would 
also have allowed an examination on whether the effect of the nominated best friends 
is stronger than a possible effect of the remaining close friends.  
Moreover, the sample size in combination with the instruments used in the third 
chapter already made identification difficult, as more instruments (included and 
excluded instrument) were used than clusters (classes) needed for class-level fixed 
effects. As a result, it made studying any contextual effects impossible (e.g. the effect 
of group composition as peer effect on the aspirations of an individual), as all 
exogenous variables needed to be partialled out to allow identification of the peer 
effect.  
Last, the design of the real-effort experiment may require improvement. The 
current design allowed the inclusion of 16 students per treatment, and 64 students in 
total per experimental session. In practice, this turned out to be difficult to run in an 
organised manner, especially in the often basic, small classrooms at the school 
locations. For example, the lack of an effect of the threat of money-burning could very 
well be caused by the sometimes cramped classrooms in which the treatment was 
implemented. A lack of privacy could not only have impacted the actual money-
burning rate, but students may also have anticipated that money-burning would 
probably not take place because of the lack of privacy, and therefore a downward 
adjustment of effort was not required. Alternatively, students that sat close together 
may also have subtly influenced each other which stimulated some form of 
competition, balancing out the effect of the threat of money-burning.  
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This privacy issue could have been tackled if the entire experiment was made 
anonymous. Social interactions can be too thick to include in the experiment. If 
respondents know their group members, their behaviour may be completely based on 
previous social interactions and relations, making it difficult to attribute behaviour to 
the three interventions. In practice, to guarantee full anonymity, the design of the real-
effort experiment requires at least 8 participants divided over two groups to take part 
per treatment. That said, group identity may be an important determinant of destructive 
envy. Gender group composition, for example, may interact with the treatment effects, 
and group identity and group similarity may then reveal the circumstances in which 
inequality is tolerated, and when it is considered inappropriate.  
Another limitation of the design of the real-effort experiment results from the 
combination of money-burning and performance feedback in the fourth treatment. 
Consequently, the money-burning in the fourth treatment is inherently different from 
the money-burning in the third treatment. As participants in the fourth treatment know 
how fellow group members have performed in a previous round of effort, their money-
burning decision may very well be based on that, even though the decision itself is 
only applicable to the earnings of the second round. More importantly, it implies that 
the anticipation of the threat of money-burning is also linked to how well the individual 
has performed in the first round. Related to this is then the interconnectedness between 
money-burning decisions. A money-burning decision may have been based on the 
anticipated money-burning decision of others: a participant decided to reduce the 
earnings of others based on the expectation that they will reduce his or her earnings. 
This would change the money-burning decision into some sort of precautious 
retaliation, especially if participants know each other. To disentangle the money-
burning decision it could be worthwhile for future real-effort experiments that contain 
a money-burning element to ask participants after they indicated their money-burning 
decision how much they expect the other members to burn, on average. This might 
then be included as additional control variable in the analysis. 
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Appendices for Chapter 2 
 
Appendix A.1. Defining Aspirations in Lugisu 
 
Introduction 
 
This appendix explores data from seven focus group discussions (FGDs) conducted in 
May 2015 in the Greater Mbale area, Eastern Uganda, a region mainly inhabited by 
the Bagisu people. The data from the FGDs are aimed at exploring local definitions of 
aspirations. A stratified sampling approach was applied and seven neighbouring 
villages were selected. The FGDs were primarily set up as a preparatory exercise, and 
the provisional findings are believed to provide essential input to further designing the 
research methods. 
Based on Appadurai (2004) and Bernard et al. (2014), the following working 
definition of aspirations is used during the data collection phase: ‘mid-term life goals 
that are realistically achievable as a result of one's individual actions’. This definition 
coincides with the five core elements derived from the two studies, which are 
considered to epitomise aspirations: aspirations are future oriented and determine 
behaviour; they are motivators, determining how much time, effort, and capital is put 
in attainment; they span multiple life dimensions like health, wealth, education, and 
social status, suggesting there may be a possible trade-off between them; they change 
over time due to life experiences; and they are attitudinal, making direct observations 
impossible. This appendix shows similarities between these characteristics and local 
perceptions and definitions of aspirations. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
The data analysed are qualitative in nature, containing the transcripts of seven FGDs. 
The FGDs were conducted by a male Ugandan research collaborator with ample 
experience in data collection, and belongs to the same ethnic group (Bagisu) as the 
majority of participants taking part in this thesis. Participants were approached by local 
mobilisers in their communities. As the design of the FGDs aimed at an equal division 
of male / female and young (18-40) / old (41-75), the research collaborator instructed 
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the mobilisers prior to the FGDs. FGDs were held in Lugisu, the dominant language 
in the research area, and recorded by means of digital recording devices. 
In total, 107 respondents participated in the seven FGDs. Before the start of the 
session, they were asked to fill out a short screening survey registering their socio-
demographic characteristics, and an overview of the descriptives can be found in Table 
A.1. The average age of participants was 39 years and less than half of them were 
female. Average household size was slightly over 6, and the vast majority of 
participants reported a Christianity as religious background (though probably with 
various sub-denominations, which were not included in the screening survey), the vast 
majority was married were from the Bagisu ethnic group. 
 
Table A.1. Socio-demographic characteristics participants FGDs 
 Mean SD 
Age 39.21 13.71 
Household size 6.03 2.46 
Female 0.44 0.50 
Christianity 0.87 0.34 
Married 0.88 0.33 
Bagisu tribe 0.97 0.17 
Observations  107 
 
As the outline of the FGDs was designed to cover a fixed number of topics, potentially 
allowing comparisons between the outcomes of the FGDs possible, the analysis of the 
data follows a thematic approach with codes established prior to data collection. They 
represent the three main elements of the FGDs (making up the ‘start list’). Structuring 
the data is then done according to the work of Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 56), who 
state that in order to avoid data overload and to help with keeping an open vision, 
systematically assigning codes and labels to descriptive information is essential and 
creates a relational structure. 
According to Hollander (2004) and Smithson (2000), a relevant concern when 
analysing FGDs revolves around group dynamics and interactions, which need to be 
taken into account when trying to understand the texts, transcripts, and other outcomes 
of group discussions and exercises. The relationship among participants (and the male 
facilitator) and the social structure in which the discussions take place influences the 
data generated, and Miles and Huberman (1994) point out that transcripts of the 
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discussions often fail to capture such group dynamics. Therefore, outcomes of this 
analysis should be treated as non-static, and can only offer a socially constructed 
reality of what might be considered a relevant discourse on aspirations in the FGD 
context. Hollander (2004) suggests that the FGDs should be regarded as a space where 
social interaction was observed, and not so much as an instrument collecting individual 
level data. This consideration also holds for the interaction between the participants 
(especially female) and the male research collaborator.  
 
Defining aspirations in Lugisu 
 
The participants of the FGDs were informed about how the facilitator understood 
aspirations, using examples of five aspirations relevant to the research collaborator's 
living conditions, and based on the definition of aspirations provided in this appendix. 
By referring to his own aspirations, the research collaborator emphasised that 
aspirations are long-term life goals that should be realistically achievable, span 
multiple dimensions, can only be achieved by individual effort, and are future oriented 
(within 5 years). Participants were then asked which wordings in Lugisu they use to 
describe aspirations. 
For this analysis, the facilitator translated their responses in English, entailing 
the risk of possibly influencing the reliability of the interpretations and descriptions 
provided in this section. This aspect was taken into account during the analysis, but is 
not expected to have a profound influence on the results. The notes and transcripts on 
how respondents perceive aspirations reveal frequently used wordings. After coding, 
these associations and interpretations were divided over five categories that illustrate 
characterisations of aspirations they are reported to represent. The overview that 
follows in the next section, however, is descriptive in nature and does not profess to 
give any deeper interpretation or linguistic analysis.  
Firstly, aspirations are associated with ‘kutamba ni gamani’, ‘kweza kuba 
bulayi mu maso’, and ‘kwilwanako mu maso’, meaning ‘to work very hard’, ‘to 
become well off in the future’, and ‘to fight for yourself for the future’, respectively. 
These transcriptions appear to point out that aspirations are associated with a certain 
amount of effort needed for attainment. Such (an) interpretation also implies that 
aspirations are perceived as being future oriented, as ‘maso’ (future) is a recurring term 
in many of the wordings. Secondly, the majority of definitions reported tend to revolve 
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around individual development. 'Kwamamo', 'kwiyamamo', and 'kugana kwamamo', 
are wordings that refer to ‘coming out’, a local term referring to dreams coming out 
and being successful. The same interpretation is given to ‘kwiyombeka’, understood as 
‘building oneself’. Thirdly, other descriptions associate aspirations with hope or being 
hopeful. ‘Kusubila’ or ‘kusubila kukola’ means ‘to hope’ and ‘hoping to do’. It could 
also imply there is a certain desire to achieving a particular goal, automatically linking 
to the fourth category which revolves around goal achievement or attainment. 
‘Bufunisi’, meaning ‘the way of getting something’, and ‘kuba ni kyigendererwa’, 
meaning ‘to have an intention’, also point out a certain desire to achieve. That also 
holds for ‘kuba bulayi’ and ‘kuba umuyindi’ meaning ‘to bring about a good life’ and 
‘being wealthy’, and ‘kyiloto’, translated as ‘a dream’. A vast amount of definitions, 
however, include the element of organisation, albeit depicted as preparing, planning, 
and thinking. ‘Kupangala’ is derived from the verb ‘to plan’ in English, and 
incorporated in the Lugisu language. 'Itegeka’ and ‘kwitegekera bulumi' means 
‘preparation’ and ‘to organise for one’s own life’ respectively, and ‘kwambasa mu 
maso’ means ‘to think ahead/about the future’. Table A.2. illustrates an overview of 
all Lugisu wordings and definitions used, together with their English translations.  
Altogether, any future data collection instrument aimed at eliciting aspirations 
needs to demonstrate sensitivity towards the way aspirations and their 
conceptualisation are introduced to respondents. These above-mentioned local 
definitions and wordings, therefore, provide valuable input towards framing and 
introducing aspirations, and the research topic more generally, resulting in appropriate 
connotations (as representative domains of meanings) that are expected to increase the 
content validity of a future data collection instrument. 
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Table A.2. Local definitions of aspirations FGDs 
Lugisu English 
Ali ni kyibaso kyekukola He has a thought or an idea of doing (something) 
Bufunisi The way of getting something 
Kuba ni kyigendererwa To have an intention 
Kusubila To hope 
Kusubila kukola Hoping to do 
Kuba bulayi Being well 
Kuba umuyindi Being rich or wealthy 
Kwamamo To come out 
Kwiyamamo To come out of oneself 
Kugana kwamamo Wanting to come out 
Kugana kwiyombeka Wanting to build yourself or wanting to develop 
Kuleta ikulakulana To bring development 
Kuleta inzowazowana To bring about development 
Kuleta kuba bulayi To bring about a good life 
Kwiyombeka Building oneself; developing 
Kyiloto A dream; or aspiration 
Kutamba ni gamani To work very hard 
Kweza kuba bulayi mu maso To become well off in the future 
Kwilwanako mu maso To fight for yourself in the future 
Kutegeka To prepare; to organise 
Kupanga magesi To organise knowledge or to come up with ideas 
Kupulaninga To plan (bears similarities as word has become part of Lugisu) 
Kukuba zi pulani oba Kupulaninga To make plans or planning 
Kuplaninga bulamu To plan life 
Itegeka Preparation 
Kutekateka To arrange 
Kwitegekela bulamu To organise for one’s own life 
Kwitegekera To organise for oneself 
Kwitekatekela To arrange for oneself 
Kulowoza/Kwambasa To think 
Kwambasa mu maso To think ahead/about the future 
Kwiyiya To survive 
Kyilowozo A thought 
Kuba nga nisobola To be capable of doing something without depending on others 
Kuyeda batu To help people 
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Appendix A.2. Interview script 
 
The script includes two parts: the first part of the script aims to record basic socio-
demographic characteristics of the participants, whereas the second part aims to reveal 
potential trade-offs between aspirations and examine the elaborations given. 
 
Name interviewer:  
 
Date of the interview: 
 
Part 1. Personal details Respondent 
Before we start this interview, we would like to register a couple of basic details: 
 
Name: 
Age: 
Area: 
Gender: 
Religion: 
Ethnic background: 
Highest level of education (finished): 
Number of (permanent) members in household: 
Marital Status: 
Main income generating activity: 
 
Part 2. Introducing aspirations & trade-offs 
The second part of this interview focuses on what you, as individual, consider 
important aspirations for the future. The following questions form the core of the 
transcript: 
 
Q1. What do you think are aspirations? Can you give examples? [THIS IS A ‘CHECK’ 
QUESTION] 
 
Explain aspirations: We are interested in what you think of doing and achieving in the 
future for yourself. Every one of us has something planned to do or to achieve in the 
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next 5 to 10 years, and these activities or achievements are based on what we think is 
realistically possible for us, and whether we can accomplish them through our own 
individual effort. That means we are not talking about things we just admire; we have 
to work for it. Aspirations are therefore described as: "Mid-term life goals that are 
realistically achievable as a result of one's individual actions". We are primarily 
interested in your personal preferences, so we would very much like to emphasise there 
are no good or bad answers.  
 
Put the aspiration cards on the table and explain each aspiration individually.  
 
Q2. Which of these aspirations do you prefer, and are for you realistically achievable 
in the next 5 to 10 years?  
 
Aspirations Selected by 
participant 
Getting a stable income over time  
Being in the proximity of your family and relatives  
Being well regarded among your family and friends  
Becoming wealthy  
Becoming part of the modern world  
Getting a well-regarded job  
Becoming independent without anybody’s control  
Getting children  
Starting an own business  
Obtaining higher education  
Becoming an active member of your community  
Getting married   
Being able to decide what happens in the household  
Building an own house  
INSERT participant’s aspirations not on card:  
 
You can pick as many cards as you want, and please put them central on the table. 
Naturally, it can also be that you don’t prefer any of the aspirations mentioned. Do you 
have any aspirations that are not on the card, but are very relevant for you? 
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Q3. Why do you consider these aspirations important to you? [ALL ASPIRATIONS 
PREFERRED AND MENTIONED] Can you elaborate on each individual aspiration? 
DEPENDING ON PARTICIPANT’S ANSWERS: In what kind of context do you see 
that? 
 
Now move to the aspirations that were not selected by the participant.  
 
Q4. Why do you consider these aspirations less or not relevant for your current life 
circumstances? Please elaborate on each aspiration separately. 
 
Put the selected and unselected aspirations in two separated groups on the table. 
 
Q5. For each of the aspirations you have chosen, is there also an aspiration that is very 
difficult or even impossible to pursue at the same time? These aspirations can be both 
from the set you have selected and from the set you have left untouched. Can you make 
pairs of such ‘conflicting’ aspirations? 
 
Once aspirations are paired as conflict, new pairs can still be made with the same 
aspiration(s) from the previous pair. So, ask the participant to point out ONE pair at 
the time. 
 
Q6. Some of the aspirations you mentioned might lead to other aspirations. They are a 
means, a tool, or an instrument for reaching something else. Can you make pairs of 
aspirations, depicted on these cards and those that you might have mentioned 
additionally, of which you think are related to each other? Can you also explain why? 
KEEP THE CARDS ON THE TABLE. 
 
Tell the participant that we have come to the end of the interview, thank the participant, 
and ask whether they have any questions or comments about the research. Please point 
out that if the participant has any questions or comments in the future, they can contact 
Joshua or Rik via e-mail, which is mentioned on the information sheet.  
 
– End –  
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Appendix A.3. Overview of participants open-ended interviews 
 
Participant Age Gender Location Date interview  Participant Age Gender Location Date interview 
R1 18 Female Busulani (Sironko) November 5th, 2015  U1 21 Female Mbale November 12th, 2015 
R2 19 Male Busulani (Sironko) November 5th, 2015  U2 22 Male Mbale November 12th, 2015 
R3 20 Male Busulani (Sironko) November 5th, 2015  U3 22 Female Mbale November 12th, 2015 
R4 21 Female Busulani (Sironko) November 5th, 2015  U4 19 Male Mbale November 12th, 2015 
R5 18 Female Busulani (Sironko) November 6th, 2015  U5 18 Female Mbale November 13th, 2015 
R6 21 Male Busulani (Sironko) November 6th, 2015  U6 23 Male Mbale November 13th, 2015 
R7 20 Female Busulani (Sironko) November 6th, 2015  U7 18 Female Mbale November 13th, 2015 
R8 18 Male Busulani (Sironko) November 6th, 2015  U8 20 Male Mbale November 13th, 2015 
R9 19 Female Busulani (Sironko) November 7th, 2015  U9 20 Female Mbale November 14th, 2015 
R10 21 Male Busulani (Sironko) November 7th, 2015  U10 21 Male Mbale November 13th, 2015 
R11 20 Female Buyobo (Sironko) November 7th, 2015  U11 23 Female Mbale November 14th, 2015 
R12 19 Male Buyobo (Sironko) November 7th, 2015  U12 20 Male Mbale November 14th, 2015 
R13 19 Male Buyobo (Sironko) November 9th, 2015  U13 18 Female Mbale November 16th, 2015 
R14 18 Female Buyobo (Sironko) November 9th, 2015  U14 19 Male Mbale November 16th, 2015 
R15 20 Male Buyobo (Sironko) November 9th, 2015  U15 23 Female Mbale November 16th, 2015 
R16 21 Female Buyobo (Sironko) November 9th, 2015  U16 18 Male Mbale November 16th, 2015 
R17 21 Male Buyobo (Sironko) November 10th, 2015  U17 21 Female Mbale November 17th, 2015 
R18 19 Female Buyobo (Sironko) November 10th, 2015  U18 19 Female Mbale November 17th, 2015 
R19 19 Male Buyobo (Sironko) November 10th, 2015  U19 20 Male Mbale November 17th, 2015 
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Appendix A.4. Survey questions on paired aspirations 
 
Instructions 
 
In this section, we are interested in what you as a person aspire and would like to 
achieve in the next 5 years, and we would like to emphasise there are no right or wrong 
answers here. 
 
Every one of us has something planned to do or to achieve in the next 5 years. they are 
based on what we think is realistically possible for us, and whether we can accomplish 
them through our own individual effort. That means we are not talking about things 
we just admire; we have to work for it. Aspirations are therefore described as: "mid-
term life goals that are realistically achievable as a result of one's individual actions”.  
 
Below in the [blue] boxes, we present two aspirations at the same time. These 
aspirations could conflict with each other, meaning that both aspirations cannot be 
pursued at the same time; one has to be sacrificed or postponed for the other. On the 
tablet, you first see a description of the two aspirations, followed by a question on 
whether you agree or disagree with the idea that these two aspirations are conflicting. 
Last, we ask you to indicate which aspiration you prefer over the other by dividing 10 
coins over them. 
 
Questions 
 
1. Becoming Economically Independent (A) - Becoming an active community 
member (B) 
 
(A). Becoming economically independent. You are able to take care of yourself by 
putting your time, effort, and resources in developing your own individual income-
generating activities. 
 
(B). Becoming an active member of your community. You are a member of various 
groups [think about savings-, farmers-, women's-, church groups], and you put time 
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and effort in keeping good relations with neighbours, family, and other community 
members. Because you know many people, you get information quickly. 
 
These two aspirations could be conflicting; if you invest your time, effort and resources 
in becoming economically independent, you cannot use them to become an active 
member of your community at the same time. To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the statement?  
 
1. Fully disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither disagree nor agree 
4. Agree 
5. Fully agree 
 
Imagine there are now 2 cups on the table. 1 with the label "Becoming economically 
independent" and 1 with the label "Becoming an active community member". There 
are also 10 coins on the table. How would you distribute these 10 coins over the cups? 
The more coins you put in a cup, the more important the aspiration is to you. 
 
How many coins would you give to 'Becoming economically independent'? 
 
How many coins would you give to 'Becoming an active member of the 
community'? 
 
 
2. Becoming economically independent (A) & living near family and friends (B) 
 
(A). Becoming economically independent. You are able to take care of yourself by 
putting your time, effort, and resources in developing your own individual income-
generating activities. 
 
(B). Living near family and friends. They will help you out whenever something 
unfortunate happens to you. 
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These two aspirations could be conflicting; when you aspire to become economically 
independent, you cannot live near family and friends at the same time as they will 
demand financial support from you. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
statement? 
 
1. Fully disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither disagree nor agree 
4. Agree 
5. Fully agree 
 
Imagine there are now 2 cups on the table. 1 with the label "Becoming economically 
independent" and 1 with the label "Living near family and friends". There are also 10 
coins on the table. How would you distribute these 10 coins over the cups? The more 
coins you put in a cup, the more important the aspiration is to you. 
 
How many coins would you give to 'Becoming economically independent'? 
 
How many coins would you give to 'Living near family and friends'? 
 
 
3. Becoming economically independent (A) & getting (more) children (B) 
 
(A). Becoming economically independent. You are able to take care of yourself by 
putting your time, effort, and resources in developing your own individual income-
generating activities. 
 
(B). Getting (more) children. Your status as parent will increase, and you will be fully 
occupied with raising them. Your children will help you out with chores in the 
household and take care of you in later life. 
 
These two aspirations could be conflicting; if you invest your time, effort, and 
resources in becoming economically independent, you cannot aspire to get (more) 
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children at the same time, as you don't have time to take care of your child(ren). To 
what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement? 
 
1. Fully disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither disagree nor agree 
4. Agree 
5. Fully agree 
 
Imagine there are now 2 cups on the table. 1 with the label "Becoming economically 
independent" and 1 with the label "Getting (more) children". There are also 10 coins 
on the table. How would you distribute these 10 coins over the cups? The more coins 
you put in a cup, the more important the aspiration is to you. 
 
How many coins would you give to 'Becoming economically independent'? 
 
How many coins would you give to ‘Getting (more) children’? 
 
 
4. Becoming economically independent (A) & living in peace with relatives (B) 
 
(A). Becoming economically independent. You are able to take care of yourself by 
putting your time, effort, and resources in developing your own individual income-
generating activities. 
 
(B). You are well-regarded by your relatives as you listen to their needs, helping them 
out with the resources you have available. Because of that, you do not have to fear 
their jealousy or envy whenever you do well. 
 
These two aspirations could be conflicting; if you aspire to become economically 
independent, you cannot aspire to live in peace with relatives at the same time, as they 
will envy your economic independence. To what extent do you agree or disagree with 
the statement? 
 
 
 
187 
 
1. Fully disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither disagree nor agree 
4. Agree 
5. Fully agree 
 
Imagine there are now 2 cups on the table. 1 with the label "Becoming economically 
independent" and 1 with the label "Living in peace with relatives". There are also 10 
coins on the table. How would you distribute these 10 coins over the cups? The more 
coins you put in a cup, the more important the aspiration is to you. 
 
How many coins would you give to 'Becoming economically independent'? 
 
How many coins would you give to ‘Living in peace with relatives? 
 
 
5. Becoming economically independent (A) & obtaining higher education (B) 
 
(A). Becoming economically independent. You are able to take care of yourself by 
putting your time, effort, and resources in developing your own individual income-
generating activities. 
 
(B). Obtaining higher education. You acquire knowledge and skills, making you suited 
for regular salaried employment or prepared for how to effectively set up your own 
farm or business. 
 
These two aspirations could be conflicting; if you aspire to become economically 
independent, you cannot aspire to obtain a higher education at the same time, as your 
studies will need your full attention, time, and funding. To what extent do you agree 
or disagree with the statement?  
 
1. Fully disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither disagree nor agree 
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4. Agree 
5. Fully agree 
 
Imagine there are now 2 cups on the table. 1 with the label "Becoming economically 
independent" and 1 with the label "Obtaining higher education". There are also 10 
coins on the table. How would you distribute these 10 coins over the cups? The more 
coins you put in a cup, the more important the aspiration is to you.  
 
How many coins would you give to 'Becoming economically independent'? 
 
How many coins would you give to ‘Obtaining higher education’? 
 
 
6. Becoming economically independent (A) & getting married (B) 
 
(A). Becoming economically independent. You are able to take care of yourself by 
putting your time, effort, and resources in developing your own individual income-
generating activities. 
 
(B). By getting married, you will gain the respect of your community and you can start 
planning a family. Your spouse and you support each other, and you will fulfil your 
obligations as husband or wife. 
 
These two aspirations could be conflicting; if you aspire to become economically 
independent, you cannot aspire to get married at the same time, as you don't have time 
and resources to fulfil your obligations as husband or wife. To what extent do you 
agree or disagree with the statement? 
 
1. Fully disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither disagree nor agree 
4. Agree 
5. Fully agree 
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Imagine there are now 2 cups on the table. 1 with the label "Becoming economically 
independent" and 1 with the label "Getting married". There are also 10 coins on the 
table. How would you distribute these 10 coins over the cups? The more coins you put 
in a cup, the more important the aspiration is to you. 
 
How many coins would you give to 'Becoming economically independent'? 
 
How many coins would you give to ‘Getting married’? 
 
 
– End – 
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Appendix A.5. Two-sided t-test. Perception of competition by gender 
 
Paired aspirations Competition 
Mean difference 
Economic Independence - Getting Married 0.037 
 (0.108) 
Economic Independence - Getting Children -0.346*** 
 (0.109) 
Economic Independence - Living in Peace with Relatives -0.033 
 (0.105) 
Economic Independence - Living Near Family / Friends 0.015 
 (0.106) 
Economic Independence - Active Community Member 0.055 
 (0.102) 
Economic Independence - Obtaining Higher Education 0.013 
 (0.111) 
Observations 572 
Notes. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The gender base level is 
boy. Each row (pair of aspirations) represents an independent two-sided t-test.  
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Appendix A.6. Gender differences in the weights given in paired aspirations 
 
Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Girl -0.115 -0.281** -0.229 -0.382** 0.070 0.002  
(0.158) (0.118) (0.182) (0.171) (0.188) (0.192) 
Religious participation  -0.002  0.010  0.002  
 (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.016) 
Birth order  0.004  -0.029  0.012  
 (0.025)  (0.030)  (0.022) 
Household wealth index (PCA)  -0.093**  -0.049  -0.001  
 (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.039) 
Father secondary educ. or higher  -0.157  -0.018  -0.178  
 (0.260)  (0.201)  (0.268) 
Mother secondary educ. or higher  0.393***  -0.242*  0.242  
 (0.133)  (0.146)  (0.157) 
Locus of control index (PCA)  0.155*  0.214***  0.058  
 (0.081)  (0.080)  (0.074) 
Income gen. father (ref = died)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Farming  0.201  0.122  0.290 
  (0.243)  (0.185)  (0.297) 
Running a business  0.058  0.247  0.179 
  (0.199)  (0.317)  (0.312) 
Salaried employment  0.212  0.057  0.298 
  (0.320)  (0.324)  (0.328) 
Other activities  0.087  -0.209  0.358 
  (0.341)  (0.306)  (0.346) 
Income gen. mother (ref = died)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Farming  -0.205  0.273  -0.230 
  (0.385)  (0.228)  (0.310) 
Running a business  -0.120  0.445  -0.137 
  (0.473)  (0.388)  (0.386) 
Salaried employment  -0.355  0.699***  0.274 
  (0.503)  (0.259)  (0.488) 
Other activities  -0.532  -0.125  -0.331 
  (0.364)  (0.246)  (0.331) 
Constant 6.085*** 6.233*** 6.195*** 6.141*** 5.154*** 5.088***  
(0.106) (0.304) (0.088) (0.270) (0.165) (0.397) 
Adjusted R2 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.015 -0.002 -0.013 
N 572 572 572 572 572 572 
Notes. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. OLS regression with class level fixed effects. Bootstrapped 
standard errors clustered at the class level and in parentheses.   
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Pair4 Pair 5 Pair 6 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Girl -0.200 -0.313** -0.513*** -0.651*** -0.620*** -0.644***  
(0.171) (0.154) (0.146) (0.175) (0.155) (0.157) 
Religious participation  -0.003  0.009  0.007  
 (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.016) 
Birth order  0.080**  0.005  0.032  
 (0.037)  (0.052)  (0.029) 
Household wealth index (PCA)  -0.068*  -0.027  -0.017  
 (0.037)  (0.039)  (0.037) 
Father secondary educ. or higher  -0.057  0.118  0.082  
 (0.269)  (0.156)  (0.187) 
Mother secondary educ. or higher  -0.056  0.073  0.322*  
 (0.154)  (0.208)  (0.169) 
Locus of control index (PCA)  -0.041  0.091  -0.155***  
 (0.098)  (0.074)  (0.056) 
Income gen. father (ref = died)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Farming  0.305  0.567*  0.520** 
  (0.247)  (0.298)  (0.254) 
Running a business  0.324  0.307  0.264 
  (0.367)  (0.226)  (0.265) 
Salaried employment  0.005  0.535**  0.192 
  (0.272)  (0.259)  (0.251) 
Other activities  -0.244  -0.157  0.033 
  (0.386)  (0.367)  (0.481) 
Income gen. mother (ref = died)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Farming  -0.172  0.019  0.171 
  (0.250)  (0.354)  (0.280) 
Running a business  0.032  0.736***  0.777** 
  (0.270)  (0.284)  (0.304) 
Salaried employment  0.280  0.935***  0.627** 
  (0.361)  (0.261)  (0.301) 
Other activities  -0.368  0.061  0.433 
  (0.354)  (0.381)  (0.291) 
Constant 5.394*** 5.197*** 5.658*** 5.008*** 4.089*** 3.147***  
(0.130) (0.343) (0.177) (0.503) (0.123) (0.184) 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.003 0.011 0.030 0.017 0.035 
N 572 572 572 572 572 572 
Notes. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. OLS regression with class level fixed effects. Bootstrapped 
standard errors clustered at the class level and in parentheses.
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Appendix A.7. Predicted weight given to economic independence per pair of aspirations by gender 
 
 
 
 
Notes. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For each pair the graph reports the gender difference in the weight given to economic independence and its p-value. 
Gender difference =  -0.281**
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Pair 3. Economic independence - living in peace with relatives
Gender difference =  -0.313**
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Pair 4. Economic independence - living near family and friends
Gender difference =  -0.651***
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Gender difference =  -0.644***
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Pair 6. Economic independence - obtaining higher education
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Appendices for chapter 3 
 
Appendix B.1. Eliciting friendship ties 
 
Name: 
School: 
    
Please indicate your relation with your classmates:  
1 = you are close friends   
2 = you are getting along well   
3 = you do not get along well   
99 = you do not know that person   
    
 Name Student Indicate your relation by inserting a 1, 2, 3, or 99:  
1 [Student 1]   
2 [Student 2]   
3 [Student 3]   
4 [Student 4]   
5 [Student 5]   
6 [Student 6]   
n [Student n]   
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Appendix B.2. Network graphs of nominated ties 
 
   
 
  
Class 1 (N=40) Class 2 (N=55) Class 3 (N=16)
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Class 4 (N=107) Class 5 (N=32) Class 6 (N=51)
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Class 7 (N=59) Class 8 (N=65) Class 9 (N=55)
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  Class 10 (N=29) Class 11 (N=29)
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Appendix B.3. Full first stage results IV/2SLS estimation 
 Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 
Dep var = aspiration 
level friends 
Economic 
independence – 
peaceful relations 
relatives 
Economic 
independence – 
proximity 
family/friends 
Economic 
independence – 
community 
engagement 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Instruments (characteristics of non-overlapping peers) 
Girl  -0.138 -0.746** -0.319 
 (0.413) (0.357) (0.362) 
Wealth index (PCA) -0.286*** -0.349* -0.300* 
 (0.090) (0.190) (0.154) 
Gisu tribe 0.091 -0.318 -0.485 
 (0.658) (0.389) (0.474) 
Birth order  0.090 0.162* 0.194 
 (0.064) (0.089) (0.136) 
Age -0.232 -0.309 -0.293 
 (0.220) (0.222) (0.233) 
Partner 0.112 0.191 0.999*** 
 (0.386) (0.435) (0.292) 
Locus of control (PCA) 0.095 -0.512** -0.068 
 (0.187) (0.207) (0.283) 
Live with both parents 0.669 0.316 0.642 
 (0.445) (0.551) (0.501) 
Characteristics of ego 
Girl  -0.254 -0.285 -0.448* 
 (0.319) (0.326) (0.269) 
Wealth index (PCA) 0.098 -0.107 0.028 
 (0.066) (0.087) (0.096) 
Gisu tribe -0.365 0.055 -0.671* 
 (0.377) (0.380) (0.382) 
Birth order  -0.012 0.091 -0.006 
 (0.045) (0.064) (0.048) 
Age -0.224* -0.072 -0.161** 
 (0.130) (0.070) (0.074) 
Partner 0.270 0.685 0.503 
 (0.347) (0.418) (0.397) 
Locus of control (PCA) -0.020 -0.296* -0.171 
 (0.146) (0.156) (0.141) 
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Live with both parents 0.058 0.030 0.331 
 (0.367) (0.410) (0.540) 
Contextual effects (characteristics of friends) 
Girl  0.000 -0.158 0.015 
 (0.079) (0.102) (0.074) 
Wealth index (PCA) -0.004 -0.019 0.015 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.023) 
Gisu tribe 0.033 -0.086 -0.045 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.063) 
Birth order  0.019* -0.012 -0.027* 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) 
Age -0.004 -0.036 0.007 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.026) 
Partner -0.058 0.040 -0.061 
 (0.086) (0.100) (0.078) 
Locus of control (PCA) 0.011 -0.026 0.004 
 (0.042) (0.036) (0.031) 
Live with both parents 0.669 0.316 0.642 
 (0.445) (0.551) (0.501) 
Constant 13.712*** 12.860*** 13.641*** 
 (5.166) (4.786) (5.108) 
R2 within 0.094 0.120 0.117 
Observations 538 538 538 
Notes. * p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<0.01. Bootstrap clustered standard errors at the class-level and in 
parentheses. Class-level fixed effects used. The coefficients reported relate to the first aspiration 
mentioned per pair. For the second-mentioned aspiration in the pair, the results are exactly the opposite. 
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Appendix B.4. Scatterplots first-stage predicted values and endogenous regressor  
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Appendix B.5. Determinants of aspirations (OLS) 
 Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 
Dep var = aspiration level ego Economic independence – 
peaceful relations with relatives 
Economic independence – 
proximity family/friends 
Economic independence – 
community engagement  
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Aspiration level friends 0.170 0.110 0.022 0.109 0.087 -0.007 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.184*  
(0.122) (0.114) (0.130) (0.082) (0.086) (0.097) (0.083) (0.093) (0.103) 
Girl   0.201 0.183  0.028 -0.020  -0.635*** -0.601*** 
  (0.190) (0.187)  (0.157) (0.155)  (0.233) (0.219) 
Household wealth index (PCA)  0.050 0.043  -0.046 -0.061*  -0.006 -0.011 
  (0.034) (0.038)  (0.033) (0.037)  (0.042) (0.037) 
Gisu tribe  -0.106 -0.049  0.337** 0.336**  -0.152 -0.149 
  (0.225) (0.224)  (0.155) (0.163)  (0.221) (0.217) 
Birth order   0.015 0.017  0.084** 0.083***  -0.010 -0.012 
  (0.023) (0.023)  (0.033) (0.031)  (0.054) (0.055) 
Age  0.049 0.048  0.083* 0.075  -0.018 -0.009 
  (0.058) (0.055)  (0.048) (0.049)  (0.039) (0.037) 
Partner  0.211* 0.205  0.448** 0.463**  0.502** 0.497** 
  (0.122) (0.131)  (0.223) (0.226)  (0.221) (0.227) 
Locus of control (PCA)  0.054 0.065  -0.030 -0.019  0.057 0.049 
  (0.065) (0.067)  (0.087) (0.093)  (0.062) (0.064) 
Live with both parents  -0.117 -0.066  0.021 0.005  0.318 0.357* 
  (0.186) (0.194)  (0.219) (0.215)  (0.195) (0.210) 
Constant 4.245*** 1.118 1.594 4.706*** 2.496 4.013 3.860*** 3.037 2.655 
 (0.679) (3.129) (2.999) (0.402) (3.792) (4.011) (0.404) (3.921) (3.914) 
Contextual effects (characteristics friends) No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Class-level fixed effect No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.002 -0.018 0.001 0.021 0.017 0.019 0.029 0.014 
Observations 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 
Notes. * p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<0.01. OLS regressions. Bootstrap clustered standard errors at the class-level in parentheses. The coefficients reported relate to the first aspiration 
mentioned per pair. For the second-mentioned aspiration in the pair, the results are exactly the opposite. The contextual effects include the full set of characteristics of friends.
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Appendix B.6. IV/2SLS and IV/GMM with and without class-level FEs 
 Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 
Dep var = aspiration level 
ego 
Economic independence – peaceful relations 
with relatives 
Economic independence – proximity 
family/friends 
Economic independence – community 
engagement 
 
2SLS GMM-2s 2SLS GMM-2s 2SLS GMM-2s 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Aspiration level friends 1.419*** 0.770 1.018** 0.760 1.185*** 0.765** 0.949*** 0.699** 0.712** 1.061** 0.425 0.988*** 
 
(0.484) (0.665) (0.438) (0.555) (0.383) (0.385) (0.311) (0.319) (0.332) (0.469) (0.336) (0.350) 
Class-level fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
K-P Wald F statistic 1.708 7.697 1.708 7.697 4.246 33.426 4.246 33.426 3.838 15.442 3.838 15.442 
Sargan-Hansen J statistic 37 7.781 10.313 7.781 10.313 3.753 5.484 3.753 5.484 3.332 7.442 3.332 7.442 
Endogeneity test 1.372  0.490 1.372  0.490 6.111** 4.237** 6.111** 4.237** 1.065 4.416** 1.065 4.416** 
Observations 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 538 
             
Notes. * p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<0.01. Bootstrapped standard errors at the class-level in parentheses. Class-level fixed effects used. Each regression controls for ego’s own characteristics 
and friends’ characteristics. Excluded instruments: 1) gender friends’ friends, 2) birth order friends’ friends, 3) household wealth friends’ friends, 4) partner friends’ friends, 5) locus 
of control friends’ friends, 6) age friends’ friends, 7) living with both parents friends’ friends, and 8) Gisu tribe friends’ friends. 
 
 
                                                     
37 To obtain statistics on the overidentification test for all instruments we use the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem and partial out the characteristics of the individual and contextual 
effects as exogenous regressors (Baum et al., 2007).  
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Appendices for Chapter 4 
 
Appendix C.1. Example of a table used for the real-effort task 
 
Table 1 
         
NAME PARTICIPANT: 
NUMBER OF ZEROS: 
    
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
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Appendix C.2. Sampling roster 
 
Treatment 1 (control) Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 Participants cumulative 
Mbale district 
Mbale School 1 Mbale School 1 Mbale School 1 Mbale School 1 16 
Mbale School 1 Mbale School 2 Mbale School 2 Mbale School 2 32 
Mbale School 2 Mbale School 2 Mbale School 2 Mbale School 2 48 
Mbale School 3 Mbale School 3 Mbale School 3 Mbale School 3 64 
Mbale School 3 Mbale School 3 Mbale School 3 Mbale School 3 80 
Mbale School 3 Mbale School 4 Mbale School 4 Mbale School 4 96 
Mbale School 4 Mbale School 4 Mbale School 4 Mbale School 4 112 
Mbale School 5 Mbale School 5 Mbale School 5 Mbale School 5 128 
Mbale School 5 Mbale School 5 Mbale School 5 Mbale School 5 144 
Mbale School 5 Mbale School 5 Mbale School 5 Mbale School 5 160 
Mbale School 5    164 
Sironko district 
Sironko School 1 (class 1) Sironko School 1 (class 1) Sironko School 1 (class 1) Sironko School 1 (class 1) 180 
Sironko School 1 (class 2) Sironko School 1 (class 2) Sironko School 1 (class 2) Sironko School 1 (class 2) 196 
Sironko School 1 (class 2) Sironko School 2 Sironko School 2 Sironko School 2 212 
Sironko School 2 Sironko School 2 Sironko School 3 (class 1) Sironko School 3 (class 1) 228 
Sironko School 3 (class 1) Sironko School 3 (class 1) Sironko School 3 (class 1) Sironko School 3 (class 1) 244 
Sironko School 3 (class 1) Sironko School 3 (class 1) Sironko School 3 (class 1) Sironko School 3 (class 1) 260 
Sironko School 3 (class 2) Sironko School 3 (class 2) Sironko School 3 (class 2) Sironko School 3 (class 2) 276 
Note: Each entry represents a group of four students. 
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Appendix C.3. Determinants of participating in the real-effort experiment 
 
Dep var = participation experiment Logistic 
regression 
OLS 
regression 
 (1) (2) 
Girl  0.199 0.026 
 (0.423) (0.056) 
Household wealth index (PCA) -0.065 -0.009 
 (0.067) (0.008) 
Gisu tribe -0.882** -0.091** 
 (0.365) (0.038) 
Total number of siblings 0.010 0.002 
 (0.039) (0.004) 
Firstborn -0.923** -0.124** 
 (0.372) (0.052) 
Father enrolled in secondary education or higher 0.044 0.011 
 (0.353) (0.038) 
Mother enrolled in secondary education or higher 0.292 0.032 
 (0.498) (0.058) 
Household dependency ratio -0.245 -0.033 
 (0.256) (0.034) 
Constant  0.920*** 
  (0.038) 
Observations 332 332 
Class-level fixed effects Yes Yes 
Notes. * p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<0.01. Bootstrapped standard errors at the class-level in parentheses. 
Class-level fixed effects used. 
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Appendix C.4. Scatter and kernel density plots identifying gamblers 
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Appendix C.5. Histograms with kernel density estimates of effort by round and 
treatment 
 
   
  
  
  
 
 
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Change in tables attempted
 (Treatment 1)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Change in tables attempted
 (Treatment 2)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Change in tables attempted
 (Treatment 3)
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Change in tables attempted
 (Treatment 4)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
Change in tables correct
 (Treatment 1)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
Change in tables correct
 (Treatment 2)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
Change in tables correct
 (Treatment 3)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
Change in tables correct
 (Treatment 4)
212 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Change in tables incorrect
 (Treatment 1)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Change in tables incorrect
 (Treatment 2)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Change in tables incorrect
 (Treatment 3)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Change in tables incorrect
 (Treatment 4)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-4000 -3000 -2000 -1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Change in earnings
 (Treatment 1)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-4000 -3000 -2000 -1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Change in earnings
 (Treatment 2)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-4000 -3000 -2000 -1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Change in earnings
 (Treatment 3)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-4000 -3000 -2000 -1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Change in earnings
 (Treatment 4)
213 
 
   
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-4000 -3000 -2000 -1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Change in earnings after money-burning
 (Treatment 3)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-4000 -3000 -2000 -1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Change in earnings after money-burning
 (Treatment 4)
214 
 
Appendix C.6. Heterogeneous treatment effects; poorest students vs wealthiest students 
Wealth index: pooled sample with only participants belonging to 1st and 5th wealth quintile 
 Attempted Correct  Incorrect Earnings Earnings after 
money-burning 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment 1 (round 2 = round 1) 
 
1.615*** 0.308 1.308* 23.077 23.077 
(0.594) (1.001) (0.753) (563.151) (563.151) 
Treatment 2 (feedback) 3.429*** 1.071* 2.357*** 300.000 300.000 
(0.496) (0.567) (0.880) (361.587) (361.587) 
Treatment 3 (money-burning) 1.692*** 0.846 0.846 338.462 330.000 
 (0.520) (0.679) (0.993) (429.088) (432.563) 
Treatment 4 (money-burning and feedback) 1.333** 0.222 1.111 -0.000 -577.778* 
 (0.657) (0.706) (0.815) (409.431) (317.433) 
Treatment 1 (round 2 = round 1) * wealthiest -0.032 0.859 -0.891 518.590 518.590 
 (0.858) (1.083) (0.940) (606.922) (606.922) 
Treatment 2 (feedback) * wealthiest -0.929 0.595 -1.524 450.000 450.000 
 (0.696) (1.054) (1.307) (641.397) (641.397) 
Treatment 3 (money-burning) * wealthiest 0.908 -1.246 2.154* -838.462* -940.000* 
 (1.162) (0.865) (1.213) (495.404) (528.315) 
Treatment 4 (money-burning and feedback) * wealthiest -0.333 -0.145 -0.188 -53.846 216.239 
 (0.852) (0.912) (1.219) (549.894) (467.244) 
Constant 13.000*** 9.906*** 3.094*** 4643.750*** 4643.750*** 
 (0.231) (0.253) (0.176) (135.882) (135.882) 
R2 within 0.548 0.075 0.205 0.028 0.051 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 
Notes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01. Individual fixed effects regression. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the school level and in parentheses. The poorest quintile is the 
base category. Earnings are in UGX.
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Coefficient plot 1: change in tables attempted   
 
Coefficient plot 2: change in correct answers 
 
Coefficient plot 3: change in incorrect answers     
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Coefficient plot 4: change in earnings  
 
Coefficient plot 5: change in earnings after money-burning 
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Appendix C.7. Heterogeneous treatment effects; wealth subsample vs remaining sample 
 Wealth index 1st quintile  Wealth index 5th quintile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Attempted Correct  Incorrect Earnings Earnings after 
money-burning 
 Attempted Correct  Incorrect Earnings Earnings after 
money-burning 
T1: round 2 = round 1 
 
2.554*** 0.589 1.964*** 98.214 98.214  2.544*** 0.404 2.140*** -12.281 -12.281 
(0.474) (0.365) (0.523) (209.858) (212.709)  (0.485) (0.513) (0.579) (302.703) (295.532) 
T2: feedback 2.213*** 1.468*** 0.745*** 659.574*** 659.574***  2.490*** 1.306*** 1.184*** 534.694*** 534.694*** 
(0.203) (0.341) (0.250) (193.233) (191.316)  (0.179) (0.242) (0.201) (133.952) (135.627) 
T3: money-burning 2.490*** 1.714*** 0.776 779.592** 440.816  2.269*** 1.904*** 0.365 915.385*** 615.192** 
(0.331) (0.574) (0.632) (339.713) (326.702)  (0.442) (0.483) (0.551) (281.662) (249.196) 
T4: money-burning & feedback 1.545*** 1.382** 0.164 674.545* 474.545  1.647*** 1.510*** 0.137 741.176** 501.961* 
(0.296) (0.616) (0.431) (350.275) (305.395)  (0.295) (0.586) (0.531) (349.299) (269.226) 
T1: round 2 = round 1 * wealth -0.938 -0.282 -0.657 -75.137 -75.137  -0.961 0.763 -1.724** 553.947* 553.947* 
(0.778) (0.939) (1.011) (549.961) (543.839)  (0.807) (0.568) (0.874) (336.555) (331.867) 
T2: feedback * wealth 1.216** -0.397 1.612 -359.574 -359.574  0.010 0.361 -0.350 215.306 215.306 
(0.519) (0.708) (1.038) (454.268) (448.798)  (0.399) (0.863) (0.792) (513.379) (502.949) 
T3: money-burning * wealth -0.797* -0.868 0.071 -441.130 -110.816  0.331 -2.304*** 2.635*** -1415.385*** -1225.192*** 
(0.439) (0.868) (1.093) (522.121) (556.761)  (1.176) (0.663) (0.929) (347.358) (341.003) 
T4: money-burning & feedback 
* wealth 
-0.212 -1.160 0.947 -674.545* -1052.323***  -0.647 -1.433* 0.786 -795.023* -863.499* 
(0.757) (0.715) (0.681) (389.710) (370.373)  (0.516) (0.755) (1.034) (476.683) (458.142) 
Constant 13.055*** 9.895*** 3.160*** 4631.250*** 4631.250***  13.055*** 9.895*** 3.160*** 4631.250*** 4631.250*** 
 (0.208) (0.182) (0.143) (93.568) (94.983)  (0.211) (0.183) (0.144) (94.484) (95.048) 
R2 within 0.467 0.169 0.125 0.100 0.060  0.460 0.194 0.145 0.129 0.082 
Observations 512 512 512 512 512  512 512 512 512 512 
Notes. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01. Individual fixed effects regression. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the school level and in parentheses. The pooled sample excluding the 
poorest quintile (in columns 1 to 4) and the richest quintile (in columns 5 to 8) is the base category. The treatment coefficients represent the change in effort between round 2 and round 1. 
Earnings are in UGX. 
